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Preface
F
In August 1976 the Committee on Technology and Inter-
national Economic and Trade Issues examined a number of
technological issues and their relationship to the potential
entrepreneurial vitality of the U.S. economy. The committee was
concerned with:
• Technology and its effect on trade between the United
States and other countries of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD);
• Relationships between technological innovation and U.S.
productivity and competitiveness in world trade; impacts of
technology and trade on U.S. levels of employment;
• Effects of technology transfer on the development of the
less-developed countries (LDCs) and the impact of this transfer on
U.S. trade with these nations; and
• Trade and technology exports in relation to U.S. national
security.
In its 1978 report, Technology, Trade, and the U.S. Economy ,*
the committee concluded that the state of the nation 's compet-
itive position In world trade is a reflection of the health of the
domestic economy. The committee stated that, as a consequence,
the improvement of our position in international trade depends
primarily upon improvement of the domestic economy. The
committee further concluded that one of the major factors
affecting the health of our domestic economy is the state of
industrial innovation. Considerable evidence was presented during
the study to indicate that the innovation process in fh •^ Unite
States is not as vigorous as it once vas. The committee recom-
mended that further work be undertaken to provide a more
*Available from the National Academy Press, 2101 Constitution
Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC 20418.
ix
detailed examination of the U.S. government policies and prac-
tices that may bear on technological Innovation.
The first phase of study based on the original recommenda-
tions resulted in a series of published monographs that addressed
government policies In the following areass
• The International Technology Transfer Process.*
• The Impact of Regulation on Industrial Innovation.*
• The Impact of Tax and Financial Regulatory Policies on
Industrial Innovation.*
• Antitrust, Uncertainty, and Technological Innovation.*
This report on the civil aircraft manufacturing industry Is one
of seven Industry-speclfl - studies, conducted as the second phase
of work by this committee. The other panels set up by the com-
mittee addressed automobiles, electronics, ferrous metals,
machine tools, pharmaceuticals, and fibers, textiles, and apparel.
The objectives of these studies were to (1) Identify ,,Iobal shifts of
industrial technological capacity on a sector-by-sector basis, (2)
relate those shifts In international competitive Industrial
advantage to technological and other factors, and (3) assess
further prospects for technological change and Industrial
development.
As part of these studies, each panel developed (1) a brief
historical description of the industry, (2) an assessment of the
dynamic changes that have occurred and are anticipated in the
next decade, and (3) policy options and scenarios to describe
alternative futures for the idustry. The primary charge to the
panel was to develop a series of policy options for consideration
by public and private poiicymakers.
The methodology of the studies included a series of panel
meetings involving discussion between (1) experts named to the
panel, (2) experts from outside the panel, and (3) govern-
ment age ; ,>, vmd congressional representatives presenting current
gs.,oie-r ,r^',,r'aa; views and deliberations.
The d-- afting work on this report was done by Lowell S. Steele,
formerly of General Electric and now a private consultant.
Bernard Maggin was responsible for assisting Dr. Steele by
providing research and resource assistance as well as assisting in
producing, drafts of report material, based on the panel
deliberations, that were reviewed and critiqued by the panel
member, at their meetings.
*Available from the National Academy of Engineering, 2101
Constitution Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20418.
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zure--in its contribution to trade, its coupling with national
security, and Its symbolism of U.S. technological strength.Consequently, the implications of the change that is occurring are
of national importance.
BACKGROUND
Civil aircraft (including engines and parts) are an Important
component of manufactured durable goods (sales--including
exports of military aircraft--of $17 billion in 1982 represent 1.88
percent of all durables) and a major source of employment for
skilled production workers, sclentlsts, engineers, and technicians.
Large transports are the dominant element in sales of civil
aircraft, and export sales now represent 60 percent of large
transport sales. Exports will become even more important, due to
the more rapid growth of air transport in foreign countries. These
export sales are vital to the economies of scale that help give
cost leadership to the United States.
Aircraft manufacture plays a unique role in national security.
The teams that could help develop design and production tech-
nology for new military aircraft are kept in a state of Increased
readiness by the requirements of the civil market. The competi-
tions and requirements of the civil market stimulate technological
and .product advances that contribute to these associated indus-
tries. The production base is also available in an emergency surge
capacity. This base comprises not only the aircraft companies,
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but also a massive specialized infrastructure of some 15,000 firms
that supply sophisticated components, materials, and equipment.
The U.S. aviation Industry has dominated world markets since
the end of World War 11. This success, of course, was in part a
legacy of the technology and production base created for that
war. Additional factors Includes
• A generally healthy domestic economy that encouraged an
aggressive and effective program of technology development,
aircraft desi n man f t
	 II	 dg ,u ac ure, set v cep an operations.
• A continuing productive relationship among government, the
airlines, and the manufacturer.
• An aggressive effort on the pact of the airlines and air-
craft manufacturers to continually improve surface transporta-
tion, resulting In significant passenger advantages in trip time,
trip cost, and trip safety.
• The resulting rapid growth in domestic and international air
transport.
The history of success began to change in the mid-1970s and
has altered the outlook for the United States in all classes of
aircraft. These changes include the impact of deregulation on
domestic air transport, the emergence of foreign competition,
internationalization of aircraft manufacture, and growing
involvement of foreign governments in the industry.
United States air transport had grown and matured as an
Industry in which regulation of routes and fares encouraged focus
on passenger amenities and political lobbying for routes rather
than on competition in fares and efficiency of operations. Service
to smaller communities was of dower priority, and experimenta-
tion with fares and service to probe customer preferences was
virtually nonexistent.
Deregulation of fares and routes in 1978 has led to greatly
increased competition for routes, the appearance of many new
carriers, and unprecedented competition and diversity in fares and
services. Airlines have responded by seeking to protect or improve
their share in markets where they were strongest by emphasizing
hub-and-spoke feeder systems. Many new commuter airlines have
arisen to serve smaller communities. Evaluation of the effects
depends on the use made of air transport. Many frequent travelers
experience increased' inconvenience in point-to-point service,
deterioration in service in many instances, and chaotic fares on
many routes, but they can also benefit from frequent-traveler
bonuses if they are prepared to accept some inconvenience.
Travelers can also obtain dramatically dower fares on many routes
and in scheduling benefit from lower fares on some flights and
new classes of service on some routes. Service to smaller
2y	 '.W
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communities is mixed--some hav° better service with better
equipment, others have seen it deteriorate or disappear.
It Is clear that competition is creating constant pressure on
fares and that strenuous efforts are being made to re4uce costs
and 'improve operating efficiency. Furthermore, the change In
route strategy is altering the nature of the optimal fleet mix,
with Increased need for somewhat smaller aircraft. A large
global supply of secondhand aircraft Is making It easy for new
entrants to lease equipment or buy it at bargain prices, and to
some extent Is acting as a barrier to the purchase of new aircraft.
The change in competitive envlronment noted above, combined
with a severe recession°, has had a dramatic effect on the finan-
cial performance of the airlines in operation at the time of
regulation. Most have experienced severe losses, balance sheets
have deteriorated, and perhaps most important, forecasting the
future has become much more uncertain. This affects projection
of future equipment needs, return on IInvestment, and security of
the return. Airlines are displaying great variability in their
ability to respond. For example, American Airlines can place a
large order for planes at the same time that Continental and
Braniff are struggling with bankruptcy and Eastern and TINA face
severe cost problems. These changes have, not surprisingly,
reduced demand for new aircraft. They also affect the future
capability of U.S. airlines to serve as launch customers for new
aircraft. Thus, the importance of international markets may grow
because large foreign carriers may play a more important role in
launching new aircraft.
One important effect of deregulation has been to stimulate
the growth of regional airlines. This has in turn stimulated
interest in specialized aircraft to serve these markets--aircraft
that heretofore had not been attractive to U.S. manufacturers.
Thus, demand for cost-effective, smaller transport aircraft
represents a new opportunity.
It is difficult to predict the eventual equilibrium after the
transition to deregulation, but it is likely that a few strong
national carriers will emerge. This panel believes it is important
that evaluation of the results of deregulation include its effect on
the aircraft manufacturers.
Foreign Competition
The European <countries have tried repeatedly to create a
viable air transport manufacturing industry. In 1970 efforts were
rationalized by creating Airbus lndustcie to draw on the resources
of a number of countries and to develop a coordinated worldwide
marketing approach.
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The A300 that resulted from this endeavor Is a technically
proficient aircraft that has begun to achieve market penetration,
reaching a peak of 50 percent of orders for wide-bodied transports
in 1982. Airbus has made clear Its Intention to develop a family of
aircraft that will cover generally all of the large commercial
transport market.
In the United States the situation regarding the manufacture
of other classes of aircraft--rotorcraft, regional transports,
I executive and business aircraft--is ,perceived to be urgent. The
requirements of these types of aircraft are more within the
economic and technical capability of smaller countries. Conse-
quently, for reasons of economic growth, improved foreign trade,
and even prestige, they have been targeted for production by
many countries--e.g., the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain,
Japan, Brazil, Indonesia, and Israel.
In rotorcraft, the U.S. industry produ ^t dine is matched In allj significant classes and sizes by competitive foreign helicopters.
The long practice of developing civil derivatives of military
vehicles Is no longer practical, due to the specialized demands for
military use. U.S. civil helicopter manufacturing must use private
capital to compete with financing granted or guaranteed by
foreign governments. Imports of helicopters have grown from 14
percent in 1979 to 35 percent in 1982.
Regional transports present a difficult situation for U.S.
manufacturers. As noted above, until recently the U.S. commuter
market did not attract the development of specialized aircraft to
serve it. Other countries did have such requirements and had
developed the needed vehicles. With deregulation leading to
increased growth in domestic regional airlines, foreign manufac-
turers are moving to capitalize on this opportunity. U.S. manu-
facturers face a dilemma: their own product lines are not
extensive; the U.S. market is relatively open to competitors while
many foreign markets are closed; and foreign manufacturers--
typically supported in some form by their governments--are
active in the field and frequently have been for many years.
A desire to avoid a U.S. monopoly worldwide has been an
important driving force behind the persistent European effort. It
is important to recognize that this increase in the strength of
foreign competition is not without its benefits for the U.S.
consumer. The demands for capital and for technology develop-
;	 went are such that not even the United States can support many
suppliers of large transports. It would not be in the interest of
the U .S. consumer to have only one domestic supplier--a not
improbable scenario.
iA factor of more immediate benefit to the U .S. economy Is
f	 the large U.S. content in foreign-manufactured aircraft--even the
A300. For example, engines, controls, and a wide variety of
rR
Sspecialized materials and components for most foreign-built air-
craft are purchased from U.S. suppliers because economies of
scale will not justify local manufacture or because local capacities
are Inadequate. All of these exports, of course, strengthen U.S.
trade and provide domestic employment. This circumstance will
not persist without aggressive efforts by U.S. manufacturers to
maintain leadership because foreign manufacturers continue to
seek ways to Increase local content; thus the U.S. content Is
diminishing. Despite the widespread concern over the strength of
the U.S. dollar as an Impediment to exports, this concern does not
appear to be applicable to the export of large transports. Airbus
Is regarded as certain to compensate for changes in the rate of
exchange Irrespective of which way it goes. The large U.S.
content also exerts a buffering Influence. A strong dollar
Increases the cost of the U.S. content but reduces pressure on
European content and vice versa.
Growing Importance of International Markets
The size and dynamism of the domestic air transport industry
that fostered U.S. leadership In aircraft began to change--at least
relatively--In the 1970s. The U.S. market grew more slowly , (5
percent vs. 9 percent worldwide), and U.S. passenger-miles
dropped from 57.5 percent of the free world to 40 percent.
Although U.S. manufacturers have always excelled at interpreting
the needs of foreign customers, they will have to be even more
sensitive in the future. Most foreign airlines are government-
owned or -supported. Consequently, purchase of aircraft is often
a politicized process that essentially requires approval of, if not
negotiation with, governments. The developing countries repre-
sent the area of most rapid projected growth in air transport, but
they also experience the most difficulty in arranging financing.
Consequently, U.S. manufacturers face increasing pressure to help
finance the purchase of aircraft. This trend will increase their
requirements for raising capital, enlarge their financial exposure
to risk, and bring them into confrontation with foreign govern-
ments that use financing terms and other government-to-
government trade factors as a competitive weapon in the
marketplace.
Internationalization of Aircraft Manufacture
The manufacture of aircraft and engines is becoming
increasingly internationalized. The growing capital requirements,
increased risk, and greater technical complexity associated with
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aircraft manufacture create pressures to form partnerships. Per-
haps more Important, the desire of many countries to participate
In the Industry leads them to use access to their domestic markets
as a lever to Increase their participation In the Industry. These
arrangements, of course, encourage a two-way flow In technology
from which U.S. manufacturers can benefit to some extent.
The formation of such International partnerships Is the subject
of controversy, and the relative merits are not easily judged. One
must balance denial of access to a market against at least partial
access, but with the risk that one may be accelerating the devel-
opment of technical competence by a potential competitor.
The eventual outcome depends largely on maintaining momen-
tum in long-range domestic aeronautical R&D' and the Incor-
poration of advanced technology in new designs. The panel
believes that a healthy, effective domestic technology develop-
► nent program Is the best possible foundation for maintaining
competitive leadership.
Financial Performance of the Industry
Manufacture of large commercial transports is a long-term
endeavor that involves committing huge amounts of capital in the
face of great market uncertainty. Developing a wholly new air-
craft requires four to six years and a $4 to $5 billion investment.
Even for a sus: ceosful venture, return of investment will typically
require at least 10 to 15 years.
The great market success of U.S. manufacturers and the long
record of technological leadership have not led to outstanding
financial performance. The aerospace Industry (separate data on
civil aircraft are not available on a current basis) has a return on
sales and on assets below the average for all manufacturing.
Anecdotal data on Individual aircraft are even more discouraging.
At most, 3 out of 22 commercial jet transports introduced world-
wide are thought to have been profitable. Thus, with the changes
now confrunting the industry, management faces a great
challenge.
COMPETITIVE ASSESSMENT OF TECHNOLOGY
Translating advanced technology Into products suited to the
marketplace has been a major factor In the success of U.S.
aircraft manufacturers. As competition Intensifles, the tinning of
the Introduction and the fit of the product to the customer's need
become Increasingly Important.
Introduction of advanced turboprops or propfans could provide up
to 20 percent additional Improvement, and the experimental
unducted propfan engine could raise this figure.
Aeronautical technology is conventionally categorized Into
seven major areas: design techniques, aerodynamics, flight
controls, structures, airframe-propulsion Integration, avionics,
and propulsion.
Design Techniques
High-speed computers make possible the use of sophisticated
computational analysis that reduces dependence on empiricism
and experiment. This technology is applicable to all classes of
aircraft. The United States is thought to have a slight lead over
Europe (and probably a larger lead over Japan) at this time.
Nevertheless, European efforts are very good, as shown by the
aerodynamic efficiency of the A300 and A310. Japanese strength
in electronics provided the foundation for Japan to develop
greater capability.
Computer-aided design and computer-aided manufacture
(CAD/CAM) permits rapid and effective evaluation of many
different designs and allows selected designs to flow directly to
manufacturing. The combination of these two technologies
permits development of Snore effective designs at lower cost,
with fewer errors and less lead time. CAD/CAM was pioneered in
the United States but has been adopted rapidly in Europe (Airbus
Industrie) and Japan. The hardware and software for CAD/CAM
are rapidly diffused throughout the free world, and foreign manu-
facturers can be expected to stay competitive in this technology.
Aerodynamics
Improved understanding of the laminar-to-turbulent-flow
transition and development of methods to delay the transition can
lead to improved aerodynamic efficiency for cruise conditions.
The United States is thought to be far ahead,,in boundary layer
management, but the Unted States and Europe are generally
comparable in wing design. For example, the Airbus A310 wing
Incorporates the latest in high-lift systems to provide excellent
takeoff and landing performance.
i
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Flight Controls
Active control systems to Improve aircraft stability can pro.-
vide reductions In drag and weight. Active controls to alleviate
stress from wind gusts or maneuvering also offer opportunities tc.
reduce weight or alternatively Increase wing aspect ratio and thus
reduce drag. U.S. manufacturers and Airbus appe pr to be approxi-
mately equal in both of these fields.
Advanced Structures
i New high strength-to-welght alloys and new superplastically
formed metals offer significant potential for saving weight. The
United States and Europe are regarded as on a par in technology,
but the U.S. leads In application experience with new alloys. This
lead enables us to project longer 0°economic life" at this stage of
application.
Composite materials offer the greatest opportunity in air-
frame materials. They offer high stiffness and extremely light
weight. long-term benefits could be a 15 to 20 percent reduction
in total structural weight, a 7 to 15 percent improvement In fuel
efficiency, and a resulting 4 to 8 percent reduction in direct
operating cost--the latter is more uncertain because manufactur-
Ing costs for composites and future fuel costs are very uncertain.
European R&D efforts are extensive and continue to acceler-
ate. Aerospatiale has an aggressive program for progressive
introduction of composite components on the A300 and the A310
as well as on helicopters and smaller aircraft. The A320 will
incorporate still more extensive applications. The United States
also is active, but the present NASA program calls for a six-year
effort to develop design data for fuselages. Given the moderate
pace of the current NASA program and the budget pressures It is
encountering, the U .S. position in this very Important technology
could be threatened.
Propulsion integration
This technology is regarded as relatively mature for conven-
tional turbofans, and the United States and Great Britain are
regarded as equal in nacelle design. propulsion integration
becomes crucial for the high-speed turboprops or propfans that
are widely regarded as offering great promise for improved
efficiency in smaller transport aircraft. The development of
advanced propellers and their gearboxes is central to progress in
this field. It Is known that the European companies are active,
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Zand It would appear that the United States and Europe are about
on the same trajectory for applying this technology.
s
Avionics i
Advances In microcircuitry will permit the development of the
ultrareliable, fault-tolerant electronic systems that are vital to
Implementation of active flight controls and computer-Integrated
	
Ili
flight management systems. Estimates of projected resultin6	 {
Improvements in fuel efficiency and weight reduction show con-
siderable spread, but improvement In fuel efficiency could be up
to 20 percent and weight reduction as much as 10 percent.
Reduction In operating cost Is projected to be 5 to 10 percent.
Much of the historical electronics/avionics capability In
commercial transports Is a by-product of military technology. In
military avionics the United States leads the world, and as long as
we retain the close coupling between civil and military avionics
technology, it is doubtful whether the United States will be over-
taken in the broad field of avionics. It Is Important to note,
however, that the Japanese have already developed advanced
cockpit-display technology and that they have the development
capability and the potentially lower costs to challenge U.S.
leadership, given the opportunity.
Propulsion
The principal foreign competitor in jet engines is Rolls Royce,
which has near parity in thrust and specific fuel consumption, but
lags in thrust-to-weight ratio and turbine temperature. Rolls
Royce has mounted an extensive program to overcome Its defi-
ciencies in turbine temperature and will likely have achieved
parity--at least in application to engines--by the mid4980s.
Overall, the United States has a lead In propulsion technology,
but it is not unassailable. Furthermore, Great Britain has demon-
strated a commitment to maintain a viable presence--a position
actively encouraged by her European partners.
Faclities
Aeronautical R&D requires massive and expensive facilities
for test, experiment, and simulation. U.S. facilities are thought
to be the best in the world; however, European facilities are such
that effort is not handicapped. At this stage, Japan Is seriously
handicapped by the lack of such facilities and by the absence of a
manufacturing industry to benefit from the technology.
10'
KEY CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Growing Involvement of Governments In Trade
. . -I growing Involvement of governments in both manufacture
and sale of aircraft on the one hand and purchase on the other has
important Implications for competition and trade. The calcula-
tion of costs and benefits by governments is based on broader and
more diffuse criteria than is possible for a private company: the
time periods for judging results and paybacks are longer, and
investments can be sustained for longer periods of time without
necessarily ever achieving commercial success.
In this context, the several agreements establishing rues for
trade In civil aircraft assume great significance, especially
regarding subsidies. This issue Is especially complex in the case of
aircraft because virtually every developed country, including the
United States, has a long history of close government-industry
relationships. Despite their limitations, negotiations under the
terms of previously agreed trade standards are the only generally
accepted vehicle for addressing problems of trade policy. The
United States has little choice except to pursue them vigorously.
Sales of aircraft are particularly difficult to deal with in this
framework because purchases tend to be made Infrequently,
individual orders are large, and obtaining initial orders gives high
leverage for follow-on orders.
Three aspects of trade administration warrant attention:
1. Adequacy of resources and political resolve to support mon-
itoring of trade behavior and to support negotiations in specific
transactions, when it is called for, are crucial. Recent steps to
strengthen U.S. capability are hig;,t commendable, and it is
important that they be sustained in th ,, =jture.
2. Effective government-industry interaction with respect to
the smaller transactions characteristic of sales of helicopters and
regional aircraft is increasingly important. Neither the govern-
ment nor the companies involved have had much experience in
such relationships, and it is important for them to be developed.
3. A more flexible and timely response is needed for govern-
ment action to counteract trade arrangements that constitute
unfair practices. Options could Include temporary measures such
as denial of investment tax credit on the non-U.S. labor content
of imported aircraft, closer coordination of military development
and industrial need, and more aggressive, export finance policies.
These measures must be invoked with great care because they
invite retaliation, typically where other governments feel they
have greatest leverage (not necessarily in the same industry), anrJ
they also risk escalation into destructive trade wars.
w-w
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subsequent ones in which the panel will advocate strengthening
the U.S. posture, the changes will redound to the benefit of many
industries-.not just aircraft manufacture.
The panel endorses the recent action in the U.S. Ge artment
of Commerce to Provide focused attention on the aircraft manu-
to
more vigorous data
d
forces
Export Credit Financing
Agreements on financing have proved somewhat elusive
because of the resolve of foreign governments to establish a
viable presence in aircraft manufacture. A "standstill' agreement
in 1975 set a maximum of 10 years for repayment--a period much
shorter than the life of the aircraft, and one that denied the
United States the advantage of its strong long-term capital mar-
ket, but set no minimum interest. A subsequent "commonline"
agreement established a minimum interest rate for large trans-
port aircraft.
The Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) currently emplo ys terms
and conditions similar to those of other lenders for larg_ Arcraft,
with one important exception: it imposes a 2 percent application
fee that enlarges the "up front" payment. In the case of develop-
ing countries--a market of growing importance--Eximbank
employs more rigorous criteria to evaluate "a reasonable assur-
ance of repayment" than many foreign competitors face with
or
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their financing agencies. Inconsistency In the application of
Eximbank policy has made it difficult for foreign customers to
I	 plan purchases and financing. Both of these conditions handicap
U.S. manufacturers because purchasers have long memories.'
The combination of weakened domestic customers, growing
reluctance of traditional lenders to provide funds under conven-
tional arrangements, and uncertain financing from Eximbank has
forced aircraft manufacturers to Invent new forms of financing.
Creative extensions of operating-lease arrangements (leveraged
leasing), which make provision for buy-back coupled with transfer
I	 of the Investment tax credit (ITC) to the lessor, point the way to 	 I
-	 the trend of the future. U.S. manufacturers have demonstrated
ingenuity and a willingness to take risks that are commendable.
This emerging trend does Increase their financial exposure and
reflects a need for still further development of financial 	 ,r
Instruments (and even new Institutions) that can spread risk
adequately.	 {
The growing importance of foreign markets means that
restrictions on Investment tax credit to foreign operators could
have a detrimental effect on U.S. aircraft manufacturers.
The panel recommends consideration of additional measures
that would ena eeaircr ftmanu acturers to s rea t e r`issl n
leasing aircraft to domestic and foreliE customers.
The p2nel recommends that Eximbank reexamine its Anode of{ operation and lending roles In the light of the helghtene7
`	 International competition facing all of U.S. industry. This report
suggests, sev :cal specific areas warranting attention to ensure
r> that Eximbank is consistent, effective, and responsive to
competit ve realities.	 {
(I
Smaller Aircraft	 6,
Since smaller aircraft are typically sold to customers with
very limited capability to finance purchases, financial 'terms can
be a powerful competitive weapon. This weapon is being used
aggressively by foreign competitors.
It is important for Eximbank to review its procedures for their
appropriateness in the light of the heightened competition U.S.
manufacturers are facing. Equally important, Eximbank should
seek consistency in its approach and its priorities so that U.S.
companies can propose financing terms with greater confidence. 	 ;.
The aanel endorses and recommends continuation of the recent..d;
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International Trade, Technology Transfer,
National Security, and Diplomacy
Trade, technology transfer as part of trade, and national
security Interests Interact In complex ways that laffect the U.S.economy and
	 Its position in
	 the International
	 marketplace.
Control of the export of technology in the Interest of national
security is unquestionably a legitimate responsibility of
	 thegovernment.
	 The 'task requires balancing national security or
foreign policy objectives with those of strengthening the U.S.
economy and preserving the U.S. position In advanced technology.
The balancing process inevitably creates apparent Incon-
sistencies and Indecisiveness that are in themselves detrimental
to trade because they tend to cast a shadow over the reliability of
U.S. manufacturers as sources of supply. f
In policy deliberations it Is Important for realistic attention to j
be given to assessing the true effectiveness of any proposed
restraints, the availability of alternatives, the potential near- and
long-term damage to U.S. firms and to the economy, and the
opportunities
	 for	 retaliatory action by
	 the
	 countries
	 beingtargeted.
National security and foreign policy have powerful advocates
within the government.
	 Commercial Interests are less easily
represented because they are diffuse and not well articulated.
Furthermore, in the sphere of International trade it is apparent
that the U.S. government places a higher priority on national
security versus commerce than do the governments of our trading
competitors.
Licensing and coproduction have been important elements of
mutual security arrangements for many years. These agreements
heighten the sense of partnership, broaden the defense industrial
base, and reduce drain on local currencies. NATO allies have
insisted on broadening the base of these
1
agreements, and they
have no doubt become a vehicle for transfer of both production
and design technology. The Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) a
under which these exchanges occur seek a balancing quid pro quo,
but the subject matter may be far afield from commerce. Indus-
try spokesmen have felt that MOUs are negotiated with insuffi-
cient input from industry.
	 The U.S. Department of Defense xr^(DOD) is perceived as being very sensitive to possible loss of
critical technology through commercial channels, but much less :...
a,
r
^i
concerned over the possible adverse commercial implications of
military agreements for coproduction.
The panel believes it is important for policy deliberations in
this area to reflect the changing circumstances of the United
States in balancing security and trade, ,i.e., allies are much
stronger economically and represent a growing competitive
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threat, the technological positions are much closer to parity,
International markets are increasingly Important to U.S. manu-
facturers, and aircraft manufacture Itself Is becoming
increasingly Internationalized.
In the light of these complexities, the panel recommends that
mechanisms be developed that will ensure an effective in ustria
In
 u^he deliberations on coproduction a reements and that
ue weig i e ven o e cane in competitive status  an re a-
tive technological position of U.. Industry In reaching decisions.
Achieving Synergy Between
National Security and Civil Aviation
a
The valuable cosipling between national defense and civil air-
craft manufacture was noted earlier. Despite the differing
requirements for civil and military aircraft, much of the tech-
nology base, much of the supplier base, and many of the skills and
processes used are common. Historically, civil aircraft have
benefited from military technological advances in both airframes
and propulsion. IIncreasingly, a reverse flow has been important,
e.g., improved fuel efficiency, flight management systems, and
composite structures.
DOD Is now supporting the launch of far fewer aircraft.
Traditionally, DOD has focused its attention on combat aircraft
and has used off-the-shelf technology for support aircraft. Where
is at present no policy or mechanism for integrating military
needs and potential civil programs in cases where mutual benefit
would+ result, e.g., advanced structures, understanding and con-
trolling behavior and use of materials, and new manufacturing
techniques.
A related benefit could result from better management of the
timing of procurement. The recurring "wild” fluctuations magnify
problems of employment instability and, even more, of preserving
the key deve:4opment and production teams on which the entire
infrastructure rests. The panel recognizes the practical difficul-
ties in achieving the goal of a mix of civil and military aircraft
procurement thatwould smooth employment. However, in the
emerging competitive climate this goal assumes greater urgency.
It should be noted that foreign governments , commonly encourage
development and production of domestic civil aircraft through
government-directed purchases of these aircraft by the domestic
military establishment.
j
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dual-use capabilities In technology development for design,
manufacture and certification.
he pane recommen s that DOD and Industry seek to
strengthen Coordinated —planning for aircraft rocurement so as to
re ice as ar as ract ca e
	 t ont e real cycl ca ty n pro ucthat disrupts the Industry.
f	 Maintaining Momentum In R&D
The bedrock of U.S. leadership In civil aircraft is technology—
its development and incorporation Into new designs. That leader-
ship need not be threatened provided that the U.S. maintains a
vigorous program of research and development. The National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Is the focal point
,. of aeronautical R&D for both civil and military applications. The
high cost of RECD and the massive facilities required for aero-
nautical R&Danrecludee	 p	 y private enterprise from performing' NASA 's central role.
It is apparent that the space programs dominate the NASA
effort--aeronautical R&D represents approximately 3 percent ofNASA 's total R&D budget. It is difficult to compare directly the
effort of the United States with the aggregate of its competitors;
however, they are approximately equal for generic R&D. In
addition, however, in Europe and elsewhere specific competing
products are also developed with public funds, and the technical
performance of the equipment indicates that it rests on a sollo
base of technology. The panel questions the present priorities of
NASA resource allocations-
-given the economic and social impor-
tance of civil aviation and the altered competitive position of
U.S. aircraft manufacturers.
Technology validation represents another area of concern.NASA 's charter permits work In basic research on new principles,
configurations, and structures. The charter also permits the next
phase, which involves technology validation with hear full-scale
systems under representative flight or other simulated operating
conditions. Technology validation is expensive, time-consuming,
and risky and must establish irrefutable proof in order' to meet
certification and legal liability standards. As a matter of prac-
tice, technology validation work receives limited support from
NASA, and adequate funds are not available to do more at pres-
ent. 'thus, a serious gap exists in the total process of developing
and applying new technology.
The nanal .o.•...,...e...c. _-- -- ---^
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rnecnannsms to ensure that areas selected for additional effort are
relevant to the needs of industry and that the results can be
applied with confidence.
Managing in the New Environment
The mana&rs of aircraft companies face an array of threaten-
ing changes, e.g,, weakened domestic customers, increased for-
eign competition, pressure to internationalize manufacture, esca-
lating financial risk, need for capital, etc.
Four challenges warrant special mention:
1. Managing technological innovation to retain product leader-'
ship in the face of escalating costs for developing and validating
new technology and growing uncertainty over market require-
ments and customer liability.
2. Developing new financial Instruments and procedures that
will help weakened customers purchase aircraft without undue
	
h'<
exposure for the manufacturer. IIronically, innovative financing Is
becoming as Important as innovative technology for this
high-technology industry.
3. Learning to move from a position of global dominance to
senior partnership with companies that have Tong chafed at the
junior position In which U.S. dominance has placed them.4. Developing the strategies for selective technological
leadership that will permit overall systems leadership in a world
where total leadership in technology is no longer practical.
Achieving a lead position in an interdependent world' will call for
wisdom and vision of a high order.
Managing !.Human Resources
Aircraft manufacture is highly cyclical. The concomitant
instability In employment Is compounded by technological obsoies-
cenr^-p
 that continually requires radically different skills. °thus,
unstable employment affects professional, technical# and produc-
tion workers. The assemblage of skills, and working relationships
in the aircraft manufacturing complex is a priceless national asset
that must be ,preserved.
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Overview of the U.S. Civil Aviation
Manufacturing Industry
The civil aviation Industry, Including both manufacturers of
aircraft and the commercial airlinesp Is In the midst of ,
 profound
change. Some features of the change result from domestic actions
and circumstances (for example #
 economic deregulation of air
transport and the severe
	 1980-1981	 recession)p	 others	 from
external developments (such as viable competition from Airbus
Industrie In the large transport sector and erosion of U.S. Industry
leadership In International sales of civil helicoptersp commuter
aircraftp and business aircraft).
	 The long-term implications of
these changes are by no means clear. What Is clear Is that the
stakes are of national Importance because civil aviation is
unique. Few other industries combine In as large a measure a
crucial role In national securityp a major contribution to national
economic health and foreign trade, and a flagship role in the
global posture of technical leadership accorled the United States.
This study focuses an aircraft manufacturep but Its connection
with civil air transport Is so close that some current and prospec-
tive features of the latter must be included. Full assessment also
requires examination of the relationship of civil Industry to mill-
tary activity.
The civil aviation manufacturing industry can be divided Into
two broad categories.
	 One comprises large aircraft and theirpartst
 jet enginest
 and avionics and support equipment used in
national and International air transport.
	 The other Is more
heterogeneous--including rotorcrafto regional transportp business
aircrafto and light piston aircraft and their partsp avlonicsp and
engines.
	 This study covers both categories and notes where
findings and recommendations do not apply to both.
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1971	 2,984
0,100
2,$94 4Y69 3393211972	 3,308 2,660 90 5S8
1973
	 4,665 3,718 121 8261974
	 5,091 3,993 189 9091975	 5,086 3,779 274 1,033r	 1976
	 4,592: 3,078 285 1,2291977	 4,451 642,9 251 11551
1978
	 6,458 4,308 328 1,8221979	 10,644 8,030 403 2,2111980	 13,058 9,895 656 2,5071981
	 13,223 9,706 997 2,9201982	 8,610 6,246 365 1999,
SOURCE A.
 Industries Association of America, Inc.,
Aerospace Facts and Figures, 1983/1984,P. 34.
THE INDUSTRY AND ITS IMPORTANCE TO THE ECONOMY
The civil aviation manufacturing industry is a major compo-
nent of the aerospace industry, which in turn is one of our largest
and most technology-intensive industries. R&D expenditures,
including both company and government funds, for aerospace (the
only segment for which the National Science Foundation provides
R&D to sales data), represent 15.4 pe: cent of sales compared with3.3 percent for all manufacturing.
Shipments of large transports, helicopters, and general avia-
tion aircraft are shown in Table 1-1. The variability of output for
a major capital expenditure such as aircraft is reflected in the
figures. Even within manufactured durable goods, commercial
sales of aircraft (including exports of military aircraft) vary from
just over l percent to more than 2 percent (Table 1-2). Although
transport aircraft represent the dominant factor in the industry,
sales of helicopters and general aviation have been growing more
rapidly, as also shown in 'Fable 1-1.
The industry is an important source of employment for both
skilled production workers and for highl y
 trained scientists and
en sneers, who represent 16 percent of the work force (Table.
1-3). Again, the highly cyclical nature of the industry is reflected
in the wide swings in employment. The employment data in Table1'-3 are conservative in that they include only estimates of aero-
I1
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1971 1,077.6 671.1 359.7 5,079 1.40
1972 1,185.9 756.5 408.5 5,199 1.27
1973 1,326.4 875.4 476.4 6,739 1.41
1974 1,434.2 1,017.9 531.0 7,560 1.42
	 j
1975 1 549 2 10394 $241 7 797 148
1976 1,718.0 1,185.7 608.4 7,622 1.25
1977 1,918.0 1,330.1 696.1 7,530 1;08
1978 2,163.9 1,496.6 798.1 10,581 1.32
1979 2,417.8 1,727.3 909.6 16,023 1.76
1980 2,633.1 4,845.9 936.0 20,097 2.15
1981 2,937.7 1,994.6 1,001.0 21,527 2.15
1982 3,059.3 1,886.0 918.2 17,338 1.88
SOURCE: Survey of Current Business, U.S. Department of Commerce, Aerospace In-
dustries Association of America, Inc., Aerospace Facts and Figures, 1983/1984, p. 30.
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space-related employment in communicatlons, Instruments, and
selected other industries at the 2-digit Standard industrial
Classification (SIC) level. Data on the massive 15,000-firm
infrastructure that supports the industry are unobtainable.
Foreign sales are increasingly important to the industry,
representing approximately 60 percent of large transport sales, 50
percent of rotorcraft, and 25 percent of general aviation. U.S.
exports of large transports represent approximately two-thirds of
total sales in the rest of the world. Civil aircraft play a major
role in foreign trade, representing 4.2 percent to 7.1 percent of
total merchandise exports since 1970 (Table 1 -4)--highest of all
export categories. Although the percentages vary, they seem to
represent a relatively stable portion of the total. Even thouh
imports of aircraft appear to have escalated dramatically in
1981-82, they are modest compared with exports (Tables 1-5a and
1-5b). Figure 1-1 shows the growth of imports since 1970 for large
transports, 'helicopters, and general aviation aircraft. The
increase in imports is troublesome, but year -to-year variations
can be large and no conclusions can yet be drawn about trends
with respect to large transports. The situation in helicopters and
general aviation is quite different. As can be seen in Table 1-5a,
penetration of imports is escalating rapidly.
Exports of transports are a major part of total aircraft exports.
The great importance of the extensive fleet of U.S.-built aircraft
operated by foreign airlines is reflected In the large sales of
aircraft and engine parts (Table 1-5b).
This U.S. export trade contributes significantly to the strength
and cost-effectiveness of the U.S. aerospace manufacturing Indus-
try. A loss In foreign trade can have significant Impact on U.S.jobs and the economy. It has been estimated that every $1 billion
increase in aircraft exports could provide the equivalent of 16,490
direct and Indirect full-time job-years per year in the 1982 to 1990
period. Of this number, 4,910 persons would be employed directly
in the aircraft industry. In addition to the $1 billion In sales,
follow-on orders of aircraft and spares would provide estimated
	
P
sales totaling $6.5 billion In the 1982 to 1990 period.`
ECONOMICS OF THE INDUSTRY
The manufacture of civilian aircraft, especially large com
-
mercial transports, Is a long-terns, high-risk, multibillion-dollar
venture. The lead times required are on the order of four years
for the aircraft and sixyears for the jet engine to power It. Since
the expected life of the aircraft in the manufacturer's product
line is approximately 15 years, the market at which the product Is
aimed may be 5 to 20 years in the future, I.e. $
 long after the key
product decisions are made. Only very gross data on economic
	 {
growth, air travel, and cost of capital and fuel are available.' ti '
Estimates contain huge amounts of uncertainty. Nevertheless,
the aircraft manufacturer must risk $2 to $5 'billion with she high
probability that even a successful venture will not 'break even in
terms of cash flow for at least 10 to 15 years. The jet engine
4.
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TABLE 14	 U.S. Exports of Civil Aircraft, 1970-1983 (millions of dollars)
Percent ofTotal Other Civil Total Total
Merchandise	 Transport Aircraft and Civil Aircraft Merchandise
You Exports	 Aircraft Products and Products Exports
1970 42,590	 1,283 1,233 2,S16 S.9
1971 43,492	 1,567 1,513 3,080 7.1
1972 48,959	 1'1 t9 1,835 2,954 6.0
1973 70,246
	
1,664 2,124 3,788 5.4
1974 97,144	 2,655 2,618 5,273 3.4
1975 106,561	 2,397 2,927 5,824 S.0
1976 113,666	 2,468 3,209 5,677 5.0
1977 119,006	 1,936 3,113 5,049 4.2
1978 141,228	 2,538 3,460 6,018 4.3
1979 178,798	 4,998 4,774 9,772 5.S
1980 216,672	 6,727 6,521 13,248 6.1
1981 228,961	 7,180 6,132 13,312 5.8
1982 207,IS8	 3,834 5,774 9,608 4.6
1983 195,969	 4,683 5,912 10,595 5.4
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, "U.S. Exports, Schedule B, Commodity by
Country; Highlights of U.S. Export & Import Trade."
manufacturer must Invest an additional $1.5 to $2 billion with his
return being dependent on the success of the aircraft.
The financial record of commercial transport manufacturers
since World War 11 Is not reassuring. Only 5 of 22 manufacturers
of large transports survive in the free world, and the viability of
some of them is questionable. Furthermore, the profitability is
below the average for all of manufacturing. The industry Is
subject to major swings In sales, employment, and earnings that
create great difficulty in building and maintaining competitive
development, design, and production teams.
TECHNOLOGY BASE
The technologies that underlie U.S. leadership in aircraft
manufacture play a critical role in the total constellation of our
technological leadership. These technologies include not only the
more obvious ones that affect aircraft performance--aero-
dynamics, propulsion, advanced structure 3, and avionics and
control-but also system Integration in the design and manu-
facture of complex, high-performance equipment; project
management to meet demanding targets for performance, cost,
and delivery; sophisticated manufacturing techniques for fabrica-
tion, testingi and assembly; and computer-integrated manufac-
ture, factory automation, and large-scale integrated Information
processing. Strength in these technologies diffuses throughout
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FIGURE 1-I Imports of Civil Aircraft as Percentage of U.S.
Consumption (U.S. production minus exports, plus Imports).
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce.
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TABLE 1-Sa	 U.S. Civil Aircraft Imports, 1978-1983 (millions of dollars) ++"
1978
	
1979	 1980	 1981 1982 1983
Civil aircraft total 	 284.5	 $08.6	 969.1	 1,336.2 1,266.0 892.2	 !'
Transports	 58.1	 199.8	 285.5	 195.5 231.4 188.0
General aviation 	 146.8	 260.4	 495.8	 913.0 837.7 541.9
Helicopters	 28.0	 21.6	 53.9	 105.4 84.9 89.S
Other	 51.6	 25.8	 133.9	 122.3 112.0 72.8
Civil aircraft
j Engines and parts 	 —	 —	 534.7	 1,407.3 1,255.9 1,074.0 j
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Schedule B. Commodity by Country.
TABLE 1-Sb	 U.S. Civil Aircraft Exports, 1978-1983 (millions of dollars)
1978	 1979	 1980	 1981 1982 1983 1.
Civil aircraft total 	 6,018	 9,772	 13,248	 13,312 9,608 10,598
Transports	 2,SS8	 4,998	 6,727	 7,180 3,839 4,683
General aviation	 496
	
650	 739	 790 517 356	
f
Helicopters	 IS6	 207	 299	 346 206 232
Other	 277	 875	 SS6	 784 783 420
Civil aircraft
Engines and parts	 2,116	 3,220	 4,436	 3,915 3,997 3,9S4
S SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Schedule B, Commodity by Country.
m
'.	 industry and contributes substantially to the overall strength and
Ij competitiveness of the U.S. economy. Furthermore, the experi-
ence gained from operating and maintaining a large, heterogene-
ous, intensively utilized commercial air fleet In itself constitutes
a valuable technological resource that contributes to the national
economy and security. These are some of the very reasons that
foreign governments, both developed and developing, have tall
geted aviation as an important component of more general
j	 economic development programs:
CONTRIBUTION : OF THE INDUSTRY
I	 TO NATIONAL SECURITY
1 A recent U.S. Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)
study highlighted the importance of aeronautics to national
security.' Among the key findings of the study were the following:
• The United States depends heavily on technical superiority
of military aircraft for national defense--approximately one-third
a	 of the Department of Defense (DOD) budget is for procurement,
maintenance, and operation of aeronautical systems.
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A healthyp competitive civil aeronautics manufacturing
Industry reduces the cost of providing un essential military-
Industrial base and wartime mobilization surge capacity.
The contribution of civil aircraft manufacture to the military-
Industrial base Is provided principally In two ways. 	 Firstp the
teams that could develop and apply new design and production
technology to new military aircraft are kept In a high state of
readiness by the continuing requirements of the civil market
which in normal times accounts for some 80 percent of the total
production	 weight	 of	 aircraft	 produced.	 The	 design	 and
production techniques and systems developed in civil operations
can bet and areq transferred to the defense sec'doro
Second, the massive production base that Is marshalled to
manufacture civil aircraft Is available as a 	 wartime	 surge
capacity.	 The many diverse Items needed to manufacture a
modern jetliner Involve contributions from some 15 9000 com-
ponents manufacturers and materials suppliers. The Items range
from complex subassemblies and engines to avionics, electrical
equipment, hydraulic and mf-chanical equipment and interiors, to
nuts, boltsv and rivets. The sk ; "	 and equipment needed are easily
adapted to the production of 	 -ry aircraft.
Military requirements for ntw aircraft would not In them-
selves provide a sufficiently stable load to maintain the design
and production teams in an adequate state of readiness for
emergencies.	 The deterioration or disbanding of these teams
would represent a strategic loss that would not quickly be
repalredp no matter how serious the emergency. in addition t the
cost benefits that come from shared overhead would be lost.
These teams Include not only the most visible top layer of sclen-
tists and engineers associated with design, but also thousands of
skilled design, development, and production specialists working on :A
such things as the development and production of componentst
sophisticated materials, advanced propulsion systemsp electronics,
controlsp communicationsp and machine tools, as well as tens of
thousands of skilled production workers.	 This vast network
remains viable only if it is constantly challenged and employed.
Civil aircraft manufacture provides the base load of work for this
network.	 Civil aviation manufacturing also provides avallablep
off-the-shelf aircraft for mission support for U.S. defense.
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would otherwise be Incurred In expanding capacity In an
emergency*
If this development and production Infrastructure deterlor-
ates—as It Inevitably will If the U.S. aircraft Industry (or Its civil
customer base) Is not financially healthy--the defense establish.
meat will undoubtedly do whatever Is necessary to help maintain
the Industry at an adequate level. Consequently, It Is In the vital
Interest of the United Statea, to ensure a healthy aircraft Industry
and v^ achieve effective coupling between defense and civil plans
and programs where there is opportunity to benefit from such
coupling. (Needless to say, our NATO partners also benefit from
a healthy U.S. aircraft manufacturing Industry.)
Rotorcraft represent a special case. Civil helicopters have
been principally derivatives of aircraft developed for military
use. But new third-generatior. U.S. military helicopter develop-
ments have not yielded airce;,ift suitable for civil certification and
commercial use. DOD ha:; In general recognized the values of
commonality with commercial products in providing Increased
economies of scale and logistics, but Its helicopter commonality
P01 mIcy has not considered the additional values that derive from
inclusion of civil-certificated derivatives of military helicopters.
New military requirements have created such specialized aircraft
that they have limited commercial attractiveness to the market.
REASONS FOR PAST SUCCESS OF THE INDUSTRY
The U.S. aviation industry has dominated world markets since
the end of World War 11. It is important to understand the reasons
for this success before examining some of the trends that are now
generating concern. Part of the success results from the large-
scale technology and production resource created for World War
11. Additional powerful factors that have been decisive in estab-
lishing ant! maintaining U.S. dominance are: (a) a productive,
decades-long relationship among the government, the major
airlines, and the aircraft manufacturers in the context of a free
market economy; (b) a combination of economic and geographical
considerations in the United States that has favored air transport
over other modes of transportation; (c) the size, diversityp and
rapid growth of the U.S. air transport industry that provided a
major domestic market; (d) an aggressive t effective program of
technology development combined with an advanced, productive
aircraft design and manufacture capability that received con-
tinuing infusions of resources; and (e) a system of product support
that earned customer loyalty. These factors and relationships,
including the productive linking of government to manufacturers
and airlinesv began as early as World War 1. The National
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Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) at its Langley
Center, the Army at Wright Field, and the Navy Bureau of Aero-
nautics established the basic foundation for aeronautical and
propulsion technology. The U.S. Post Office contributed signifl-
cantly by establishing transcontinental airmail service via lighted
airways in 1924, and the Kelly Bill In 1925 encouvaged private
Investment in air mail contracts.
s,'1
	 modern structure of the Industry began to emerge In 1934,
wit,	 !ie separation of airlines from manufacturers by government
fiat to Increase competition and Industry development.
	 Direct
subsidies to promote passenger travel, economic regulation of
airlines, air traffic control, and &,4fety authority were fully codi-
fied in the 1938 legislatio►
 - establ"iling the Civil Aviation Adminis-
tration (CAA) within the U.S. Department of Commerce.
	
The
functions of the CAA were divided in 1948.
	
Two separate
agencies, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), and the Federal
R Aviation Administration (FAA) were established. The CAB was
ass; ned to handle route and economic matters (economic regula-
tionf. The FAA was charged with technical, safety, and certifica-
tion matters. Both were charged %with encovn4gong the %xpanslonY,
of the Industry. The combination of the NACA, Arm y Air Corps,
and Navy technical research In aerodynamics, structures, engines,
and fuels, together with R&D by private manufacturers and the
development of far-flung airline operations, assisted the United
States in becoming the world leader in commercially successful
aircraft (e.g., ®C-3) and services (e.g., extensive domestic routes
and long-range overseas routes using the China Clipper).
U.S. civil aircraft, and especially engines, benefited from the
continuous stream of large R&D investment by the military estab-
lishment, especially the competition for jet bombers. They also
benefited from the economy of scale afforded by the growing
domestic
	 market, and	 from	 the	 aggressive,
	 market-focused
management of the industry. U.S. civil aircraft offered excellent
performance, excellent quality and reliability, size and perfor-
mance range that matched market needs, lower operating costs
than European aircraft competitive purchaserices and excel-
t.,
5
,.j
lent logistics and field operati ns support. European manufac-
turers sometimes led in introducing new technology, e.g., first use
of jet engines in commercial transports and first smaller two-
engine jets, but they did not succeed in marshalling the array of
competitive factors that led to commercial leadership.
The principal reasons for the past success of U.S. large trans-
part aircraft manufacturers have been a strong tech nological
base, a good perception of airline and business requirements, and
a willingness to accept the risk of implementing new technology
and to tool up for early high production rates so that the market
opportunity could be exploited as rapidly as it developed. United
rs
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States ma
nufacturers have been able to make decisions about
Product selection, prices, costs, and production 
facilities withrelatively limited government involvement, in 
contrast to theircounterparts in Europe where governments have often beenInvolved, e
.g., the VC 10 and the A300.
Business aviation directly benefited from the large 
U-S. tech-nology base developed for commercial jet transports, describedabove. In the early 1960s business aviation was a small U.S.Industry. Some large corporations had flight departments andrecognized the benefits of rapid air transportation p but the fleetwas composed of recon
structed military aircraft and a few cabin-class ,
, twin-enginedp Alston-powered 
aircraft. Turboprops and jetswere just being Introduced.
In the ensuing 20 years progress has been enormous, due torapid technological advances In U.S. aircraft design and manu-facture, U-S. government support for small airports and naviga-tion infrastructure, and the willingness of 
U.S. general aviationmanufacturers to accept the risk In applying new technology Innew products. As the market developed--helped by the expansionof Industry and growth of small P
opulation centers.-generalaviation m
anufacturers frequently offered aircraft with muchimproved p
erformance and service capability through advancessuch as high-bypass engines, In
creasingly useful avionics, long-range navigation 
systems, 
and structural and safety advances.
Most other regions of the world had neither the domestic market,technological base, nor the government support that the United
States enjoyed, and thus little competitive foreign industryd
eveloped in general aviation until the last half 
of the 1970s.
NOTES
d. National Benefits of Aerollillace
 Ex ores The AerospaceResearii^111 `1 Center, Aerospace Industries Association 
of America,Inc., Washington, D.C.9 3une 1983.2. F.J.L. Dlepenq "Aviation and Technology In the 
EuropeanEconomy," A1CMA
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-14,1967.3. Aeronautical Research and Technolgly
c ExecutiveOffi  
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The environment began to change in the mid-1970s. A series
of events, both domestic and international, has altered the U.S.
outlook. Evaluating the significance of these events and pre-
dicting the emerging trends is complicated by the deep recession
Of 1981-1982 that has affected civil air travel and aircraft pro-
curement worldwide. The events of special note include: uncer-
tainties in the financial status of U
.S. airlines resulting from an
inability to match revenues to increases In operating costs and
deregulation of routes and fares; growing emergence of serious
foreign competition in aircraft manufacturing; increasing impor-
tance of International markets; escalation of financial risks in the
development, manufacture, and marketing of new aircraft; inter-
nationalization of aircraft manufacture; and foreign governmentinvolvement-
-some would say participation--in the industry.
CHANGES IN 'U.S. AIR TRANSPORTATION
System Development
The modern U.S. air transport industry evolved in the decade
immediately after World War III. It comprised a small group of
maJor carriers that were the launch customers for new aircraft,
augmented by a group of other growing carriers that tended to be
followers and a group of unscheduled charter operators with older
equipment that emphasized low fares and minimum service. As in
other countries, U.S. government regulation through the CAB
controlled routes and fares. Consequently, airline competition
concentrated on lobbying for attractive new routes and provision
of more attractive passenger service, i.e., convenience of sched-
ule and in-flight amenities. Fares were based on average costs,
which continued to decrease as the size and efficiency of each
new transport airplane unproved the cost performance of the
29
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fleet. Because Of CAB regulation the major airlines engaged Inalmost no fare Competition to achieve lower costs through 
modl-flCations In service or economies in alrJlne operation. They didlittle to Probe customer preferences by experimentation In faresor levels of service. The major airlines, not 
surprisinglyp resistedboth the entry of new airlines and attempts Of smaller commu tersto expand routes and service, even 
though they themselves werenot aggressive in serving low-density location that did not pro-vide an attractive basis for profitable 
operations. Lack of cOm_Petition in fares and service, combined with Pressure 
Of smallerOperators to expandt
 Is credited With creating an environmentthat fostered demands for deregulation.
Airline Restructuring--Deregulation
The rapid Increase in fuel costs after the 
Organization ofPetroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crisis in 1973 was a jarringnote to the financial performance of !ae airlines. These escalat-In& fuel costs changed the 
cost structure and operating character-istics of the industry. in the early 1970 the 
cost of fuel as a per-cent of total operating expenses was 12.7 ercent. T costbegan to escalate in 1974, 
reach ing 30 Percent
p
 in the early
he
 1980s,Table 2-1).
A second major perturbation was created by deregulation. Thetermination of airline economic regulation in 1978 removed the
TABLE 2*1 Jet Fuel COsts, 1970-1982
Cost Index As Percent ofYear (1972 =100) Cash Operating
1970 Expenses
1971
93.7
97.0 12.7
1972 10010 12.6
1973 109.3
12.0
1974 208.0 12.2
1915 249.7 17.4
19,16 271.6
1977 310.6, 19.5
1978 336.8 20.5
1979 496.0 20.1
1980
1961
766.1 25,130.5
1982
892.7
841.6 30.328.1
SOURCE: Air Transport A-00clation of America Inc.,Aerospace Facts and Figures,
	
'1983/1984, p. 98.
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barriers to entry and opened the door to new routes, new carriers,
' and unprecedented competition and flexibility In fares and ser-
vices. Experience soon demonstrates that fare levels were more
Important to many people than service amenities. It Is not yet
clear, however, how many new passengers have been attracted as
a result of lower fares because passenger statistics of this nature
are limited and subject to various interpretations. The situation
Is further beclouded by the coincidence of a major recession.
During the era of regulation, short-range jet transport
operation was traditionally subsidized by longer routes, with the
lever and degree of subsidization controlled by the CAB. Further-
more, the CAB provided direct subsidies for many short routes.
'these regulatory policies had the effect of creating an artificial
marketplace in the domestic United States, which distorted
operating efficiency and equipment selection to the disadvantage
'	 of some consumers--i.e., frequency of service was low to smaller
'
	
	 localities; fares tended to be artificially high on the longer, more
heavily traveled routes in order to subsidize the short, lower-P„	
{
E'	 density operations; and little was available in the way of special-
ized equipment to serve the commuter market because it dad not
appear attractive enough to stimulate the interest of aircraft}	 manufacturers.
As the Impact of deregulation began to be felt, the large
carriers responded by abandoning their less productive, low-
density markets. Commuter airlines, many of them new, expanded
to fill the void. The number of certificated scheduled carriers
offering passenger service has expanded from 36 to 98 (Figurestir,
	
	 2-1). In addition, service in terms of number of flights and
passenger seat-miles available has been increased for more thinly
populated areas.' Perhaps more important, the structure of air
	
ftravel service has changed markedly. The regional/commuter air-
lines have expanded the number of airports served, while the
major national airlines have markedly reduced the number of air-
ports served (Table 2-2). The trunk airlines have instead concen-
trated their attention on the largest hubs, where they offer com-
peting service with majors already entrenched. Fable 2-2 shows a
79 percent reduction In airports served exclusively by the majors
	
a
and a 58 percent increase in airports served exclusively by
regionals. 'Gable 2-3 shows that in March 1983, 15 major carriers
were serving only 42.g y 8 percent of the city-pairs they had served in
March 1978. The .pairs dropped were replaced by joining other
majors at a few major hubs. Figure 2-2 indicates the concentra-
tion of the major carriers on the large hubs. The sharp shift to
the right of the Paned bars indicates the dramatic concentration of
	 >'} t
major carriers at major hubs. At deregulation the average major
	 (r tF{hub was served by seven major carriers, by 1983 it was served b
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FIGURE 2-1 Number of Certificated Carriers Before and After
Deregulation (Civil Aeronautics Board documentation of air
carrier traffic statistics for September of each year)
SOURCE: Civil Aeronautics Board.
One study of airline productivity before and after deregulation
found that average annual Improvement for 10 trunk airlines
increased from 2.6 percent between 1972-1975 to 4.9 percent for
1975-1980. improvements for regional carriers increased from 4.0
percent in 1970-1975 to 6.3 percent in 1975-1980. The two cate-
gories combined showed an Improvemcnt from 2.8 percent to 5.1
percent. These numbers indicated a substantial improvement in
productivity in the period including deregulation: It should be
noted that evaluation of productivity for a service such as air
travel where convenience and time saved are important Ingredi-
ents for many users, is exceedingly difficult. The study cited does
not attempt to incorporate these variables.
The airlines have responded to deregulation by revising their
strategies for designing routes. The earlier emphasis on nonstop
city-pair routes Is being supplanted by an expanded hub-and-spoke
strategy. This strategy seeks to improve load factor by strength-
ening market positions In selected hub cities where airlines
already have strong positions by funneling increased traffic in
from other cities. Consequently, the number of major airlines
serving major hubs has tended to Increase significantly, while
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TABLE 2 .2	 Airports Served by Regional and Major Airlines, 1978 Versus 1982
1978 1981	 1982
% Change
1978.1982Airports served
Regional/Commuters
	 630 766
	 817 +30Major/Nationals
	 673
Exclusive airports served
389	 323
-52
Regional/Commuters
	 359 SO4	 566 +58Major/Nationals
	 230 80	 49 _79
SOURCE: Fairchild Industries, Inc.
service to dower tr ff'a ac airports is Increasingly being left to
regional airlines; however, the number of nonstop flights between
long-distance city-pairs is being reduced. Figure 2-2 shows the
significant increase in service being offered by the 11 major
airlines at the 23 largest hubs. Many of the major airports are
now serving as key transfer points for passengers:
Evaluation of the consequences of deregulation for the
passenger depends very much on one's point of view, and both
advocates and opponents have strongly held views. The panel has
TABLE 2.3 Major Airline Service Reductions Since Deregulation
City-Pairs Served In Percent of City-Pairs
Served in March 1978
Carrier March 1983
Both March 1978
and Which Were Also ServedMarch 1983 in March 1983
Northwest 284 165 S8.1Pan American 109 62 56.9Eastern 503 273 54.3
Delta 645 335 51.9Trans World 237 120 50.6USAir 566 282 49,8
United 472 226 47.9Piedmont 383 164 42.8Ozark 208 83 39.9
Frontier 231 90 39.0American 343 129 37.6Western 253 86 34.0
Republic 94S 305 32.3
Continental 384 S9 15.4Braniff 0 0 0.0
Total-	 5,563	 2,379
	 42.8
SOURCE: Official Airline Guide, March 1, 1978 and March 1, 1983.
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FIGURE 2-2 Concentration of Major Airlines at Large Hubs
Before and After Deregulation
SOURCE: Official Airline Guide.
not attempted a comprehensive evaluation--it is beyond the scope
of the study. The panel 's perception of the various points of view
is that for the frequent business traveler, chaotic fare structures
and frequent changes have been unsettling; at the same time
special incentive plans have offered him fare reduction. Further-
morel
 his interest in frequent point-to-point service between
city-pairs is now sometimes less well served, (especially for
longer-distance pairs) and in-flight amenities such as food and
space have deteriorated. For the traveler who seeks the lowest
possible cost and is willing to accept some inconvenience and
minimal amenities, the result has been dramatic improvement.
Travelers, both business and nonbusiness, in smaller communities
face a mixed picture. For some # service is improved; for others,
service is less convenient or nonexistent--commuter airlines,
usually with propfan equipment, ' have expanded coverage; the
trunk airlines have reduced it severely.
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This change In route structure also changes the comparative
demand for large versus small airplanes. For smaller route seg-
ments, the carriers need smaller aircraft. Consequently, there Is
a surplus of large aircraft (747, DC-109 L-1011) and increased
demand for commuter airlines and fuel-efficient, 100- to 175-seat
equipment. In fact, there is still considerable uncertainty regard-
Ing what mIx of equipment will best serve future markets.
Depressed airline earnings and reduced demand for travel have
created a pool of unused or underused aircraft, not necessarily
' with the lowest operating costs, but available at rock-bottom
prices. Free entry and the absence of fare regulation make it
possible for new operators to buy or lease such aircraft, select a
high-density route, lease the operating Infrastructure (ticket
` sales, baggage handling, maintenance), and hire otherwise unem-
ployed flight and cabin crews at less than the salary scales of
established major and national carriers. 	 These new carriers
obviously have very low costs In their selective route operations
and can price their seats to be profitable at the margin for less
than the established carriers, which have a large Infrastructure,
union salary scales and work rules, and the loan payments on
highly efficient modern aircraft.
There are several consequences:
• Ticket prices stay low, driven by the lower costs of the new
entrants, so that some established carriers continue to Incur
dosses or nominal profits even as traffic grows.
• Operators find it more difficult to justify paying the high
price of new and more efficient aircraft since the improvement in
aircraft productivity may not outweigh the economic benefit of 3
' old, inefficient aircraft bought at discount prices and operated
with low-cost labor.
• As new aircraft are bought by foreign, state-owned airlines,
their used aircraft are taken in trade and frequently appear on the
U.S. market. 11
The present period is one of transition, aggravated by the
recent recession that further beclouds the future. The character
of the eventual new equilibrium--assuming one ensues--is uncer-
tain. More time will be required for the full effects of deregula-
tion to become clear. Despite the pressure for improved effici-
ency in operations, the lower fares, and the improved service to
'
V' r
some smaller communities that deregulation generated, one can-
not yet conclude that the present arrangement is optimal. 	 In
assessing results, it is Important for consideration to be given to
all the significant effects, including safety and the impact on the =Y	 ;
aircraft manufacturers. .1
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Irrespective of the details of the outcome, high priority mustk	 continue to be placed on safety. Even though the commitment to
safe operations of all Interested parties Is continuously reaffirmed,
It Is Important to reexamine all the institutional arrangements forinsuring safety In the light of the changing character of the air
	 f `transportation industry.
Where is little question that the airworthiness of aircraft issubject to continuing careful scrutiny.
	 During the era of con-
	 Etrolled entry the professionalism, operating competence, and
experience of the airlines with respect to such matters as flight
crew training and monitoring, maintenance standards, replace-
ment schedules, training and monitoring of maintenance crews,
and depth and experience of engineering staffs were well estab-
fished. The airlines then operating had been In business for many
years and level of safety and reliability of schedules were major
r:	 elements of the airlines competitive stature.
	 However, withbarriers to access removed It Is Important for the FAA Inspection
process to take into account such factors as the changed char-
acter of the Industry, the many new entrants, the comparative
lack of extensive operating experience and the variety of equip-
ment utilized by given operations. For examlep	 It is Imor tInsure that severe cost
	
a	 p ant to
fleets--with some flight a d operating crews having to adjust todifferent instrumentation, flight deck layouts in aircraft, andwork rules-
-do not lead to deteriorating standards of quality and
safety. Accumulating experience has led to Increased government
attention to this situation.
Deregulation, depressed economic conditions, and growth of
foreign competition are having profound effects on the U.S. manu
-facturers of aircraft. The subject Is complex and multidimen-
sional. One p
otentially disturbing effect concerns the continued
capability of U.S. aircraft manufacturers to launch new aircraft.
Depressed traffic and earnings of the airline Industry have caused
a severe reduction in new orders, deferment of deliveries, and in a
number of cases, Inability to take delivery of firm-order aircraft.
The prospect of continued instability In route structure shortens
the time frame over which forecasts can be relied upon for
decisions on capital investment. it is difficult to make a decision
based on a calculation of the return on investment of a new air-
craft with a service life of 20 years when routes and traffic can
not be forecast credibly for the next 12 months.Although It is premature to make such a dire prediction, theseadverse conditions could persist long enough to prevent the launchof new programs, cause the termination of current
 developmentand production programs, and lead to the disbanding of the teamsperforming advanced development. Such an eventuality wouldHead to a deterioration of aircraft design, development, and
C^	 r
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production capability In the United States with attendant adverse
consequences for the military establishment as well.
Other nations, with economic and social criteria that do not
apply to private U.S. firms, can and may seek to take advantage
of recent changes In this U.S. market environment. Foreign
programs to launch new aircraft could damage the prospects for
future U.S. Industry recovery. This subject will be discussed In
more detail below under "Emergence or Foreign Competition.10
Monitoring this situation, and taking corrective action as need be,
warrants the highest attention within industry and the government.
This "worst case" scenario could not be regarded as probable
at the present time. However, very undesirable and costly
deterioration could occur before the problem is perceived and
adequately addressed If It Is not watched carefully.
FINANCIAL STATUS OF THE AIRLINES
Major Airlines
For all mayor and for some of the smaller airlines,
deregulation generated great uncertainty with respect to financial
yield per seat-mile offered. It also produced an Inappropriate
match between the existing aircraft fleet and the evolving net-
work of routes.
For many of the major airlines the consequences of these
events, combined with a deep recession, have been a suboptimal
fleet mix for hub-and-spoke routes, reductions In market share,
serious deterioration in financial performance, dramatically
different and heightened competition, and an urgent need to
control or reduce frequently Intractable operating costs. Table
2-4 and Figures 2-3 to 2-3 reflect the decline from consistent
profits to severe losses and the deterioration In debt/equity and 	
^f
working capital ratios, and breakeven points. Although these
changes are obviously adversely affected by the recession, they
began well before it and coincide with the onset of deregulation.
Perhaps the most Important and uncertain elements relate to
planning route structures and fares, forecasting financial per-
formance, and projecting capital and equipment requirements for
procurement of new flight equipment.
The changes noted above are very Important to the future
health of the suppl iers of new transport aircraft. It has become
more difficult to forecast market requirements, and the con-
tinuing ability of customers to accept and pay for new equipment
Is less certain. These changes have altered the investment
climate and the prospects for adequate security and return on
r
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a TABLE 2.4 Operating Profit of
U.S. Air Carriers on Domestic
Operations, 1970.1983
1 You	 Hu lops of Dollars
1970
	 (1)s	
,
1971	 257I 1972
	 493	 r1973
	 4941974	 78S197S
	 1171976
'
f
1977
	 6S7
f 1018-D®rogolation1979
	 129	 I1980
	 (6)
(264)	 }1982
1983
	
NA	 ff
NA
°
`N
*Loss
SOURCE: Aerospace Industries Associa•
	 ( ,tion of America, Inc„ Aerospace Facts
and Figures, 1983/1984, pp. 88.89.
	 !
investment for the financial Institutions that fund the purchase ofnew aircraft. In a regulated environment the route franchise wasregarded as a valuable asset that provided security for loans.Flistor 11y, new aircraft were funded by Internally generated
cash and short-term and long-term credit from banks and irs-ritu-tional lenders. The sharp deterioration in financial performancehas dried up the former, and the reduced stability brought 
aboutby deregulation, combined with poor profit prospects, has largelydried up the latter. It is Interesting to note that re presentatives
of the equity investment community are more optimistic over the
financial prospects of the airlines than are bankers who supply
credit and must be concerned with ability to repay loans on
schedule: The financial results for 1983 have not been reassuring.
Recently the industry has been successful in raising funds In
the public market, but these funds have been used largely to 
coverlosses. Due to the uncertain profit outlook this source of funds is
no longer as readily available. The financial, representatives onthe panel indicated that the debt leverage permitted in the futurewill be scrutinized more carefully. New sources of funds andpossibly the d
evelopment of new financial instruments may be
needed, but a return to consistent profitability is essential if
carriers are to be able to purchase new, more efficient aircraft.
As noted, the outlook for the domestic airlines to continue to
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and have been able to achieve reductions in "abor costs on a time
scale that few familiar with the industry would have predicted at
the beginning of the recession. A few are using bankruptcy reor-
ganizations as a means to void labor contracts that have been a
barrier to achieving cost-competitiveness. Other carriers will no
doubt continue to experience liquidity problems that will inhibit
their ability to finance new aircraft. The ready availability of
low-cost used equipment will likely continue to make it easy for
new entrants into even mayor hubs as long as noise regulations do
not ground such equipment. it is also possible that carriers not
experiencing significant financial problems will devote resources
to protecting route structures by cutting fares to meet competi-
.... .' ...YUVY, .PU,r I t Y.7a,, ®y rutw- munson,. Boeing. Company,Sea44ie, Washinngton.
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FIGURE 2-4a Working Capital Ratlo, U.S. Major Airlines
SOURCE: Presentation before U.S. Civil Aviation Manufacturing
Industry paned, 3auly 7, 1983, by H.C. Munson, Boeing Company,Seattle, Washington.
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FIGURE 2-3 load Factors and Breakeven Points of Major AirlinesBefore and After Deregulation
SOURCE; Derived from Civil Aeronautics Board data.
tion rather than risk commitments to new generation aircraft thatmay not meet competitive needs by the time of delivery.
The domestic airline industry may well continue to be 
unstablefor some years. The failure of several additional major carriers isa p
ossibility. It is likely that when the situation stabilizes the
industry will continue to exhibit the characteristics; now dis-played, i.e., it will be made up of several financially strong car-riers, such as American, Delta, and United, a number of 
marginalcarriers, and a number of new entrants with varying financials
trengths. The number of carriers comprising the latter groupwill p
robably vary with the economic cycles, with some failing
and new ones enterlrv, :',-ie financial health of the industry will
be strongly affected by the success of airline 
managements andlabor unions in achieving lower costs and higher productivity. Thesuccess of Individual airlines will be strongly influenced by themarketing p
erception and nimbleness of their management inIdentifying and serving attractive market segments. They willoperate in a much more volatile competitive environment. It isJnlikely that many of the new airline entrants emphasizing low-cost operation, severe price competition, and great flexibility willreadily take on the long-term capital commitments required top
urchase new aircraft, much less to help launch anew aircraft.
s.
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Selected U.S. carriers with international routes may do some-
	 j
i what better because capacity is, to some extent, subject to
bilateral agreements with other countries. Although discounting
Is severe on selected routes, the international carriers are taking
some steps to improve yields rather than expand market
penetration.
if, as the panel postulates, a few strong carriers survive the
competitive struggle created by deregulation, they could again
serve as launch customers for new aircraft. in the near future the
	
broad base of healthy airlines demanding new equipment, which
	 j
	
_ r
	
the domestic industry has provided in the past, will probably not
exist. Lacking such a platform to launch new aircraft models,
U.S. manufacturers would have to depend more than they have in
the past on financially stronger non-U.S. airline customers for
initial orders. This change would undoubtedly alter the nature of
competition from foreign manufacturers. If the foreign manu-
facturer is a multinational consortium with a good product the
aggregate marketing power than can be brought to bear can be
daunting.
It is not evident to the paned that the implications of deregula-
tion of the airlines for the health and competitive status of the
U.S. civil aircraft manufacturing industry have heretofore
received adequate attention. it is important for future evalua-
tions of the effect of deregulation to include this additional
dimension.
Regional Airlines
The regional airline segment of the domestic airline industry is
made up of approximately 245 carriers, serving regional areas
with low traffic density and short route segments that are not
economically attractive for the large national and major car-
riers. In addition, these regional carriers often provide service to
various connecting hubs in cooperation with the major airlines.
The number of entries and exits from this segment is greater than
that of the larger carriers.
Unfortunately, comprehensive financial data on regional
airlines are not available. Most are not publicly-owned, and the
few that are public have gone so only in the last three years.
Members of the financial community. have told the panel that
typically the regional carriers are weak financially. Uneven
earnings and cash flow, combined with weak balance sheets, do
not provide a credible basis for supporting borrowings from
conventional sources of- financing for purchasing new aircraft
(much less for supporting long-term commitments for developing
new aircraft). Consequently, the burden of providing financing
r!
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for purchase of new aircraft usually falls on the aircraft manufac-
turers. It has become apparent that the ability to offer a
financing package, if one can afford It, is an essential marketingtool.
The change In route structure resulting from deregulation
created an active demand for aircraft, from the regional carriers,
which currently represent a growing segment of the potential U.S.
aircraft market. Some of the problems of low traffic and unsatis
-factory yield that are prevalent among the larger carriers are also
present with the regionals. Part of their poor performance, how-
ever, Is due to the fact that the aircraft they are currently
operating are not cost-effective for the routes served. Thus, if
financing can be secured, there Is a market for new existing or
advanced aircraft. It Is anticipated that as the economy Improves,
demand for the smaller transport aircraft will pick up before the
demand for larger transports. The key Is financing, which depends
on long-term assurance of economic stability.
EMERGENCE OF FOREIGN COMPETITION
Large Transports
All nations are concerned with their balance of trade. The
industrialized nations have evidenced a desire to participate in
higher-technology, higher-visibility items such as jet transports.They recognize the advantages in exports, domestic employment,
technology, sophisticated manufacturing, and prestige. Fur aher-
more, they perceive the need to balance trade and national secur-
ity by producing as much as possible of their rrdlitary equipment
needs domestically.
Not surprisingly, the Europeans have tried repeatedly to create
a viable air transport manufacturing industry. The jet transport
era was, in fact, launched with the British Comet and de Havilland
Ghost turbojet engine in 1952. Over the next 15 years a succession
of European firms and consortia built eight additional models ` of
commercial jet aircraft, but with little commercial success.
United States manufacturers addressed the interests of a diverse
range of large, atrong domestic customers and foreign airlines in
their design deliberations. Thus, their aircraft matched the
requirements of the United States and most International markets
as well. Until recently, the combination of a large domestic
market base, attractive products, and aggressive marketing and
product support worldwide enabled U.S. manufacturers to dom-
inate the large civil transport aircraft industry.
w_
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The
	 European
	 efforts
	 were characterized
	 by	 competingnational
	 ,
.political and economic interests, by lack of experience
with customer-focused product planning, and by a narrower view
of market requirements based on European experience. As they
i " turned to multinational consortia to undertake development, theEuropeans aisc encountered a lack of experience In managing such
undertakings-
-a iock shared by U.S. manufacturers, and one they
did not have to address until later. Despite the early Europeanfallures, those efforts provided many valuable lessons from which
:. ^•' - esa nt consortia have gained.
G In December 1970, In response to the advent of the wide-bodied
	
jets,	 the
	 European
	 transport aircraft
	 Industry
	 was
rationalized with the creation of a major European marketing
project--Airbus IIndustrie--which draws on the aircraft manufac-
turers in a number of European countries! The Airbus program,
starting with the A300 airplane, has a strong market orientation
`
`
that seeks to serve not only the European, but also the Asian,
African, and South American markets, and specifically the largeNorth American market.
In contrast to the competitive adjustments and structural
realignment that have been occurring in the U.S, aircraft manu-
facturing industry over the past decade without specific govern-ment guidance, European governments for man y
 years have had a
strong hand In encouraging industrial realignments by nationaliz-
ing and combining firms within countries and by Intergovernmen-
tal agreements for intra-European cooperation.
`
The Airbus A300 series of aircraft (twin-engined, wide-bodiedjets) are technically proficient airplanes that have been more
successful commercially than most earlier European develop-
ments.
	 Their success has resulted in part from government
financial support of design, development, manufacturing, market-ing, and sales.
	 In part, it also reflects the fact that the A300
addressed a market segment not well covered by U.S. aircraft.
Until Boeing was able to deliver the 767 beginning in 1982, Airbushad the only advanced twin
-engine, wide-bodied airplanes on the
market. As can be seen in Fable 2-5 Airbus has managed to
achieve much
	 more effective market penetration than
	 thex Europeans ever achieved in narrow
-bodied jets. Although Airbus
achieved virtually no market penetration until 1975, It has been apowerful factor in the market since that time. Airbus obtained 49
percent of the orders in 1980 and has obtained 36 percent of all
orders since 1978, the year it began to demonstrate strong market
acceptance. Unfortunately, data are not available on the finan-
`
clal performance of Airbus IIndustrie or on the level of investments
or the criterla applied for evaluating performance and requiring
payback to the various governments that are partners in Airbus.However, the investment is estimated to be about $5 billion. it isY
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TABLE 2.5 Market Share of Commercial Jet Transports by Type ofAircraft Orders`
Narrow-Bodied Wide-Bodied Total
United United UnitedDate States	 Foreign Total States Foreign Total States Foreign
1947.54 —	 19 19 — —
—
— 191955.59 409	 154 563 —
—
— 409 154196064 101	 261 962 —
—
— 701 2621965.69 2,079	 283 2,362 346 — 346 2,425 3831970 127	 29 1S6 69 69 196 291971 105
	 34 139 41 6 47 146 401972 180	 52 232 68 3 71 248 S51973 210	 21 231 65 — 65 275 211974 198	 25 223 62 8 70 260 331975 121
	 30 151 31 15 46 152 451976 179
	 14 193 44 1 45 223 1515177 221
	 12 233 76 20 % 297 321978 374
	 18 392 229 69 298 603 821979 221	 12 233 194 127 321 415 1391980 2S5	 20 275 160 155 315 415 1751981 191	 29 220 124 80 204 31S 1091982	 171	 6	 177
	 17	 6	 23	 188	 121983
	 139	 —	 139	 41	 2	 43	 180	 2
SOURCE: Merrill Lynch Aviation Log.
known that Airbus survived for five years with only 10 orders
after its announcement—something no U.S. company could do and
remain in the buslness-
-and that it has built unsold aircraft(01white tallsrr
 worth $1.25 billion) to be placed in inventory during
the recession, again something no U.S. company could finance.
The competitive threat of such action is demonstrated in the
recent gale of some of the "white taills 00
 to Pan American. It is of
course true that the overall program objectives and evaluation of
success are quite different for Airbus, with Bob creation holding a
high place.
The advent of deregulation, with the concomitant changes it
has generated in route structures and service, has increased the
importance in the U.S. of the market segment that Airbus serves.
This market segment (moderate
-range, high-density) has been
served historically with many hundreds of early model BAC-111s,
DC-9s, B-737s, and B-727s. Many of these aircraft, due to age
alone, not to mention problems with fuel efficiency and nolse, are
candidates for replacement. Nevertheless, Airbus has had little
success since deregulation in penetrating this U.S. market.
Airbus dndustrie has been particularly successful in estab-
lishing a foothold in the band of countries from the Middle Bast to
South and Southeast Asia and to Australia, a region forecast to
have the highest rate of growth in air transport over the next twodecades. Airbus Industrie s
 according to its own public pronounce-
7717— acv
^	 I!
s
z
^
E
=r
f
I.
46
meats, has the objective of obtaining a substantially enhanced
market position in the 1980s. it has introduced the A310, in
direct competition with the Boeing 767, to broaden its family of
large transport aircraft.
In the coming decade the market changes noted above may
lead the carriers to look for a new, more productive short-to-
medium range aircraft with a seating capacity of 120 to 170 pas-
sengers. Such a vehicle would be a fuel-efficient replacement for
older aircraft that serve short-to-medium range, moderate den-
sity routes. This market segment, however, has considerable
uncertainties. The Boeing 737-300 and McDonnell Douglas MD-80
series (updated, enlarged versions of old designs) serve it in part,
and now the Boeing 757 competes in the larger sizes. U.S. manu-
facturers are reluctant to launch an all-new airplane program
until market requirements are clarified and potential customers
identified with greater certainty. Nevertheless, the Airbus part-
ners have agreed to proceed with the A320, aimed specifically at
this market. Airbus hopes, by moving aggressively, to preempt
U.S. manufacturers in this segment, and thus to capture a signifi-
cant market share by being the first to offer a completely new
aircraft of this size. The possible advent of the unducted fan jet
engine in the late 1990s or early 1990s Is adding further uncer-
tainty and complexity to this competitive scramble.
After repeated attempts since World War lip Europe has
produced an aircraft in the A300 that has achieved market
acceptance In regions cwtside Europe. The effort has provided
thousands of jobs, saved foreign exchange, and contributed to
national prestige by demonstrating ability to produce a tech-
nologically proficient aircraft. The eventual success of Airbus in
achieving worldwide market penetration with a family of aircraft
Is unclear, but its efforts to do so inject additional uncertainty
into an already uncertain business outlook for U.S. manufac-
turers. Furthermore, through aggressive pricing and financing it
can further reduce the investment attractiveness of the U.S.
commercial aircraft industry, whose financial performance has
been modest at best.
Rotorcraft
The U.S. industry's civil helicopter product line is matched in
all significant classes and sizes by competitive foreign helicopters.
Current competition Is from individual helicopter manufacturers
in France, Italy, West Germany, and the United Kingdom. Multi-
national competition Is emerging. Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm
(MBB) of West Germany and Kawasaki of Japan have recently'
formed a joint venture. They have established cooperative devel
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opment and production of the BK-117--a medium, twin-engined
helicopter powered by Avco Lycoming LTS-101 engines.
In another multinational program, the governments of Italy
and the United Kingdom have agreed to start a new 30- passenger,three-engine civil transport helicopter program.
	 This aircraft,the EH- 1'01 9
 will be developed and produced by European Hell-
copter Industries, a consortium formed by Augusta of Italy and
Westland of the United Kingdom.
	 A military version will bedeveloped concurrently for the British and Italian navies and for
export. The EH-101 will be powered Initially by General ElectricT700 engines.
For a long time the U .S. civil helicopter product line consisted
principally of derivatives of aircraft developed and produced forthe U.S. military services. Most of the recently developed U.S.
military helicopters are dedicated combat vehicles that do not
provide a cost-effective opportunity for developing civil deriva-
tives. As a result, the U .S. civil helicopter industry has had to
develop and initiate production of Its next generation of com-
mercial
	 roducts with private capital absorbing all business andtechnicarrisks.
U.S. civil helicopter
	 manufacturers, operating on private
capital, have to compete with financing granted (or guaranteed)by foreign governments to their helicopter industries. Using such
capital as part of a basic government strategy to create jobs and
business, helicopter industries in Ourope have developed and
introduced products that are aunt: d at the world civil market
without having to incur the traditional business
	 'U.S.risk.	 (Thedomestic civil market represents about 50 percent of that world
market.) These aircraft sometimes feature advanced technology
acquired or confirmed through
	 U.S. license agreements and
reciprocal defense procurement agreements.
	 They have had alarge measure of success.
	 The foreign share of the U.S. civil >helicopter market, measured by shipments, has increased from 14
percent in 1979 to 35 percent in 1982 and Is projected to continue
to grow, unless the U.S. helicopter industry finds a better means
of financing the development and initial production of competingproducts (Table 2-6).
	 United States manufacturers of necessity
TABLE 2.6
	 U.S. Civil Helicopter Market (millions of dollars) w
Shipments 1978	 1979
	 1980	 1981	 1982
U.S produced domestic industries
	 172	 196
	 357	 251
A
fn159Imports
	 28	 22	 54	 I05	 85
Total Market ^^200
	 218
	 411	 356
	 244Imports share percent
	 14	 10	 13	 29	 35
SOURCE: Compiled from Aerospace Industries Association of America, inc., data.
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are moving to form joint ventures in Canada and elsewhere, on
the basis that part of a loaf is better than none.
General Aviation
Unfortunately, the various categories of aircraft comprising
general aviation are not always defined consistently and unam-
biguously. General aviation will be taken to include regional
aircraft (often referred to as commuters), business aircraft for
executive travel and other uses, and light (piston-powered)
aircraft for both private and business use. Although the United
States manufactures some 90 percent of the world's fleet of
general aviation aircraft and represents the largest single market
by far (two-thirds of total world demand), significant Int. ads are
being made by foreign manufacturers.
In 1981 our trade balance in general aviation aircraft was
negative dace to imports of turboprop transport aircraft for the
regional market and business jets (Figure 2-6), and the negative
balance persisted Into 1982 and 1983. It should be noted,
however, that these Imports have significant U.S. content In
terms of materials, components, and subsystems.
Regional Transports
Regional transports (defined as commercial transport aircraft
with less than 60-passenger capacity) present a bleak picture for
the four U.S. manufacturers In this market, despite the fact that
there Is a strong growth pattern in this segment of air transporta-
tion. The financial, technological, and managerial requirements
for launching these aircraft are less severe than for large trans-
ports. However, the investment needed Is still beyond the capabil-
ity of those U.S. companies normally Involved, and the regional
airlines are too small and too thinly financed to support launching-
size purchases. This smaller investment for development Is, how
ever, within the capability of smaller economies and single
nations. Consequently, in addition to Canada, the United King-
dom, France, Italy, Holland, Sweden, and IIsrael, the Brazilians,
Spanish, and Indonesians also perceive this segment as a means of
participating In air transport design and manufacture. Some of
the programs in these countries are being undertaken as inter-
national partnerships. For example, the Canadian government has
supplied Pratt and Whitney Aircraft-Canada with $130 million
(Canadian) of R&D for the PT6—an engine for regional and
business aircraft. Of this $130 'million, $110.5 million was in the
form of an interest-free loan; the rest was direct support.
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ine aeveaopment of this class of aircraft, e.g., CASA-212 (Spain,
• Indonesia) and Shorts-330 (United Kingdom). however, with low
fuel prices and limited U.S. demand, total world sales remained
low. Increased fuel prices and deregulation changed this situa-
tion. Regional airlines, which use efficient turboprop equipment
for short-range operations, are now projected to grow signifl-
r,.	 ,.
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cantly. Driven to a significant degree by the American market,
the size of the aircraft needed has also grown. to the United
	
States, only one company (Fairchild) has invested in an aircraft 	 j
with a seating capacity of over 20 passengers. Fairchild produces
a 19-passenger regional aircraft, the Metro, but for a 30-seat
aircraft it has joined with Saab of Sweden to produce the SF 340,
a twin-engined turboprop.
For foreign manufacturers, this market has the further
	
attraction of not having a strong, established U.S. presence. In	 {
contrast to the situation for large jet transports, where the grow-
ing size of the international market means that the U.S. market is
no longer the only basis for launch, the U.S. market is the single
most important element of the decision to launch a turboprop}	 aircraft. Sales in the U.S. are probably essential to the successful
launch of a new regional aircraft because the United States com-
prises over half of the market potential. Furthermore, the U.S.
market Is open to all, whereas foreign markets are often polltl-
cally controlled and access is generally limited. A U.S. aircraft
manufacturer hence is in quadruple jeopardy: It begins with a
limited presence in the market; its U.S. market is relatively open
to competition; many foreign markets are totally closed; and a
government financing) are concentrating on the field supported by{
Business Aircraft
j	 Business aircraft comprise a fleet of some 120 9000 aircraft, of
which 66,000 are used directly for business or executive travel.
The remainder are used for a variety of lesser commercial pur-
poses such as air taxi, rental, instruction, etc. In turbine-powered
and turboprop equipment Canada, France, IIsrael, 3apan, and the
United Kingdom offer a significant challenge to the U.S. IIndustry,
and new groups from Indonesia, Italy, Spain, and Sweden are
entering the field. At present about 60 percent of the market is
In the United States. The U.S. fleet of business turbojet and
turboprop aircraft has grown substantially. At the end of 1981
the fleet numbered 3,171 fixed-wing turbojets and 4,660 fixed-
wing turboprops and was used principally for executive travel.
Turbojets provide speed and moderate range. Turboprops offer,
basically, operational efficiency. Foreign manufacturers have
made significant inroads in the United States and world markets."
{	 However, about two-thirds of the current and planned turboprops
	
rb " r
	
are produced in the United States, two foreign-designed aircraft	 G S,.'a=
are to be assembled in the United States, and one (Learfan 2100)
`	 may be built in Northern Ireland from a U.S. design. Figure 2-7 	 ^4f	 k
displays shipments of regional and executive aircraft from 1970 to
1982.
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FIGURE 2-7	 Shipments of Regional Transports and Executive
Aircraft (turboprop and turbofan), 1970-1982
a SOURCE: Garrett Turbine Engine Company.
Light Aircraft
In	 light	 (piston-engined)	 aircraft	 three	 American	 firms
dominate--Cessna, Beech, and Piper. American firms produced
17,890 units in 1979.
	
In 1980 they provided 92 percent of all
general aviation aircraft and 67 percent of net billings, producing
11,877 units. Because of the worldwide recession they produced
only 4 9000 units in 1982 9 with continued slippage in 1983.
Although France Is the second largest producer with 591 air-,
craft In 1979, there is not yet a serious challenge in this market
from foreign manufacturers. Britain, Brazil, and others are also
producing light aircraft. Brazil, under license to Piper, has-pro-
duced a broad range of Piper designs. The state of the art applied
to the light aircraft segment of general aviation has-been low, and
costs are Increasing in the United States due to reduced produc-
tion rates. Consequently, the potential for foreign penetration of
the markets serviced by U.S. manufacturers exists if foreign
governments choose to finance an entry. Since the U.S. market is
approximately 90 percent of the world market, no other nation
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first 600 MU-2 aircraft produced, 450 were sold In the United
States, 120 In other countries, and 30 In 3apan. After an earlier
commercially unsuccessful effort to introduce a commuter air-
craft, 3apan has become a subcontractor and venture partner with
Boeing on the 767. In addition, 3apan Is participating In an Inter-
national consortium with Rolls Royce, !Pratt and Whitney, and
German and Italian partners to develop and produce a new engine
for the prospective 11150-passenger' aircraft (described In Chapter
5). Part of the motivation for this venture appears to be to gain
access to large-scale test and development facilities currently
lacking. Another Is the need to learn how to establish credibility
in the marketplace. As noted earlier, 3apan is also developing a
civil helicopter with a West German firm.
The nature of 3apan°s long-term thrust Is not fully clear--
prime, partner, or subcontractor. The MITI position is that the
magnitude of the technological and financial risks dictates the use
of international joint ventures. Gaining access to foreign markets
will also require joint ventures, and furthermore, creating market
acceptance for 3apanese products may well require International
partners with long experience and established positions. Were the
3apanese to join forces with the Europeans, the competitive
threat, both technologically and In terms of access to markets and
capital, would be formidable. However, achieving a major role as
an independent designer and manufacturer of large transport
aircraft almost certainly will require a much more substantial
investment by the 3apanese government and/or industry In aero-
nautics R&D than currently Is planned. For the next 10 to 15
years 3apan probably represents a larger threat to major U.S.
producers of large aircraft parts and components than to the
oil
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principal aircraft prime contractors and assemblers. No matter
what role Japan chooses to play, it must be regarded as a potent
force in helping to shape the structure of the global industry in
the decade of the 1990s and Into the next century.
U.S. Corrcent in Foreign Aircraft
The emergence of powerful foreign competition is not without
its opportune! ;s, especially In the sale of components and sub-
systems. Despite the desire of the Europeans to use their com-
ponent and subsystem technology in the Airbus A300, many
j	 components throughout the plane (auxiliary power units and
avionics are examples), as well as major parts of the U.S.-
designed jet engine, come from the United States' However, this
situation is changing. Airbus management is replacing U.S.-
supplied components with European components where possible
and practical, and the effort will be Intensified on the A320.
At present the European component industry is small
compared with that of the United States The panel believes it is
competent but relatively high-priced. The industry could replace
U.S.-manufactured equipment in foreign-built aircraft, should the
policy decision be made to do so and capital Invested.
U.S. components in other classes of aircraft also represent a
significant part of the assembled vehicle. In addition to engines,
the flight controls, radios and navigation systems, and aluminum
for the skin are generally provided by U.S. manufacturers. The
long-term concern is that the acquisition of significant airframe
market share by foreign manufacturers will result in greater
foreign interest and activity in the components market that could
displace U.S.-manufactured products. Examples of this expanding
interest are the involvement of Japan and France in large jet
engines; of England, Italy, Japan, France, and Canada in small
turbofan engines; and of France, West Germany, Italy, and Japan
in avionics and controls. Furthermore, with the formal launch of
the A320, the sponsoring governments (France ,  Great Britain,
West Germany, and Spain) also agreed in principle to strengthen
Europe in the A320 °s subcontracting and component supply.
The most critical step in maintaining U.S. leadership in com-
ponents is to preserve its lead in total aircraft system concepts,
design, development, and integration. This kind of leadership is
heavily dependent on launching new aircraft at reasonable inter-
vals. Without this leadership in systems, the future of the U.S.
components industry, as it relates to civil aircraft, could face
much more severe competition than has been the case hereto-
fore. Military systems provide some relevant experience, but
commercial requirements are sufficiently different that a direct
i
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focus on commercial development and design is regarded as
essentiaw
Foreign Perception of Future Markets
A British perspective on world competition in commercial
aircraft Is that Boeing will continue to dominate the long-haul,
wide-bodied aircraft market. 10 The medium- and short-haul
market Is viewed as "up for grabs." Airbus is being encouraged by
its British partner to develop, over the long term, a family of
k equipment to enter this market. The commuter market is pro-
jected to be chaotic, with many players from both developed and
developing countries and with a requirement to deal with fleet
operators who are shaky financially and who will need significant
1
	
	
operational support. Consequently, th,. ammuter market seg-
ment is regarded with caution.
In summary, the two broad segments of civil aircraft manufa*-
ture face different circumstances regarding the changing nature
of international competition. Large transports face a competitor,
backed by the resources of several European governments, that
has succeeded in achieving market acceptance. Despite penetra-
tion in some important markets, the long-term success of Airbus
is not easily predicted. Its ability to affect aircraft pricing and
profitability adversely is a more likely possibility. Even with the
availability of government funds, the projected financial perfor-
mance of the aircraft will, In the long run, influence government
decision makers. The experience of the Concorde and the A300
has loomed in the background in discussions on funding the A320.
Governments do not have unlimited funds. With conflicting
demands for resources, continuing drains on treasuries will even-
tually receive careful scrutiny. Unfortunately,that eventuality is
small solace to the private firms trying to compete. Meanwhile,
the Japanese loom as a potentially powerful but largely unknown
factor in the competitive arena.
In the other arena, especially with helicopters, commuters,
and executive aircraft, the threat is more 'immediate. The
aircraft fit better with the resources of individual countries and
companies. The U.S. market is barge, open, and attractive. U.S.
technology and U.S. components are readily available. Significant
market penetration has already been achieved.
1	 GROWING IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL MARKETS
As mentioned previously, the size and dynamism of the U.S.
air transport market during the 1950s and 1960s played a power-
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SOURCE: Presentation before U.S. Civil Aviation Manufacturing
Industry Panel, July 7, 1983 0 by H.C. Munson, Boeing Company,
Seattle, Washington.
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ful role in establishing leadership for U.S. aircraft. The require-
ments and size of the U.S market helped define the aircraft
needed and, wi'.h effective atterstlon to foreign needs and mar-
kets, provided economies of scale that helped establish world cost
leadership. In 1971 U.S. air travel represented 57.5 percent of the
world's passenger-miles flown outside of the USSR, its allied
countries, and the People's Republic of China. During the perloo
1950 to 1970, U.S. airline operators bought 67 percent of the
aircraft produced by U.S. manufacturers.
This situation began to change in the 1970s. Growth of the
more mature U.S. air travel market was the slowest of the seven
major world regions (about 5 percent a year versus an average of
about 9 percent elsewhere), and U.S. traffic dropped to a 40 per-
cent share of the passenger-miles flown. Since the early 1970s,
the world market for large transports has reflected the slower
rate of growth of air travel in the U.S. The 40 to 60 percent split
in new equipment orders favoring the. higher growth rates In
foreign markets is a reversal of market splits in earlier years.
Current market projections through the mid-1990s indicate a
continued gradual diminution of the U.S. share of world passenger
traffic (Figure 2-8). The traffic projections show the U.S. share
dropping from 40 percent in 1981 to some 36 percent by the
mid-1990s. Nevertheless, in absolute terms the U.S. market is
still the largest market, dnd it is projected to s'^ow significant
future growth.
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TABLE 2.7 Projected Growth in Air Travel
Share of Traffic (percent)
1970	 1982 1995
U.S.	 55	 40 36
Europe and Canada
	 29	 31 31
Rest of World
	 16	 29 33
100	 loo 100
Revenue-Passenger Miles (billions)	 288	 678 1,413
SOURCE: Presentation before U.S. Civil Aviation Manufacturing Industry Panel,
July 7, 1983, by H. C. Munson, Boeing Company, Seattle, Washington.
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The less developed countries are ealmated to have the most
rapid passenger growth. The Middle Eastern, Latin American,
Pacific Region, and Asian market segments are projected to
increase from 29 percent in 1982 to 33 percent of total passenger
service in 1995 (Table 2-7).
The success of a U.S. civil aircraft or engine program has
always been heavily dependent on winning a large share of the
international as well as the U.S. domestic market. The U.S.
maitufacturers have excelled in interpreting and satisfying the
product requirements of international markets. But with the
increased future importance of foreign airlines, the process of
launching new aircraft or engines by U.S. industry will require
even greater understanding of and responsiveness to the economic
needs and political environment of foreign airlines and govern-
ments. These needs are well understood by our foreign competi-
tors and have been exploited with great success by Airbus
IIndustrie and Rolls Royce in opening markets for their current
products.
Most foreign manufacturing competitors are backed by gov-
ernments whose goals are full employment, technology develop-
ment, and generation o,Z foreign currency in addition to commer-
cial gains. Consequently, these competitors are likely to stay in a
selected market, even if large expenditures are required to sustain
extended product development and production operations during
periods of very slow sales--witness the experience with the A300
discussed earlier. While such actions would be both unsound and
impossible for a private manufacturing company, they can make
long-term social and economic sense for individual countries.
Hence, this difference constitutes a formidable competition for
privately financed U.S. companies.
Although the airlines around the world are experiencing
problems similar to those of the U.S. airlines with respect to
traffic, overcapacity, and yield, their general business situation is
4..
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not as serious as that of the U.S. domestic airlines. The economic
recovery outside of the United States generally lags behind the
recovery In the United States, but traffic growth in many parts of
the world has been more vibrant than in the United States even
during the recessionary period largely because air transport Is a
less mature industry In the rest of the world. pare competition
for foreign operators, although more prevalent than in the past, is
not as severe as for U.S. domestic operators. This Is mainly due
to foreign government regulation of fares, pooling of revenues,
and control of capacity on routes between certain countries. On
most domestic routes in other countries there is usually only one
carrier, and any competition that exists Is generally tightly con-
trolled.
Most non-U.S. carriers are either government-owned or
government-supported in some way. in developed countries there.
is a modest trend toward having the carriers stand on their own
without subsidy or government-guaranteed financing, but not in
developing countries. With few exceptions, such as Swissair,
foreign carriers are largely instruments of their governments.
Consequently, support Is generally provided when it is truly neces-
sary. Thus, when traffic makes the acquisition of new aircraft
necessary, access to capital through government support is usually
available irrespective of the financial performance of the airline.
For much of the international market, export financing is very
important. Private sector banks are able and willing to lend or
lease at reasonable terms funds for procuring aircraft by foreign
airlines whose governments guarantee support for such transac-
tions. in the case of developing countries, the financial condition
of the airlines is usually weak, and the situation with regard to
capital availability for purchasing aircraft is bleak. This group of
carriers, while protected by bilateral agreements, often does not
have adequate traffic to operate profitably on international
routes. In addition, many of these carriers do not have a
profitable domestic system.
Even though they are government-owned, carriers of devel-
oping countries have difficulty borrowing from the private sector
to purchase aircraft even if the government guarantees the debt,
because the country itself is in a weak credit position. Since the
availability of capital for this group is uncertain, pressures are on
the aircraft manufacturers to suppor,..these aircraft sales with
help in financing. The availability of export financing is critical
to this group of customers, but clearly there are increased risks in
such transactions.
At a time when U.S. aircraft manufacturers face increased
competition from foreign manufacturers, They also face a chang-
ing market. With the U.S. air transport system maturing, inter-
national markets will represent an increasing portion of the total.
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Assum":
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— Medium size 6 range aircraft
Representative U.S. costs	 PROGRAM CASH
PR AM
LAUNCHING
COST
PRODUCTION
	
INTEREST
	
TOTAL CASH
COSTS
	
RECEIPTS FROM AIRLINES
	
TOTAL EXPENDITURES
DELIVERIESSTARr.
0	 2	 4	 a	 a	 10	 12
YEARS
N 1
^ 0
OO
0 -1
O -2
4
m -3
FIGURE 2-9 Typical Cash Flow Curve for ]Large Transport
Aircraft Program
SOURCE: International Competition in the Production and
Marketing of Commercial Aircraft, Boeing Company, March
1982. Based on curve from "Long Range Needs of Aviation #" a
report of the Aviation Advisory Commission, January 1983.
the financial ability to pay for what has been ordered less certain;
and the escalation in product liability awards that is affecting all
of industry. In addition, concurrent investments required for
equipment and training, and for productivity improvement, may
approach the development cost itself. And as noted earlier,
strong foreign competition is emerging.
The use of new technology is an essential element of the total
risk taken in the development of a new commercial aircraft. An
advance in the state of the art is essential to be competitive, but
if added performance is not achieved, or the advance is not cost-
effective for the customer, or the product is delayed because of
the new technical concept, additional costs are incurred and a
share of the market may be lost. The risk is compounded by the
need to make an early assumption about market share in estab-
lishing initial pricing. Any loss of aircraft performance or late
aircraft delivery could reduce market share, precluding financial
st <
.
.cess.
An example of such a risk was th: a desire to achieve the weight
saving and efficiency afforded by composite materials on the fan
of the Rolls Royce RB-211 for the Lockheed L-1011. In the early
h'.1
tjn
{ 1970s the failure of this new fan and the necessary use of a
backup titanium fan, with weight and balance changes to the air-
craft, affected costs and schedules adversely. The change so
perturbed the engine program that the Rolls Royce Company was
subjected to financial reorganization. The impact on Lockheed
included a forced hiatus in sales activity and near bankruptcy.
Afterwards, the L-1011 program did not achieve sufficient sales
and had to be terminated early because profitable future produc-
tion levels could not be predicted.-
i Technical risk was obviously not the sole reason for Lock-
heed's L-1011 financial straits and program termination. The
L-1011 was in head-to-head competition with an almost identical
transport, the McDonnell Douglas DC-10. The ensuing competition
forced unrealistic pricing levels on both airplanes. In addition,
the worldwide recession so reduced the projected total market,
and therefore both production rates, that pricing became even
more unrealistic. Nevertheless, the failure to achieve a planned
technical advance was a contributing factor in what eventually
became a major financial loss for Lockheed.
The experience of the Canadair Challenger business jet
illustrates the cost of delays associated with Increases in weight
and problems of engine performance that arose during develop-
ment. Cancellation of orders and lost sales have resulted, requir-
ing large additional capital investments that may never be
recovered from sales."
Conversely, failure to incorporate new technology can result
in a vehicle that is not competitive and as a consequence cannot
be successful. This situation is further exacerbated by the long
time periods involved in design, development, and production.
Deregulation in the United States and the trend toward
greater competition in foreign markets is causing restructuring of
many airlines and worldwide experimentation with service, sched-
ules, and routes and fare mix. The result is greater uncertainty
regarding new product requirements, as well as decreasing
prospects for large-volume sales of any one aircraft type.
In order to satisfy certification agencies and reduce their own
potential for Inability, airlines and aircraft manufacturers are
incurring major additional front-end costs to AOprove00 a technology
before it is introduced. In many respects the aviation industry 3s
encountering, in magnified form, growing public requirements for
utmost safety in all products.
Members of the Airbus IIndustrie consortium have stated 12 that
they place great emphasis on the risk associated with airplane
development and manufacture. This consideration played an
important role in forming the consortium and in its decision to
incorporate only proven technology in the A300.
,f
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The situation regarding risk Is somewhat Ironic because the
understanding of technical phenomena, analytical procedures,
testing, and operating experience that underlies present technol-
ogy Is clearly superior to that available earlier. It Is the financial
consequences of an error, or even a perceived error, that have
changed.
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF
AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURING
Given the situation described above, It Is not surprising that
since the end of World War III the number of prime free-world
manufacturers of large commercial transports has decreased from
22 to 5. Competitors failing to capture sufficient market share
	 j
have gone out of business or merged Into larger entities. The
	 I,
massive infrastructure of vendors and subsystem suppliers who f
helped to spread the capital requirements of the U.S. prime
contractors certainly contributed to their survival.	 One obvious
response has been to spread the risk and the requirement for large
financial resources by forming partnerships.
	 in Europe this led
first to national realignment of firms and then to multinational
programs, principally among the nationalized 'industries of Great
Britain, France, and West Germany, with each industry receiving
the financial backing of its respective government. It also led to
demands for offset manufacture of military aircraft among NATO
countries to help build an indigenous production base and to gener-
ate the funds to buy aircraft.
This trend of increasing internationalization
	 can	 also be C
observed among U.S. airframe and engine producers in the past 10
years. The joint venture of General Electric and SNECMA in
engines, the Fairchild-Saab joint venture in developing the 340
commuter aircraft, the Rolls Royce engines on the Lockheed
L-1011, and the involvement of Japanese and Italian firms as
risk-sharing partners on the Boeing 767 are examples of growing
foreign	 participation in the	 product development efforts of
American firms.
	 This same mode of operation is apparent
worldwide--witness the General Electric and Pratt and Whitney
engines on the A300, the 42 percent U.S. content in the British
BAel46, and the 40 percent U.S. and 20 percent Canadian content
in the Brazilian Bandeirante.
In addition to these joint ventures in aircraft and engine devel-
opment, the export of U.S. components for incorporation into air-
craft designed and built abroad has increased significantly. From
1978 to 1982 civil aircraft engine exports alone increased from x	 r	 -:
$300 to $800 million and parts from $2.1 to $4.0 billion. The full s
extent of these exports has not been carefully examined. yl
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partnerships, which respond to these additional criteria. The
converse is also considered to be true. Failure to form such
arrangements can reduce or eliminate market penetration.
The economic necessity for manufacturers to serve the total
world market is conceptually illustrated in Figure 2-10, which
shows representative effects on unit costs (of changes in produc-
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tlon volume) for a projected fleet of 700 aircraft. A 25 percent
reduction would result In a cost Increase of 10 percent. A 50
percent reduction would result In a cost Increase of 35 percent. If
a foreign government elected to Incur a cost penalty In order to
establish a domestic Industry that serves 25 percent of the world
market, the effect would be to dramatically change the pricing
and thus the profit prospects for a privately funded U.S. manufac-
turer. The 30- to 50-seat commuter aircraft market is a good
example of such a possibility. With the opportunity for profit
reduced or destroyed, due to a split market, the U.S. firm might
well choose not to enter, and the foreign competitor would then
have the total market available.
Other countries have made and will continue to make Impor-
tant contributions to aircraft and engine technology that U.S.
manufacturers will want to tap (e.g., aluminum-lithium alloys,
composite materials, electronic displays). International part-
nerships are an effective way of gaining access to such tech-
nology. The concept can work in both directions.
The relative merits of International partnerships are not easilyjudged. One must balance denial of access to a market and
possible creation of a future Independent competitor against at
least partial access to a market, with accompanying risk that one
may also be accelerating the development of technical compe-
tence by a partner--who may still eventually become a competitor.
Another complicating factor in evaluating the economic effect
of the internationalization of the industry is U.S. content in
"foreign1° aircraft--a situation noted earlier. Today American
manufacturers dominate the production of components used in
commercial transports. It is believed this position will hold for
the near future, but the longer term is less certain. U.S. firms
manufacture the major share of engines, avionics, control sys-
tems, environmental systems, and auxiliary power systems used in
aircraft in the free world, and much of the fasteners and aluml-
num from which the airframes are constructed. When sales to
third parties of foreign airplanes with high U.S. content are taken
into account, there can be a net positive U.S. foreign trade
balance despite the importation of these same aircraft by U.S.
customers. U.S. buyers, as well as third-party buyers of foreign-
made aircraft, are purchasing parts manufactured in the United
States--e.g., the A300 includes some 30 percent U.S. content in
terms of value. In most cases (prance is the principal exception)
UoS. components tend to continue to be used on aircraft of foreign
manufacture because local suppliers cannot afford the investment
for the sales volume available domestically.
Internationalization of aircraft manufacturing has a number of
additional important implications. One of the most significant is
the evolution of a new skill in managing transnational technology
ij
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development among partner firms. Until recently, multinational
development programs In any Industry, even within a single com-
pany, that operated In more than one country, were considered
very poor risks. The early difficulties In European cooperation In 	 #
aeronautics reinforced the apparent validity of the perception.
The success of the A300, the much smoother development of the
A310, the productive partnership of General Electric of the
United States and SNECMA of France, and the use of venture
partners on the Boeing 767 all signify the change. The Europeans,
	
!and the Japanese for that matter, have accumulated much experl-
	 !
ence and management skill in such undertakings. The competitive
value of such partnerships should not be underestimated. U.S.
manufacturers, approaching such a relationship from a position of
dominance, will need to demonstrate great sensitivity to the
position and attitude of their potential partners. A number of
	
x
members of Airbus Industrie perceive European companies as
potentially more attractive partners for the Japanese than U.S.
firms. Although this attitude may reflect some wishful thinking,
It also reflects past experiences with U.S. firms that adopted a
superior attitude in dealing with "junior" partners.
The use of consortia also has important Implications for the
nature of the Industry itself.
	
The major European partners In
Airbus all began as relative equals in aircraft manufacture. They
are evolving Into specialists in portions of aircraft--wings, fuse-
lage, control systems, flight deck, etc.
	
Concurrently, project
management, which was originally Intended to rotate among s
partners, is solidifying in the Aerospatlale complex at Toulouse,
where the major	 product integration and assembly work is
located. Airbus is headquartered in Paris. With this Increasing j
specialization--which is also fostered by the need to reduce
technological risk--the role of the systems integrator and project h
manager assumes greater leverage.
	 While a number of non-
French representatives of the Airbus consortium have expressed
concern about the long-term implications of this trend, they see
no alternative at this point; nor do they perceive the eventual
situation that may emerge. They have begun a journey because
they felt they had no choice, but the destination is unclear.
The increasing participation of foreign firms as partners and
major subcontractors in the development of new aircraft and
engines by U.S. firms has led to similar expressions of concern
over the impact of such arrangements on American technological
leadership and on employment In the U.S. aircraft industry. Of
concern is the increased opportunity such arrangements may pro-
vide for foreign participants to gain access to advanced American
aircraft and engine technology. According to this argument, the
more ready access of foreign firms to U.S. technology, in combi-
nation	 with
	 their	 own	 technology	 development--to
	
which
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(presumably) U.S. firms do not have access--can eventually Im-
peril the technological lead of the United States. The recipients
of the technology see the situation differently. Technology
exchange agreements typically call for all improvements In the
technology to be made available to all partners. This has been
characterized as attempting to win a race with a rigid pole
between the runner-up and the leader--the former°s efforts only
push the leader faster.
These concerns may reflect a misunderstanding of the basis
for the current American technological lead and misconstrue the
prowess and chain of relationships among research, technology
development, and product development. The key to maintaining
technological leadership Is to sustain a vigorous R&D program,
which generates a continuing stream of new knowledge and
understanding. A particular product development extracts from
that stream selected advances In technology to Incorporate Into
the product. By the time that development is complete, the R&D
effort, if It has continued, will have produced a rich additional
stream of new knowledge. Making a particular embodiment
available to a partner does not expose the underlying body of test
data, analytical procedures, design principles, and related
experience • associated with its production. Consequently, while
the product could be copied, it would provide limited information
for creating a different embodiment and of Itself would not give
away leadership. The valid hazard against which one must guard
is not that the technology might be given away by being embodied
in a product, but that support for the long-range research and
technology development might diminish, or of equal importance,
that the United States might fail to develop new aircraft that
incorporate the new technology.
The present status of U.S. technology is perceived by the panel
as a mixture of both parity and leadership. Increasingly, the
United States stands to benefit from, as well as to contribute to,
partners who are technically advanced. The European partners in
Airbus attest to the benefits derived from such partnerships. One
benefit, perhaps not so obvious, is that the vigorous, often frus-
trating discussions that occur among partners help to mittimize
design errors before they get as far as hardware- -even thougi'o the
discussions may also lengthen the project. Undoubtedly, national
pride also contributes to a sense of competition and a desire to
"look good01 in comparison with international partners. The nega-
tive side of partnerships is the building of potential competitors
and the slower decision-making process that is entailed.
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FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF THE INDUSTRY
Analysis of financial performance of civil aircraft manufac-
ture is very difficult because most of the important participants
are also involved in military aircraft and oth.:r aerospace busi-
nesses as well. Data on civil aircraft manufacture are not
developed on a continuing basis and current data are not avail-
able. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) made a hurried
analysis for the period 1970 to 1975, but it is out of date and
careful corroboration has never been carried out. DOD was
expanding its procurement of military aircraft during that same
period, and this too would affect profitability.
Data on the entire aerospace industry suggest a level of
performance Inconsistent with its image of leadership In high
technology and its critical contribution to economic strength and
national security. Charts A, B, and C in Figure 2-11 indicate a
return on sales and on assets (a widely used measure of financial
performance) that is significantly below that for all manufactur-
ing. The crossover on return on equity in 1977 reflects in part the
increase in debt financing that occurred during that period. The
aerospace companies are more highly leveraged than formerly.
As can be seen, aerospace financial performance has narrowed the
gap with all manufacturing since about 1979. Inability to disaggre-
gate data limits analysis, but it is known that many key industries,
such as automobiles, steel, and machine tools, had disastrous
performance that adversely affected overall profitability in
manufacturing at the same time that military procurement was
vacillating. Consequently, although the data are not conclusive,
the panel concludes that profitability in civil aircraft manufac-
ture has not been consistent with the picture of an industry that is
technologically dynamic and has world dominance.
The anecdotal evidence on profitability is still more discourag-
ing, even when allowing for the caveats about difficulties in
disentangling the costs of a very long term project. The life cycle
of a jet aircraft program Is approximately 40 years (7 to 10 years
of precursor R&D and design for the aircraft and the engine, 15 to
20 years of production, followed by another 15 years of continuing
application of the last aircraft produced). During that time, as
we have seen, the aircraft company may have invested $4 to $6
billion (exclusive of engine development) and have waited 10 to 15
years or more before it recovers the investment--even for
successful aircraft (Figure 2-11).
Evidence on the profitability of individual jet transport
families such as the 8707 or the DC-9 is not entirely consistent.
One author having intimate contact with the industry states that
out of 22 commercial jet aircraft developed, only 2--the Boeing
707 and 727--have been pro.^itable. 39 (The widely regarded
Economist adds the DC-8 to the list.") All others have been
1
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unprofitable. One must assume, however, that a number of the
U.S. programs may have achieved sizable positive cash flows at
times during their production that were critical to company
reinvestment needs for successive rounds of new product devel-
opments; otherwise, the U.S. civil industry would reflect a dif-
ferent history. During this period U.S. manufacturers dominated
a world market that was growing vibrantly. The modest financial
performance of the past suggests there could be serious problems
addressing future competitive opportunities. In addition to the
changes in markets and Internationai competition noted above,
the manufacturers are increasingly exposed to additional risk
because of the necessity to parti=ipate in financing the sale of
aircraft--a subject that will be discussed later. One cannot envy
aircraft manufacturers this financial and management challenge.
MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES
The changes occurring in the environment pose major chal-
lenges to the management of civil aircraft manufacturing. This
environment can be summarized as follows: Projections of mar-
ket requirements--always precarious--are ever, more so with the
structure and performance of U.S. airlines in turmoil and foreign
markets looming as increasing!y important in the future. The
investment required to launch new aircraft incorporating new
technology is escalating. With the l f a cycle of the first commer-
cial jet transports drawing to a close, one can begin to assess
their impact on the investment attractiveness of the aircraft
manufacturers, and the results are modest.
The deteriorating balance sheets and uncertain future of
domestic airlines are leading to increasing caution by the conven-
tional providers of financing for new aircraft; they are becoming
more cautious in providing additional funds. Consequently, manu-
facturers themselves are finding it necessary to participate in
financing sales of aircraft and thus to enlarge their own exposure
and increase their own requirements to raise capital.
After only limited success in 30 years of trying, the European's
now have presented to the world market a large transport that is
technologically sound and commercially viable. While one cannot
predict the future, it is unlikely that with this budding success the
Europeans will continue to accept a U.S. monopoly in large trans-
ports. The A300 provides the entry on which Airbus can build. In
addition, Japan has now announced its intention to become a
significant participant in aerospaceindustry.
In the face of this array, U.S. manufacturers also possess
formidable strengths: a decades-.tong record of ,producing tech-
nologically advanced, cost-effective aircraft that meet customer
needs; a global capability for service; massive investment in
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imodern facilities; an Infrastructure that in fact supports aircraft
manufacture globally; and technological leadership that, while 	 I
admittedly narrowing and vulnerable, still exists.1e
Among the many challenges with which manufacturers must
contend the following warrant special mention:
1. Accommodating the increasing cost associated with vali-
dating and introducing new technology in the face of a historical
record of modest financial results is a major challenge. The trend
toward managing escalating financial risk by moving toward
incrementa! improvements in technology and incorporating them
gradually through derivatives is a rational response. The skill
demonstrated in this initial phase of managing technology will
play a major role in determining the future success of aircraft
manufacturers.
2. Participating in financing aircraft sales will in many cases
determine whether a sale can be made. The ingenuity now being
displayed in this arena has opened a new dimension in competi-
tion; the size, sophistication, and flexibility of the U.J. capital
market and its long time	 scale	 are	 important competitive
resources that are being exploited through new financial instru-
ments and arrangements. These efforts inevitably include deeper
involvement in the sale of secondhand aircraft and increase the
risk of serious loss.
	
Special attention needs to be paid to the
development of new financial instruments and mechanisms that
will spread this risk.
3.	 Perhaps the biggest challenge is also the most subtle--
moving from a position of overwhelming global dominance to
senior partnership with manufacturers in other countries. 	 With
clear evidence of progress in intra-European :-,00peraton and
potential market success in sight, the Europeans are unlikely to
abandon their 30-year effort to participate in large transports.
The emergence of likely Japanese participation broadens this
competition and makes it more threatening. U.S. manufacturers
have already begun to respond--continued confrontation across {
the board does not appear attractive.
	
Steps toward interdepen-
dence will require learning how to work effectively in a partner-
ship mode--and some Europeans are saying they will make more
effective partners with the Japanese than will the powerful U.S.
firms. Subtle problems of balancing domestic employment versus
access to foreign markets and of preserving technological leader- a
ship while cooperating in technology development must also be
f aced.
4. Accommodating to the likelihood that the United States
will no longer be able to maintain leadership in every aeronautical'
design and production technology and ensuring leadership in those ^^	 s
technologies critical for preserving competitive advantage are
^additional	 challenges.	 Many	 governments	 in developed	 and x,	 •,
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developing countries have identified their civil aviation sectors
for special support. These governments recognize that establish- 	 I
ing a technology base in design and production is a mandatory
concomitar.t of achieving commercial viability, and they will do
whatever is necessary to create that base. The growing Impor-
tance of international markets increases the likelihood that
control of access to markets will be used as a lever for Increasing
participation in manufacture. The comparative technological
position of foreign firms will almost inevitably improve. Conse-
quently, it is no longer realistic to assume that leadership in
virtually all aspects of aircraft design and manufacture--which
the United States enjoyed for many years--will continue to be	 I
sustainable. Internationalization of manufacture may well
continue to grow, and the United States must recognize and
accept the likelihood of foreign parity or leadership in some
aspects of aircraft technology development and production.
Preserving the viability of the U.S. companies capable of 'eing
systems integrators in developing, designing, manufacturing, and
selling new aircraft is the key to preserving the critical mass of
the infrastructure required for national security and for competi-
tive leadership. Thus, initiating the actions that will retain the
United States' overall technological leadership in a matrix of
international cooperation_ requires special attention. It is impor-
tant for the managers of the civil aircraft industry and of the
supporting industrial substructure to determine those aspects of
development, design, and production that are critical to main-
taining competitive leadership. They must then allocate resources
selectively to achieve that objective. How these choices evolve is
a matter of private and public concern warranting careful
attention.
Exercising this kind of selectivity is complex and frequently
involves painful choices, but in the face of the emerging inter-
national competition it c!mnot be avoided. Managing inter-
national 'interdependence in technology in a way that preserves
overall leadership will call for vision and wisdom by U.S. managers
in an arena in which they have had relat,vely little experience.
PRESERVING HUMAN RESOURCES
Civil aircraft manufacture demonstrates in extreme form the
characteristics of a cyclical industry with high labor content.
Abrupt variations in equipment purchases by both DOD and the
airlines exacerbme the changes in volume. This characteristic of
the industry imposes especially severe employment uncertainty on
the skilled workers who design, test, and produce sophisticated'
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modern aircraft. Technological obsolescence creates an addi-
tional element of uncertainty for the work force. For example,
the Introduction of new materials and processes, new production
and assembly technologies, and methods of testing and quality
control often generate a requirement for radicaa!y different
skills. In the past the U.S. Industn y has responded to such change
or cyclical fluctuations in orders by fairing or laying off production
workers, engineers, and managers in pace with need. Forelgn
industries, constrained by !sws and social practices, have tended
to avoid expanding err s +1.+	 to meet demand peaks, have
subsidized employment <,s 	 ^:nmd, and have in some cases
resisted pressures for	 s.ai a .snge that would increase
productivity.
Fortunately, U.S. workers and labor unions in the industry have
long recognized the vital role of new technology in maintaining
the health of this industry. in the heightened competitive climate
of the aviation Industry it is exceedingly important for manage-
ment and workers and their union representatives to strengthen
the dialogue on the introduction of new technology. Worker
concerns over displacement, loss of income, and erosion of skills,
if not adequately addressed and if blamed on technology, can turn
into resistance to change that would be detrimental to the com-
petitive position of the industry. The growing awareness of the
important contribution that workers can make to improved pro-
ductivity and quality, when they feel that they have truly partici-
pated in the process of technological innovation, represents a
powerful opportunity for the industry to strengthen its competi-
tive position.
The assemblage of human skills and working team relationships
in the aircraft manufacturing industry represent a priceless and
irreplaceable national resource. A deterioration in financial
performance or a long gap in the development and launch of new
aircraft would seriously threaten the survival of these teams. If
they were dispersed, the loss would be severe--possibly irretriev-
able.
The United States has not yet developed adequate mechanisms
with which to dampen cyclical unemployment. Furthermore, the
social and economic costs such unemployment generates are
neither adequately quantified nor incorporated into the calcula-
tion of the economic contribution and performance, of the indus-
try. The fact that the timing of procurement for defense also
makes no allowance for employment stability only exacerbates
the problem. This is much less true in other countries. It is
apparent that a major consideration in the drive of other govern-
ments to establish an indigenous aviation industry is the attrac-
tive employment level and skill content associated with aircraft
manufacture. They also recognize the synergism between civil
rc
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and military aviation. Such governments give high priority to
	 }
employment stability, and they calculate the full social and
i	 economic costs of unemployment when negotiating sales and trade
agreements. These costs, In fact, become a factor In setting
	
F
prices, terms, and conditions for sale of aircraft. The goal is to
	
r
achieve a more nearly level production rate and increased pro-
ductlon efficiencies for these foreign manufacturers. if foreign
manufacturers deliberately limited thei° market penetration to a
	
i
level compatible with stable employment (a not unlikely scenario),
U.S. manufacturers would ►.e left to accommodate the even more
cyclical portion that remained. U.S. manufacturers, no matter
what they might wish, lark the resources to stabilize their pro-
,'	 duction rate. Nor are -they responsible for, or in a position to reap
fully, the associated social and economic benefits that accrue to
the nation from more stable employment.
Some panel members believe that the mechanisms that other
countries have established to ameliorate employment instability
have Imposed increased rigidity on their operations, reduced the
ability of management to respond rapidly to changing competitive
circumstances, and In turn resulted in restraints on technological
innovation In the workplace. They fear that these stabilizing
mechanisms would have the same Inhibiting effect on the United
States. Consequently, the desire of U.S. industry to maintain
technological momentum and to avoid these disadvantages sug-
gests the need to search for solutions less penalizing than the
political and economic solutions being used in other countries.
other panel members, however, suggest that increased employ-
ment stability creates a more favorable environment for techno-
logical innovation in the workplace, and that the social and
economic benefits of employment-stabilizing policies more than
offset the costs of any increased operating rigidities. Among the
problems that need urgent attention are:
• Retirement security--Due to the large variations in
employment, workers can complete an entire career in aircraft
manufacture and never accumulate enough time with one
employer to qualify for an adequate pension. it is reasonable for
management, workers, and government to give specific attention
to the development and implementation of policies and programs
that allow workers to accrue retirement benefits commensurate
with their employment experience, not just their attachments to
individual employers.
• Unemployment--it is a responsibility of management,
workers, and government to develop instruments that minimize
employment instability and ameliorate, insofar as possible, the
costs of periodic job loss, a condition that has been characteristic
of the industry. The "migrant" skilled worker phenomenon has not
yet been adequately addressed.
iI	 ^	 4t
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	 Training--The hlgh rate of technologlcal change In both the
product and workplace that characterizes the Industry imposes a
special requirement that there be mechanisms allowing workers to
develop new skills and to share equitably in the fruits of
technology.
	It is believed that resolution of these issues will promote the
	 t
	
flexibility and efficiency of the industry, advance its ability to
	 j
maintain a competitive lead in the Incorporation of new
technologies, and allocate costs and benefits more fairly across
the industry and the economy.
	 y
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IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
As mentioned repeatedly, throughout the post-World War 11 era
foreign governments have been heavily involved in supporting the
development, production, marketing, and sale of aircraft as well
as in the operation of a largely government-owned air transport
system.' This involvement has covered the spectrum from
mandating aircraft specifications to meet specific national airline
requirements (as in the case of government-owned British Euro-
pean Airways in specifying the design of the Trident), to funding
development (as in the case of the Conway engine, the Caravelle,
Concorde, and A300 aircraft), to financing uneconomically low
rates of production (for the RB-211, A300, A310, and other
aircraft) a
Foreign government support, through its ownership of c:
involvement in the industry, has also been directed at regional
transports such as the C-212, the helicopter family of Aero-
spatiale, the Canadair Challenger, the British BAe146, the
Bandelrante of Brazil, and the CN235 developed jointly by
Nuritania of Indonesia and CASA of Spain.
This support was provided for a variety of reasons, as has been
noted, e.g., to sustain an indigenous industry, to avoid a condition
of dependency, to provide •employment, to stimulate technical
growth, and to foster national prestige. The limited commercial
success of such foreign aircraft through the 1970s minimized the
competitive impact on the U.S. aircraft industry. On balance, the
programs probably constituted a net drain to the economies of the
countries involved. Such calculations are not easily made, how-
ever, in part because assumptions must be made about the level of
unemployment if the program had not peen sponsored, about the
social and economic costs of unemployment and about the value
or loss of value of the spread of technslogy to other industries.
ii.	 +  ^	
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There can be no doubt that government Involvement changes
the competitive equation significantly, Not only Is the calcula-
tion of costs and benefits based on broader and more diffuse
	
criteria than Is possible for a private company, but also the time	 j
	periods for judging results and seeking payback are much longer.	 f
For example, Airbus A300 production began In 1972, but when
deliveries . T n in 1977 there was only a total of 10 firm orders.
	
Furthermore, the terms specifying timing and conditions of	 I
payback are often more indeterminate than is possible with a
conventional private financial arrangement: The production of
the A300 and A310 for inventory, begun during the 1981-1982
recession, Is still continuing. No private enterprise could, or
	
would, propose these actions. The production for Inventory
	
r
provides a marked delivery advantage as a market recovers. It
	
also provides a powerful incentive to offer below-market terms 	 1
and conditions for sales financing in order to move the aircraft
out of inventory. Both faster delivery and attractive financing
have obvious competitive advantages.
Another way In which government involvement affects the
competitive situation Is In its capacity to sustain a program over
long time periods. For example, only 180 Australian Nomads were
sold in 18 years. The Europeans have been seeking to establish a
viable civil aircraft Industry for almost 30 years, and to a degree
they are now beginning to succeed. in 1980 Japan's Ministry of
International Trade and industry (MITI) identified aerospace as
one of Japan's future industries, and the building of a capability
for its aerospace technologies as one of the two most important
things for the Industry's future (see Note 8, Chapter 3)• This and
MITI's announced plans for Japan's aircraft sector to be competi-
	
tive with Western industry by 2010 indicate the long time scale 	 i
with which Japan's government approaches targeted industries.
The common assumption among both U.S. and European aircraft
manufacturers is that Japan intends to play a major role some-
time in the mid-1990s and beyond and to use international joint
	
development programs as an avenue to build competence. Indeed, 	 G
the long time intervals for design and development and the long
aircraft lifetimes are well matched to the long time horizon that
can characterize government initiatives.
The airline procurement process has always been politicized.
It is Instructive to note that British Airways, Air France, and Air
Inter (a domestic French airline) were required to purchase the
BAC-1.11, the Trident, and the Caravelle as long as they were in
production. More recently, the Airbus A300 and A310 have
benefited from this directed mode of procurement in France.
Involvement by the French government was evident in the
engine procurement decision for the Air France Airbus A310
during the last half of 1979: The General electric-SNECMA.
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( U.S.-French) partnership$
 was competing vigorously with Pratt
and Whitney. The speclAc engine Involved was a version of the
CF6, but GE and SNECMA had an extensive history of coproduc-
tion of engines and were also currently partners In developing a
	 =
new engine, the CFM 56. Which engine Air France should be
allowed to purchase was the subject of debate between ministries
of the French government and was the subject of two formal
Interministerial reviews. The government finally directed pur-
chase of the GEJSNECMA engine, with Its partial French con-
tent. This example not only demonstrates the impact of govern-
ment involvement but also the advantage of an international
partnership for a U.S. manufacturer.
The trends In air transport noted earlier, which forecast more
rapid growth for the developing countries, amplify the slgnifl-
cane of government involvement In future marketing and sales.	 tSince most airlines in these countries are nationally owned and	 4
aircraft procurements represent major expenses, the procure-
ments are subject to review at ministerial levels. Inevitably, the
process is politicized. With Airbus looming as a major competi-
tor, the opportunity Is growing for purchasing decisions to be
made, as they have been, through government-to-government
negotiations.
Situations in which a foreign government is involved in
negotiations are frequently subject to widespread allegations of
offers of tie-in sales, technology assistance in other fields, and
counter-trade proposals that a private firm cannot match. The
belief is widespread in Industry that these inducements are fre-
quently used and are effective. Not surprisingly, no documented
evidence of such arrangements is available. The experience of
U.S. government administrators who monitor activities in this
field Is that such actions are sometimes attempted, but In fact
rarely work and can be countered by candid discussion. On
occasion the pressure generated by zealous government support
has been counterproductive. These somewhat differing points of
view undoubtedly reflect the different ch4nnels of information
that are available to each group.
i
IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
The Agreement on Trade in CIvII Aircraft, effective January
1, 1980, concluded under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) as part of the Tokyo Round, is one of several multi-
lateral agreements intended to control and monitor government
subsidies and other trade practices affecting civil aircraft sales.
This agreement requires the abolition of all customs duties on
trade in aircraft and many of their components, the avoidance of
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government pressure on parties to procurement transactions, and
requires that "civil aircraft prices should be based on a reasonable
expectation of recoupment of all costs."
The agreement has facilitated trade in aircraft components,
but Is neutral to the internationalization of the industry throughjoint ventures and licensing. Although practice varies among
countries, the experience of U.S. trade administrators and U.S.
industry is that the agreement is useful. For example, both Great
Britain and West Germany are thought to exact conditions for
lending and repayment that are somewhat comparable to those
that would be required by private financiers.
The issue of subsidy Is exceedingly complex. in virtually every
developed country, Including the United States, intimate relation.
ships between government and aircraft manufacturing have
existed for decades. The relationship covers every aspect of the
industry from research to manufacturing facilities to sales
financing. Modes of support are diverse and obscured by the
passage of time. Opportunities for argument abound on every
detail that may be under negotiation regarding a particular sale
and legitimate costs for the pricing of a product. Consequently,
one must have modest expectations regarding attainable progress
in trade discussions to assure compliance with agreements. One
must keep in mind that the U.S. objective is not to eliminate sub-
sidies (an unrealistic goal), but rather to eliminate trade-distorting
subsidies such as selling below cost! The fact remains that
negotiations related to previously agreed trade standards repre-
sent the only vehicle currently accepted by our trading partners.
The United States has little choice except to pursue trade nego-
tiations as vigorously as possible, recognizing their limitations.
To do otherwise Invites trade wars with implications and ramifi-
cations that are difficult to predict, much less control.
The aircraft industry suffers from two special vulnerabilities
connected with the ex post facto monitoring of compliance with
international trade agreements: the large size of individual air-
craft purchases and the leverage gained by initial sales. Aircraft
purchases tend to come in spurts rather than in a continuous flow
as an airline replaces aging equipment or adds capacity. Conse-
gv-1-r, a y, by the time gave terms of a transaction have been deter-
rne3nvd to be in violation of a trade agreement the entire sales
opportunity can be over. The importance of this circumstance is
magnified by the leverage of initial orders. Airlines prefer
commonality of equipment for better logistics in stocking parts
and for greater efficiency in the operation of flight and main-
tenance crews. Consequently, the manufacturer who secures the
initial order has a major advantage with respect to all subsequent
orders. l.,
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While various provisions of the Agreement on Trade In Civil
Aircraft have been questioned, the agreement does provide a
forum for discission on trade policy Issues that can prevent the
occurrence of or help resolve a dispute before it escalates. It also
strengthens the basis for demonstrating Injury and pursuing
countervailing duties and other actions within the United States.
The agreement is weakened to a degree by its failure to
include all of the nations involved in aircraft production. Brazil,
Israel, Spain, Indonesla, and Australia are not signatories. There
is some reason to believe that their reluctance to sign reflects a
desire to change their competitive position in the world market.
Spain will be brought under the terms of the agreement should itjoin the EEC. The agreement's enforcement on a "most-favored
nation" basis, however, means that signatory and nonsignatory
nations are treated equally by signatories and thus nonsigratories
have no incentive to join insofar as tariff protection is con-
cernnd. The "most-favored nation" treatment, however, does
provide a basis for discussions with nonsignatories of their policy
on import restrictions. Brazil, Israel, and Indonesia are protected
by the agreement's tariff provisions In approaching the U.S.
market, but the agreement is not binding on their governments
with regard to sales in those countries. Enforcement of the
agreement, though aggressively pursued, has been hampered to
some degree in the past by insufficient data and staff resources.
Recent steps taken in the U.S. Department of Commerce to
organize along the lines of industrial segments and to increase
staff manyfold have dramatically strengthened the U.S. capability
for monitoring and enforcement. U.S. administrative support is
now comparable in an absolute sense with that in key European
countries; however, elected officers at the highest level, the
diplomatic corps, and even royalty are thought to be more actively
involved In supporting trade than their counterparts in the United
States. Furthermore, the aggregate participation of those
countries in international trade In civil aircraft is small compared
with its importance to U.S. trade. Unfortunately, our expanded
effort is vulnerable to the political changes in administration.
The uanel endorses the recent action to strenathen capability
exnrTing To Tne undtea JTates.
ne might arguetha t is effort could be facilitated by the
possible revocation of "most-favored nation" status for non-
signatory countries, a basic principle of GATT. Such a step
.1
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obviously should be taken only after active negotiation to induce
nonsignators to join Indicates the futility of other measures and
with careful consideration of the consequences. It chief value
would be as a threat.
The panel also recommends more vl orous data collection
monitoringg assessmento ana enforcement of the GATTa regiment
by government personnel for all segments of the aircraft industr y,
not justare commercial e s.
Enforcement  cou a facilitated by a higher degree of coordl-
nation among the U.S. agencies most directly Involved In Imple-
mentation--the United States Trade Representative 's office, the
Department of Commerce, the Department of State--and those
agencies responsible for related, and frequently conflicting,
pollcles--the Department of State, the Department of Defense,
and the National Security Council.
rE,
Providing More Flexible and Timely Response
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Foreign support of R&D, risk capital, and export finance are
indicative of a larger policy issue, namely, the desire , of foreign
governments to support the development of an indigenous aircraft
industry using economic criteria that are not applic46le to private
firms In the United States. Agreements aimed at controlling
government subsidization of Indigenous lndi^,vtrles inevitably can
be evaded, given a political will to do so. However; the U.S.
government should continue to pursue such agreements for the
reasons that have been indicated. Nonetheless, in the final
analysis; it may be necessary to develop U.S. policies that
recognize the "targeting" of the civil aircraft Industry by foreign
governments and that reflect the broad national security,
economic, and social interests served by a healthy U .S. aircraft
manufacturing industry. Said another way, it Is desirable to
recognize that economic and social Interests are important
dimensions of national security along with the obvious dimension
of military strength.
The transitory nature of many of the most flagrant foreign-
government trade policies and the problems of large Individual
orders and first-sale leverage, noted earlier, suggest the impor-
tance of timeliness and the need for a variety of potential
responses in formulating+and ;44ministering U.S. trade policy--
responses that can vary in strength, In length, and in the nature of
their administrative implementation. Options could Include much
closer coordination of U.S. military developmers t and procurement
practices with Industrial need, tighter and more extensive integra-
tion of NASA with civil R&D, as well as more aggressive U.S.
export finance policies.
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One area of action that should be explored In response to fla-
grant distortion of trade agreements by foreign governments Is
the possible utility of retaliatory measures that are clearly tem-
porary * Temporary measures that permit immediate unilateral
action could expire In six months or less, barring certification of
continued subsidization of sales or other forms of predatory
action by foreign governments. Examples of such temporary
policies Include the denial of investment tax credit on the
foreign-produced (non-U.S. labor) content of imported aircraft, or
the prohibition of loans uncaer the FAA loan guarantee program
for purchases of foreign aircraft with a U.S. content below some
threshold (e.g., 35 percent). Such retaliatory measures are not
without danger, because they in turn invite retaliation, not neces-
sarily In the field In question, but rather where the foreign
government feels it has the greatest leverage. Their existence on
a standby basis, however, would be a clear signal of the impor-
tance attached to the problem and would add another dimension
to the options available to our trade negotiators. Foreign trade
negotiations are like a high -stakes poker game, and it is Important
for our negotiators to have as potent a list of bargaining ploys as
do their counterparts.
Temporary measures could, in principle, be Invoked on short
notice and could thus help alleviate the problems of slowness of
response. As noted earlier, the pace of commercial negotiations
and the ebb and flow of competitive success in the marketplace
are frequently faster than the ability to mobilize the machinery
of government and to generate a response. Improvement requires
action by both mdustvy and government. In the past, there have
been painful occasions when by the time some members of the
industry recognized the need to invok: government participation,
learned to deal with the bureaucracy, and built a case that would
initiate government action, and appropriate government ag ncles
had coordinated their positions, the transaction had already been
completed. The recent changes In the U.S. Department of 	 !
Commerce {provide the basis for more timely government action.
Recognition of these changes Is not yet widespread in Industry.
Both trade associations and government must be active in
fostering improvement. Government can be most useful when it
is involved early and can initiate discussions with other govern-,
ments before bargaining ploys have surfaced anra pn^,itions h: +e
become more intractable.
iCj,
and the long time interval associated with payback, financing
terms have significant leverage on the eventual cost to the
customer. The discussion that follows will examine the general
situation and then look specifically at the circumstances for large
aircraft and smaller aircraft. Export cred',t and export subsidies
are a common feature of foreign trade and a topic on which
Organization for Economic Cooperation -.nd Development (OECD)
negotiations were conducted in 19%5. The agreement was
intended to cover all capital goods, but Great Britain, France,
West Germany, and the United States were unable to reach
agreement on civil aircraft--an indication of the resolve of others
to alter the competitive picture in aircraft. Consequently, a
so-called "standstill" was adopted under which the OECD nations
agreed not to offer in the future terms more favorable than then
being offered.
The 1975 "standstill" set a maximum of 10 years on the
repayment period for loans to purchase large transport aircraft,
but 12 years for leases. However, it set no minimum for interest
rates. The limitation on the term of the repayment period does
not coincide with the useful life of aircraft (20 to 25 years);
furthermore, it abrogates a powerful U.S. competitive weapon,
the strong long-term (20 to 30 years) capital market, a feature
lacking in Europe. This short period in itself constitutes a barrier
to sales because it mandates a rapid repayment schedule that
necessitates large early payments.
As market interest rates began to escalate, the United States
found itself in an increasingly disadvantageo^is position. The
absence of a minimum for interest rates offered opportunities for
increasing levels of subsidy through lower-than-market interest
rates--a conditi~,n the agreement was intended to bring under
control. Airbus inade aggressive use of such interest subsidies in
its marketing.
As interest raves escalated further, the United States
undertook to negotiate a "commonline" with the Airbus-financing
governments. We succeeded in establishing a minimum interest"
(eventually 12 percent on U.S. dollar loans) that was still below
market rates, with the repayment period remaining at 10 years.
Agreements in export finance are no stronger than the
political will of their signatory governments. However, these
agreements clarify and ratify the basis for retaliatory actions,
	
and they provide a forum for continuing multilateral and bilateral
	 i
negotiations over trade policy.
	
The panel endorses and recommends continued vigorous efforts
	
!
to eliminate all orms of trade-distorting mechanisms7
 so that
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Large Aircraft
The Export-Import Bank (Eximbank), as part of the "common-
line" agreement relating to large transport aircraft, charges a
fixed rate of 12 percent plus a 0.5 percent commitment fee.
However, it charges a 2 percent application fee that is paid either
up front or over the first six semiannual installments. This pro-
cedure raises the effective rate to 12.5 percent. On the guaran-
tee option, the guarantee fee is 0.5 percent with no loan applica-
tion fee. However, the funding of the guaranteed paper is at
market rates.'
The European export agencies only provide credit guarantees,
but will support aircraft exports to the extent of 62.5 percent of
the cost of the aircraft rather than 42.5 percent as in - he case of
the Eximbank. In consequence the U.S. has offered 62.5 percent
and the Europeans have come down to 42.5 percent on recent
competitive transactions. Eximbank repayment occurs only after
private lenders have been repaid. The funds are provided by
private institutions, but the export, agencies subsidize the rate at
the commonline level, which is presently 12 percent. Both the
Eximbank and the European agencies will provide financing up to
85 percent if the other offers it.
The basic result is that the direct financing of a sale is close
to parity except for the 2 percent application fee (the normal
European fee is 0.3 percent). This fee makes the financing of the
U.S. export more expensive and is particularly onerous because it
represents an "up front" payment from airlines that frequently are
scrambling to raise she down payment on the aircraft. The market
rate for the Eximbank guarantee of 85 percent of the cost is
balanced against the subsidized interest rate on up to 62.5 percent
financing by the Europeans with the balance of 27.5 percent at
market rate. However, in cases where the Europeans go up to 85
percent with a subsidized rate, the Eximbank guarantee program
is more expensive, particularly when the 0.5 percent commitment
fee is included.
Although the commonline agreement that relates to large
transport aircraft calls for a 10-year term, both Eximbank and the
Europe-an agencies are willing to guarantee a 12-year lease trans-
action. However, a 12-year term and the requirement of equal
semiannual a ments of rinci al dame a the economics of a t xP Y	 P	 P	 g	 alease. The optimal time period of a tax lease is 15 to 18 years.
Another competitive problem for the U.S. manufacturers
relates to the practice of the European manufacturers to fund
their exports in their own currencies. Under the-, terms of
commonline agreements, the European export credit agencies may
lend German marks at 9.5 percent and French francs at 11.5
percent, while U.S. dollar loans are at 12 percent. In competi-
jY
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tions over the last several years it has become very clear that not
all airlines regard these rates in the various currencies as equiva-
lent. The U.S. Eximbank will lend only dollars but allows its
guarantee to be used to raise loans in other currencies. This
latter option does rot match the European offers because com-
mercial banks cannot offer to fix an interest rate 18 to 24 months
in advance of aircraft delivery and, in any case, will lend only at
commercial rates. The French franc rate has been highly sub-
sidized during the entire existence of the commonline agree-
ment. The only solution that completely neutralizes this issue is
for Eximbank to offer to lend directly at commonline rates not
only U.S. dollars but also German marks and French francs.
	
United States exporters are adversely affected by Eximbank
	 5policy with respect to airlines of developing countries. The
Eximbank charter requires "a reasonable assurance of repayment,"
which is often used to turn down loan applications from airlines of
developing countries. In contrast, the European export agencies
	
are more liberal. It should also be noted that the "commonline" 	 i
agreement does not cover exports of Fokker and British Aero-
space to developing countries. However, on such transactions, the
commonline agreement on interest cost is adhered to on 85 to 95
percent of the transactions.
Another disadvantage for U.S. manufacturers is that the
Eximbank will not cover the foreign content of a U.S. export
while the European export agencies will. In consequence, the U.S.
exporter has to find another way to finance this portion of the
aircraft cost. With growing percentage of foreign content in U.S.
aircraft exports, this becomes an increasing problem and a com-
pet i tive disadvantage for the U.S. manufacturers.
The Eximbank and the European agencies now have an infor-
mal understanding not to provide financing commitments in one
another°s countries, i.e., the United Kingdom, France, West
Germany, and the United States. This recent development can
prevent some of the unusual transactions condu 'ted in the past.
Unfortunately, the Eximbank has been inconsistent over the
years not only in its policy toward large aircraft exports but also
in administering that policy. This has inhibited the ability of cus-
	
tomers to plan their equipment purchases and related financing. 	 f
In dealing with the European agencies they knew where they
stood. Although Eximbank will meet foreign competition, it is
often unwilling to provide financing where no competition exists.
This policy limits sales to some customers, particularly to devel-
oping countries where alternative sources of funds are not avail-
able. More disturbing is the policy of Eximbank to insist on a
competitive offer from a foreign manufacturer before it will
agree to finance a U.S. aircraft export. This can have the effect
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of requiring the aircraft manufacturers to induce competition
	
when none may otherwise have existed. 	 !
As can be seen, the Eximbank export support for large trans-
ports falls short of meeting foreign competitive financing. In
consequence, the burden has fallen on the manufacturer to pro-
	
vide competitive financing. Competitive pressures in financing	 t
international sales have combined with an uncertain earnings
outlook and cash flow difficulties to stimulate new forms of
financing. Many carriers and their lenders have become hesitant
to take on substantial long-term debt service commitments for
new aircraft. Ironically, the succzss of an industry that has
historically been a bellwether of technological innovation is
	
increasingly dependent on innovation in financial instruments and 	 t
arrangements.
Some recent transactions for both domestic and international
	
carriers have been based on an operating-lease concept in which 	 ?	 +
th:: airline commits itself to lease aircraft for a two- or three-
g ear lease payment term. The concept involves structuring the
cransaction as a tax lease with the lessor taking the investment
tax credit and the accelerated depreciation. This then reduces
the lease payments. The balance of the cost is raised from banks,
institutional lenders, or the public market.
	
The problem associated with such operating leases is that	 -	 4
should the airline return the aircraft at the end of the initial lease
term, the senior lenders would have considerable exposure against
	
the residual value of the aircraft, and the equity investor would	 `	 }
be in danger of losing the tax benefits if the aircraft could not be
leased again. As a result, some mechanism must be devised that
would make such a transaction, with its residual risk implications,
attractive to both equity investors and senior lenders.,
In spite of the inadequacy of airline operating profits to pay
	for "new generation" aircraft, manufacturers have been under 	 V
considerable pressure to get their aircraft in the hands of carriers
that represent good potential for follow-on orders, particularly
when the alternative would be to close down the aircraft manu-
facturing line. Not surprisingly, many recent transactions have
involved substantial manufacturer financing.
Senior lenders could probably be induced to take an asset risk
in the range of 50 to 60 percent of the aircraft price, provided the
manufacturer were willing to assume the responsibility of remar-
keting the aircraft in the event of a default by the airline. Unfor-
tunately, banks are limited to a 25 percent asset risk on an
operating lease. It might be possible to secure residual value
tf:	 insurance for a portion of the -,sset risk. However, the market for 	 r
residual value insurance is thin, and the volume of the risk	 ui pli
can be covered in this manner is uncertain. Consequently, t is
not clear that a large number of aircraft could be financed on this
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basis, because of the problems outlined. in addition, the expense
of the insurance can adversely affect the economics of the
transaction.
Another possible approach that might reduce the residual risk
is to develop a special entity to purchase aircraft and enter into
operating leases with a number of airlines. The risk would be
spread over time and over a large number of borrowers since not
every airline would turn back aircraft at the end of the initial
lease period.
The financial community, the, aircraft manufacturers, and the
airlines need to continue efforts to design financing packages that
meet airline minimal cash flow and balance sheet requirements
and that minimize the exposure of the inaoufacturers while assist-
ing them in making sales. The panel recognizes that use of tax
policy to improve international competitiveness is controversial,
largely because it involves tax "expenditure" to encourage
exports. Those exports do, however, represent business that
otherwise would not exist and thus enlarge the tax base. Never-
theless, government tax policies obviously will continue to play a
critical role in determining the attractiveness of such
arrangements.
The panel recommends consideration of additional measures
that would enable aircraft manufacturers to reduce the risk in
leasing 	 to lomestic and foreign customers. Many of
t es^i a steps would involve removalof eRa roadblocks rather than
Unlike banks or other financial entities that are currently or
prospectively engaged in such leasing (e.g., insurance companies),
aircraft firms engaging in leasing do not hold highly diversified or
liquid portfolios of financial assets or have a broad customer base
compared with financial institutions. Therefore, large transport
and especially commuter aircraft producers face greater risk of
catastrophic financial losses than more diversified lessors. The
ability of U.S. aircraft producers to finance new products in the
deregulated airline environment would be enhanced if restrictions
that determine a "true" lease (i.e., one that allows five-year
depreciation) and the claiming of the investment tax credit on the
part of the lessor were liberalized. Easing restrictions would
partially equalize the financial risks faced by lending institutions
and aircraft roducers in le=sin and allow aircraft demand to beP	 g
exercised.
Leases of aircraft to foreign operators also have increased in
recent years. However, current tax policy penalizes leases to
foreign customers by restricting the eligibility for investment tax
credit (ITC). Actions that would eliminate ITC for all non-U.S.
aircraft operators would be counterproductive to this country's 	 I'efforts to sell aircraft to non-U.S. operators. Continuing the use
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of tax leasing to the international airline community is an impor-
tart marketing tool. An additional step that would be useful in
enhancing sales to developing countries would be to include
aircraft as infrastructure project equipment that qualifies for
Agency for International Development (AID) and World Bank
funding.
In view of the fact that over 60 percent of the current civil
transport aircraft market is outside the United States, the avail-
ability of the investment tax credit to foreign operators will have
a major and beneficial impact on the market for U.S. aircraft.
Determining the net benefit or cost will require careful analysis.
The importance of foreign markets for the U.S. civil aircraft
manufacturing industry means that congressional proposals to deny
even the current, restrictively defined investment tax credit to
foreign operators could have a serious and detrimental impact on
the industry. However, as noted earlier, the denial of the invest-
ment tax credit on foreign aircraft purchases could serve a useful
purpose as a temporary measure to countervail unfair trade
practices. The earlier admonitions with respect to the dangers of
invoking retaliatory measures must be repeated.
Recent changes in legislation have been enacted to improve
the utility of special corporations to permit deferral of U.S. taxes
on foreign sales. The rules governing the corporations (formerly
called Domestic International Sales Corporations [DISCs], but now
called f=oreign Sales Corporations [FSCs]) have been modified to
bring them into conformance with GATT. In the new legislation
changes have been made that reduce the obligation for demon-
strating a foreign presence for smaller firms, and they all provide
for partial exemption of taxes rather than partial deferral, as
formerly permitted. These changes can be of benefit to smaller
enterprises in the civil aircraft industry i:i their efforts to expand
export sales.
The panel recognizes that the subject of providing government
support for financing export sales of aircraft L controversial (the
same could be said for other long-lived capital goods that require
large expenditures, e.g., electe ical generating equipment). Oppo-
nents assert that the support benefits a few large companies--an
assertion that ignores the benefit to the 15,000 enterprises that
supply materials, components, and subsystems to the major
designers and assemblers of aircraft. Opponents also assert that
competitive markets should be allowed to work and question why
American taxpayers should be asked to support foreigners who buy
U.S. aircraft. To the first the panel responds that it is unrealistic
to regard the international market for aircraft as "competitive 11 in
the classical sense employed in economics. As this report has
indicated, many countries--large and small, highly developed and
developing--have explicitly targeted aircraft manufacture as an
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industry in which to participate. Financing is an area in which
competitive advantage can be established much more easily than
in technical superiority, better product planning, or better ser-
vice. Private firms face abnormal forces when they attempt to
compete in such a market. In an era in which balance of payments
looms as a problem of major and continuing concern, it is impor-
tant for government policy to recognize the realitic,> of the
international market in which a major source of exports operates.
Small Aircraft
In the case of small aircraft the impact of financing terms can
be so large that it changes the competitive balance in the purchase
of aircraft and can Induce an airline to purchase foreign equip-
ment. In some cases, if there were no access to very attractive
terms, no equipment would be purchased at all. The preferential
financing terms being offered by some foreign export agencies
and manufacturers include a minimal down payment, below-
market interest rate, lengthy maturity, and deferral of the
repayment of principal for a number of years. Some U.S. regional
airlines, with balance sheets and income 'statements that would
not permit raising funds in the private debt markets, are pur-
chasing foreign aircraft with these below-market financing terms.
These arrangements are the equivalent of discounting. For
example, increasing the repayment period from 7 to 19 years
produces savings to the buyer equal to a discounted present value
of 11 percent of the purchase price. Alternatively, offering an
interest rate of 6 percent versus 12 percent provides a reduction
equivalent to 16.7 percent of the purchase price at a given repay-
ment interval. (Differentials of this magnitude have, in fact,
been encountered.) These savings in cash have a significant
effect on breakeven point and thus on the competitive position of
an airline. Naturally, cash-limited airlines welcome such con-
cessionary credit terms.
To meet this competition, the Eximbank now offers the
Medium Term Credit Program for U.S. manufacturers seeking to
export general aviation aircraft. This program is directed at
exports of all products including aircraft, providing funds for
loans with a term normally of seven years, where foreign
competition can be demonstrated to be drawing on subsidized	 i
export credits. The program provides no help in meeting foreign
competition in the domestic market. This program is especially	 I'
important because, as noted earlier, the market potential for
regional aircraft is growing dramatically. Since aircraft of these
!
	
	 sizes are within the capability of a modest-sized economy
	 }(especially if it purchases sophisticated components from the
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United States), a number of countries are competing in th
marketplace--and offering attractive financing as part of th
' package, e.g., the United Kingdom, France, Brazil, and Indonesia
Under the Medium Term Credit Program the Eximbank makes
fixed interest-rate loan commitment to the U.S. bank financin
the export sale by loaning its funds on a recourse basis. Eximban
lends up to 85 percent of the contract value, and the buyer mus
make a 15 percent cash payment.
Most transactions under this program do not exceed $5 million
but recently the Eximbank agreed to change this limit to $1
million. The term for this type of loan is generally seven year
however, exceptions have been made extending the term to 1
years.
Loan pricing (cost) is based on whether the purchaser 's countr
is rated 1„ 2, or 3 in order of increasing risk. At present, for a "1
country the interest rate would be 12.4 percent, plus the usual 0.
percent commitment fee.
To qualify for this program the U.S. aircraft manufacture
must provide evidence of subsidized competition from a foreig
manufacturer.
While the Eximbank has played a major role in support of th
export of large transports, similar assistance for rotorcraft
business, and commuter aircraft exports has been less abundan
and/or effective until the inauguration of the medium-tern
Eximbank facility.
Despite the limited participation in this program at this earl,
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The Eximbank medium -term credit program has the potential
to assist in exports of many industries, including those outside the
aircraft industry, where the individual transactions tend to be
modest in size. The panel believes that the Eximbank 's operations
and policies shouil give highest priority to supporting the ability
of U.S. exporters to offer comparable financing. The fact that in
the case of smaller transactions such actions would incur higher
administrative burdens should not be used as a deterrent.
Predatory financing presents a dangerous problem for
imports.	 Although presently prohibited by "informal"
understandings, a more certain solution should be sought.
Establishing the capability at Eximbank to match terms offered in
the U.S. market is better than providing a penalty after the fact
through countervailing duties. The latter does not restore to a
U.S. bidder the opportunity to win a sale. Matching terms is not
prohibited in the Eximbank charter, but it would require a major
change in practice. The panel recognizes that use of such a
capability should be approached with caution because it could
invite domestic customers to stimulate foreign competition in
14	
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order to obtain better financing. Nevertheless, the availability of
this type of action would signal the United States' determination
to deter predatory pricing in U.S. markets as well as in foreign
markets.
It should be noted that o!though Eximbank represents an
impo. • tant source of financing for exp-, ,,), t sale of aircraft, it serves
many other industries as well. Consequently, actions of the type
suggested below have as their objective improving the effective-
ness of Eximbank in serving all of industry. In much of capital
goods the terms of financing become a powerful competitive
weapon that can counteract both technological strength and
manufacturing efficiency.
STRENGTHENING EXIMBANK'S ROLE
Eximbank reexamine its mode of
nauonai com enuon IaCLng an oz U.a. civic aviation as weu as au
U.S. industry. Eximbank pays a critical roe in We aviation
industryp  andshould make efforts to improve its ability not only to
remove impediments but to strengthen the competitive position of
the industry. Examples include establishing a consistent policy
toward exports to ensure customer confidence; eliminating the
requirement for a competitive offer from a foreign manufacturer
as a condition of Eximbank financing, permitting foreign content
to be included in the financing packages, and extending the term
of Eximbank--guaranteed financing from 10 to 15 years.
NOTES
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available in Parker, Elbert C., "Foreign Transfer of Technology:
A Case Study of the GEJSNECMA 10-Ton Engine Venture." A
research report submitted to the faculty of the Air War Cellege,
Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, April 1974.
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6. This fee is not required by the Commonline Agreement
for Aircraft, an understanding reached by the export financing
agencies of the United States, France, West Germany, and the
United Kingdom. For other than OECD countries, Eximbank
charges higher rates than for nonaircraft products.
7. The term trade-distorting mechanisms is simple in
principle, but efforts to reduce it to a definition that can be
applied in practice have proved to be difficult. The term refers
to nontariff actions that would lead to market shares that differ
from those that free market forces would create. With respect to
aircraft the large leverage of financing has focused attention on
efforts to remove financing as a factor that would influence the
purchase decision. The goal of "market rate, market term" for
interest and repayment is regarded as an important step that
would be amenable to monitoring and evaluation. Even though
this limited step would not address all aspects of trade distortion,
its vigorous pursuit would be beneficial and consistent with the
traditional position of the United States on free, fair trade.
8. Ibid.
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International Trade, Technology Transfer,
National Security, and Diplomacy
CONTROLLING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
j
Trade, technology transfer as part of trade, and national
security interact in complex ways that affect the U.S. economy
and the U.S. position in the international marketplace. The most
	 kvisible traditional involvement of the U.S. government with the 	 k
air transport and aircraft manufacturing industries has been
through three categories of activities: ( 1) regulation of air trans-
port, administration of air traffic control, certification of air-
craft, and the funding of airways infrastructure- -airports and air
traffic control systems, and R&D related to the latter; (2) the
funding of research and technology development through the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and DOD;	 i
and (3) the funding of DOD-contracted development and engineer-
ing. Items (2) and (3), of course, have a major influence on the
pace and direction of aeronautical technology development.
The government is also increasingly involved in technology
transfer, not just through NASA and its unclassified civil R&D,
but also through DOD military programs with our allies. Inevit-
ably, such cooperative programs result in the transfer of military
technologies, many of which are applicable to civil aircraft as
well. The increasing proclivity to use control of international
trade as an instrument of foreign policy adds further complexity
to the issue.
Control of the export of technology--either in direct form or
when embedded in advanced equipment--in the interests of
national security is unquestionably a legitimate responsibility of
government. The task requires balancing national security or
foreign policy objectives with those of strengthening the economy
and preserving the U.S. position in advanced technology. This 	 k .
balancing process inherently produces occasional inconsistencies
and is vulnerable to indecision, which in itself is detrimental to
trade. The U.S. aircraft manufacturing industry is inevitably a
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participant in this process. With exports now representing about
two-thirds of sales of large jets and external markets projected to
continue to grow more rapidly than domestic ones, the impact of
export restrictions Intended to limit and control technology
transfer can become serious indeed.
one consequence is to cast a shadow over the reliability of
U.S. manufacturers as sources of supply: the U .S. government
may unilaterally terminate sales of aircraft, engines, and parts,
and products manufactured by foreign companies may be cut off
from U.S. compom,jtts.
Questions that should be addressed in policy deliberations on
the control of technology transfer include the following:
• How effective will given restraints be? And for how long?
• What alternatives are available to the foreign country or
firm?
• What avenues for retaliation or compensatory action by
foreign competitors or customers are available for both near and
long term?
• What near - term and long-term commercial damage will U.S.
firms suffer?
• What damage will the U.S. economy suffer?
With respect to the first and second questions, the growing
technological parity shown by the competitive evaluation of
technology by this panel leads increasingly to the answer that the
foreign firm simply turns to another source of supply--even if it
has to develop one (e.g., the certification of the Aeritalla G222
trar; ;,,car . with Rolls Royce Tyne engines instead of CT64 engines
so ; `: ,ah'r 1 . oe plane could be sold to Libya). W" respect to the
w-1nfar questions, the evaluation should consioc. more than the
po ,
--slble loss of sales on a particular transaction. The result could
be not only permanent loss of a particular market (because the
customer resolves not to be trapped again), but also the creation
of new competitors who could challenge in other markets as well
(e.g., Airbus InL-strie's plan to develop a European environmental
control system for the A320 to replace the Garrett system used
on the A300 and A310).
=a The panel is concerned about the effectiveness of the institu-
tiona l
 mechanisms for addressing this complex policy issue.
National security and foreign policy have powerful and a. ticulate
a` advocates within the institutional structure of government.
Marshalling and integrating the interests of the private sector is
complex, and the institutional mechanisms for doing so are
comparatively much less well structured. Even within aircraft
manufacturing, the interests and priorities of the large transport,
commuter, business aircraft, and helicopter manufacturers are
.•
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diverse, not to mention those of the thousands of component
manufacturers.
This already complex problem is further complicated by the
fact that the United States approaches this issue with a quite
different perspective from that of its allies. The United States
has tended to place highest priority on national and mutual
security. Our allies, who expect us to take the lead in security,
give greater weight to furthering economic growth. Furthermore,
and especially in the area of foreign policy, the U.S. purview
tends to be global, while that of NATO emphasizes Europe and
nearby regions. In all cases it is important to recognize that
technology has value only in a limited time frame. If the rules
and procedures preclude its commercial application during this
"window," its value deteriorates drastically.
Licensing and Coproduction
The United States has had a longstanding policy of cooperation
through coproduction and licensing of American military aircraft
and components with its industrialized allies (mainly NATO and
Japan). The objective of this policy has been to enable allied
nations to contribute to their mutual security with their own
funds and industrial resources, by manufacturing and developing
standard materiel of U.S. design. This program also reduces the
drain on their foreign currency and engenders a greater feeling of
partnership in mutual defense.
The details of this policy have changed substantially during the
last 25 years. From 1955 to 1970 the primary mechanism for
industrial cooperation in weapon systems was that of grant aid
and foreign production of U.S. systems by allied nations under
license. Examples of such "coproduction" agreements with NATO
allies include production of the F-104 in Canada, Germany,
Holland, Italy, and Japan, and production of various military
rotorcraft in Britain and Italy.'
These coproduction agreements began with repair and main-
tenance and U.S. export of "knockdown" kit,; for assembly in the
licensee nation. This was followed by a gradual increase in
content manufactured in the licensee nation. The agreements
served as important conduits for the transfer of manufacturing
technology, as well as more limited transfer of design skills and
data. r
The magnitude of the transfer of technology through these
coproduction agreements is very difficult to document. However,
T such licensed production undoubtedly helped create the manufac-
turing base for the European rotorcraft industry, and supported
indirectly the growth of European romponents design and produc-
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tion capability. The Japanese aircraft industry was destroyed in
World War II and stayed moribund until component repair work
began for the U.S. Air Force during the Korean War. In 1960, for
the same objective of national security, the U.S. government
approved the F104J program for Japan. This program transferred
modern production technology and created a production base in
Japan.' However, it is doubtful whether such coproduction
agreements directly or materially aided European prime con-
tractor capabilities in large commercial transports, or current
business or commuter aircraft design and development.
With the growth in size and sophistication of their defense
industrial bases, the NATO countries began to seek a more
substantial role as partners with the United States in the
coproduction of complex systems and as suppliers of sysicto., and
components to the U.S. market. The arrangement for the
coproduction of the F-16 was an early example of European
(NATO) success in obtaining offsets in exchange for the purchase
of U.S. aircraft.
The subject of mutual defense is beyond the scope of this
study, but in the area of aircraft it is one in which the United
States and its allies have somewhat opposing 'views. The United
States wants its allies to bear their share of tho cost of the joint
aeronautical military establishment, and it exerts heavy pressure
to adopt American equipment. Carried to extreme, that policy
would leave Europeans totally dependent on U.S.. aeronautical
development and production capability--a position hardly consis-
tent with mutuality. The European allies believe an indigenous
aeronautical capability is not only vital to their internal security,
but also to a viable mutual defense arrangement. The United
States cannot be. consistent in asserting the v;.cal synergisms from
a common civil-military aeronautical base for the United States
without recognizing the applicability of this concept to Europe as
well. Viewed from t:,iis vantage point, if it is in national security
interests of the United States for Europe to have a viable military
aircraft manufacturing establishment, we must recognize the
legitimacy of Europe's interests in establishing a viable industry
in civil aircraft manufacture.
President Carter endorsed the policy of the "two-way street"
in NATO procurement in 1977. This was intended to result in
increased U.S. purchases of European systems and components.
The "two-way street" policy was initiated to prevent Europe from
undertaking diverging military development, but the desire to
achieve greater standardization and interoperability of NATO
weapons was an additional reason that received publicity. It was
apparent that continued U.S. access to the European military
inarket was dependent on programs that enaLled the Europeans to
attain a less secondary role in aircraft manufacture. The French,
96
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meanwhile, continued to develop a competing capability. The
sheer magnitude of the U.S. defense effort, and es
pecially the
huge R&D effort, has meant that the "street" was never
"two-way."
This policy of reciprocal procurement has been carried out
throu,g h the negotiation of bilateral Memoranda of Understanding
(MOM with the other NATO governments. Under the terms of
the policy, the competitions of the U
.S. and foreign signatory
nations for military procurement are to be open to the foreign
signators. As part of these MOUs exchanges of advanced tech-
nical data are mandated in order to provide a sound, even base for
competition.
The legal status of the MOU is somewhat cloudy: it is a
bilateral Executive agreement over which Congress has very
limited powers of review or approval. Industry spokesmen have
felt that MOUs are negotiated with insufficient input from
American industry. DOD is perceived as seeking some sort of
quid pro quo in negotiating an MOU, but the thing(s) sough. do not
necessarily have anything to do with technology or commerce.
The panel believes that the defense establishment is perceived as
being very aware of and concerned about the p.asible loss of
critical technology through commercial channels, but much less
sensitive to the possible adverse commercial implications of
military ,agreements for coproduction. It is asserted that too
many data and too much technology of a proprietary nature and
having commercial applications are being transferred abroad with
too little reciprocal flow. Design techniques and detailed data
that are much more technologically advanced than was the case
under early license coproduction agreements are now subject to
transfer. Thus, the newer form of allied cooperation is considered
to have a higher potential for adversely affecting the competitive
status of the U.S. commercial aircraft industry than may have
been realized and considered in the decision to support this DOD
technology transfer process.
Frequently, the MOUs governing the "two-way street" via
NATO procurements have obligated U.S. firms to crake significant
portions of their technology or research findings and know-how
available to foreign firms: This transfer of technology involves
"disembodied 1
° product design data and production techniques.
Consequently, this process represents a potentially more damag-
ing channel of technology transfer than does direct coproduction
itself.
The inadequacy of opportunity to provide input on MOU
negotiations is of concern to representatives of industry. Care
must be exercised if expanded congressional review is adopted as
the solution. Recent congressional attempts to enforce "Buy
American" policies (e.g., the strategic metals clause and the
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	x	 Martin-Baker ejection seat episodes' have placed U.S. pro-
	
;	 ducers in an indefensible position. Through MOUs, DOD develop-
ment centers transfer advanced technology abroad, much of it
applicable to both civil and military a pplications. At the sametime, Congress presses for protectionist actions that raise the
	
kt	 possibility of European retaliation against U
.S. exports of aircraft
	
•	 components and systems.
	
PI
, .	
The balance of defense trade is still in favor of the
UnitedStates, in part due to two factors: the large U.S. investment
 inmilitary R&D creates effective advanced technology systems, and
	
v	 the large L S. purchases drive manufacturing costs down to levelsothers find difficult to match.
F The panel believe ,s that these arrangements have benefited theUnited States. They have undoubtedly played an important role in
preserving the unity and commitment of our NATO allies>
thermore, in the early stages-
-over two decades ago--they on-
tributed to rebuilding the industrial base of Europe and Japan
when cold war concerns were high. The importantolic
	 kis the need to reflect the changing environment for U.S. prod-
ucts: much greater economic strength among allies, much more
comparable technological capability of international competitors,
and increased importance of international markets for U.^.
manufacturers.
	 iF
G
Japanese-American Cooperation F
Japanese-American cooperation in wea onsr
represents a special case. Due to self
	
Production
weapons exports, Japanese industry does not at p
r esent haves
 he
on
option of selling systems to the United States or others. Expart
to the United States of certain electronic components with
military applications is already a highly sensitive political issue
within Japan. Accordingly, co production has remained theprimary channel for joint support of weapons procurement.
Recent cases of coproduction MOUs with Japan include the
F-15 fighter and the associated F-100 engine. While these arehighly sophisticated aircraft technologies, their direct, near-term
spillover to commercial applications is relatively modest. How-
ever, this MOU followed a long list of similar agreements (e.g.,
P2V, T-33, F-104, F4, and P-3C aircraft as well as T58 and J79
engines) that in the aggregate significantly enhanced Japanese
manufacturing capability. There has not been a large impact on
the present ability of Japanese firms to operate as prime contrac-
tors for large transports or engines, or for regional aircraft.
Japan has been active on a modest scale in the area ofturbine-powered business aircraft. Since their introduction in 'I
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1966, 749 Mitsubishi MUZ series turboprops have been sold. The
Mitsubishi Diamond, a small turbojet, appeared in 1982. With the
sale of nine aircraft, it obtained a 3 percent market penetration.
It is likely, however, that the technology, materials, machine
tools, and labor skills transferred through Japanese -American
coproduction of military aircraft have strengthened the position
of Japanese firms as subcontractors and/or vendors in future
commercial jet transport projects. It appears that this is the
policy being pursued by Japan. The real and projected impact of
coproduction with Japan may be both to weaken the subcontractor
infrastructure of the U .S. aircraft industry and to provide the
base for future Japanese aircraft. It should be understood,
however, that Japan has paid for this technology transfer through
higher costs than would have been incurred in bringing aircraft
from the United States. For example, the first lot of 90 F-15Js
produced by Japan cost $45 million each. If purchased in the U.S.
the aircraft would have been priced at $25 million each. Thus, it
cost Japan $ 1.8 billion extra to produce the aircraft in Japan and
to acquire associated skills. It Is reasonable to assume that one
objective in incurring the cost was to help develop an indigenous
technology base.
Interaction with Foreign Policy
Exports of aircraft, as well as of other high-technology prod-
ucts, are controlled by the U.S. government, sometimes with the
intent of influencing both the foreign and the domestic policies of
other countries and of limiting the flow of advanced technology to
Communist bloc countries. As a result, U.S. civil aircraft export
controls are sometimes exercised in a manner that removes U.S.
aircraft products from competition in some foreign markets.
Other countries do the same, but the large U.S. share of aircraft
exports makes U.S. activities more prominent.
This situation obviously favors foreign competitors whose
governments view security and trade relationships differently. It
has important long-term implications; consequences need to be
weighed carefully. This situation can have the following impacts:
it can contribute to the growth and power of competitors and
even foster the creation of competitors whose governments do not
	
I
agree with or wish to support U.S. policy, or view commerce as
independent of foreign policy; it can contribute to the image of
U.S. companies as unreliable sources of supply, not only for initial
purchases but perhaps more importantly, for continuing product
support (as in the case of French efforts to "de-Americanize" the
Airbus); it can also permanently remove some markets from U.S.
participation by allowing foreign competitors to develop "ground
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•.00r" positions from which they can be dislodged only with great
difficulty. This latter situation applies to 
manufacturers of parts
and components as well as complete aircraft.
The influence of U.S. control has been extended by getting
other allied exporting nations to acknowledge U.S. sanctions with
respect to reexport to third countries. This has placed 
the U.S.Policy position on firmer international ground but given foreign
exporters additional incentive to move toward the 'deletion of
U.S.-supplied content in their aircraft products.
It is important to recognize the realities of the present com-
petitive world with respect to export controls, commerce, and
technology. Denial of access to technology that already exists
elsewhere or that can easily be developed by competitors doeslittle to preserve U.S. se r..urity and damages the U.S. competitive
trade position. It forces the acceleration of the development of
in-country technology, thereby creating new competition.
..
p^
Achieving Balance in Controlling Technology Transfer
In assessing the desirability of controls on the export of U.S.technologies and proprietary data in aircraft, it is important to
recognize that technological advancement in aviation has always
involved two-way flows. A U.S. policy that leads to excessive
restrictions on technology exchanges with other nations can
threaten to impede reverse flow and thus impair the aeronautics
infrastructure of this country. This reverse flow will become
more important as other countries' R&D creates new technology,
e.g., eutectic alloys in France and ceramics in Japan. There are
major cultural, political, and economic offsets that must also be
considered with respect to a fundamental change in the nation's
historic open-door policies, which capitalized extensively on
European aircraft technology before World War II.
It is equally important for the present status of U.S. tech-
nology vis-a-vis that available from others to be appraised
realistically. For example, control of technology transfer for
electronics and avionics has become very difficult. The commer-
cialization of computer memories and data communication
devices has diffused this technology all over the world. The
United States does not hold technology leads in all areas, note,
e.g., the powerful role of Japan in memories and data manage-
ment.
This discussion is not intended to lead to the conclusion that
the panel is opposed to U.S. government control of technology
transfer. Rather, the panel recognizes the complexity of theissues.
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In the light of these complexities the panel recommends that
mechanisms be developed that will insure an effective industrial
input to the deliberations on coproduction and technology transfer
and that due wei t be given to the change in competitive status
and relative technologicalological position in U.S. in du.; 	 in reachin
decisions.
'—^fechnology is to be controlled, it is important for the con-
trol to be effective, i.e., that there not be adequate alternatives
available to the other side. It is also important to identify and
give adequate weight to possible long -term adverse effects on the
competitive position of U.S. industry. The cumulative effect of a
deterioration in the competitive position of the U.S. aircraft
industry has obvious strategic implications for the nation.
SYNERGY BETWEEN NATIONAL SECURITY
AND CIVIL AVIATION
Leadership in aviation in support of the strategic strength of
the United States has been a prime element of U.S. policy since
World War II. In many respects leadership in the air has replaced
the concept of power on the seas as a symbol of national strength.
The recent study by the Office of Science and Technology
Policy (OSTP), noted in Chapter 1, in which both the National
Security Council and DOD participated, reaffirmed the vital role
of civil aviation--both aircraft manufacturers and air transport--
to the strategic posture of the United States.
The relationships between civil and military aviation are
important to the health of each. A healthy civil industry is vital
for national security and for wartime surge readiness, including
the potential of elements of the civil transport system as a
military reserve fleet in an emergency. Consequently, policy
decisions that adversely affect the civil side of aviation can also
impair the security of the nation.
t
Dual Use
The 15,000-company supplier base is an important key, since
these firms supply critical materials and parts to both the civil
and military aircraft industry. Frequently, in the case of smaller
j second- or third-tier suppliers, the military and civil production
outputs are sufficiently common that the same facilities and labor
pools produce both. U.S. requirements for military production
have diminished substantially in recent years, representing about
37 percent of aircraft output compared with 53 percent in the
period 1968 to 1972, during the Vietnam war. They are now
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increasing again as a result of increased DOD expenditures. Thus,
civil aircraft production provides a vital stabilizing influence on
the industry in the presence of continuing military procurement
uncertainties.
Despite the differing requirements for civil and military air-
craft, the technology base, much of the supplier base, and the
skills and processes used are essentially common. They become
mutually supportive in attaining diverse civil and military objec-
tives. The technological synergies are very constructive. Mili-
tary developments stress performance, while commercial aircraft
developments emphasize lowered production costs, vehicle operat-
ing efficiency, and high availability with low maintenance--
attributes that are valuable to the military establishment.
Historically, civil aeronautics development was triggered by
military advancements, which the civil industry could refine or
improve to gain the efficiency or technical objectives required in
civil application--for example, the swept
-wing, fly-by-wire
controls, and retractable landing gear. in more recent years, a
reverse situation has become common, with the results s,f civq
research or component design subsequently being used for military
purposes, e.g., improved fuel efficiency, maintainabiliiy and
reliability of jet engines, super -aluminum alloys, flight manage-
ment systems, and composite structures.
DOD has sponsored basic advances in propulsion technology in
areas such as high-temperature materials, high pressure ratio
compressors, combustion, etc. Although technology on supersonic
engines and their integration into the inlet and exhaust systems of
supersonic aircraft has little commercial relevance, other mili-
tary engines for bombers, transports, patrol aircraft, and heli-
copters share common performance requirements with commer-
cial aircraft. Both seek low fuel consumption, high thrust-weight
ratio, long life, and high reliability. The need for high pressure
ratio-high temperature engines is also common to both.
Technology developed for commercial requirements also bene-
fits military applications. Commercial engines gain service
experience 10 to 15 times faster than military engines, even
military transport engines. To stay competitive, commercial
engines are under continuing pressure to improve fuel efficiency,
reliability, and service life--all resulting in significant cost savings
to the user. The benefits of these advances, with their large base
of in-service verification, recycle back into military engines. For
example, some of the improvements in the CF6 turbofan engine
(derived from the TF39 used in DOD's large C5A cargo airplane),
developed during commercial service, are being incorporated in
later versions of the TF?9. Thus, commercial experience provides
the DOD with better engines for transport and mission support
aircraft than would have been produced by military experience
alone.
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The traditional role of DOD in propulsion development is
changing. DOD is now supporting the launch of far fewer aircraft
than was the case in previous decades. Equally important, for the
last 15 years DOD has tended to define its interests more nar-
rowly, to fund less generic research, and to insist on a specific,
demonstrable relevance to present or proposed weapons systems
for all DOD-sponsored R&D. For all but advanced supersonic
aircraft or highly specialized mission requirements, DOD is
largely prepared to buy off-the-shelf engine technology. Because
of the huge investment ($1.5 to $2 billion) required and the long
interval involved in the development of a new engine (four to six
years), the future of U.S. technological leadership in propulsion
will continue to rest to a large degree on defense sponsorship.
Thus, an issue is evolving as to whether or how U.S. leadership in
propulsion technology can be sustained in the face of this chang-
ing posture for DOD.
There are, however, some military requirements that do not
place important demands for specialized performance on sup-
pliers. These aircraft, which provide support services, include
general personnel and supply transport, navigation and command
control trainers, and in-flight refuelers. The C140A (Jetstar),
U-817 (Seminole), T-39A (Saberliner), E-3 (707), E-4 (747), C-9A
(DC-9), and KC- 10 (DC-10) are examples of civil aircraft that
have evolved into dual-use aircraft with major cost avoidance to
the nation. Recent examples are the Learjet 35A--designated
C-21A, and Beech Super King Air---designated B 2000 for support
functions:
Our allies and international competitors provide explicitly for
military support of commercial aircraft development. For
example, the new British Aerospace AR146 commuter is being
purchased by the Royal Air Force, and a version of the Bandei-
rante commuter is being purchased by the Brazilian Air Force.
Obv iously, it would be inappropriate for DOD to purchase civilian
aircraft just to support the industry. However, at present no
effective mechanisms exist even for joint consideration of
military needs and civilian applications in planning development
of civilian aircraft and in timing procurement. Generally, the
military establishment has filled its support-aircraft requirements
through existing civil production aircraft or called for new
specialized developments when it saw a need. Planning military
requirements for these support aircraft with a view to their
integration with civilian developments could help U.S. manufac-
turers become more competitive by spreading the cost of design,
development, and procurement among both military and civil
users.
It is important to note, however, that the common use of
aircraft or even joint development of support aircraft, while
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enhancing new starts and potentially reducing costs of systems,
has at best a modest impact on the technological competitiveness
of U.S. aircraft in the International arena. It could perhaps have
greatest Impact on regional transports and business aircraft.
What is more critical is that there be an effective national
coupling between all areas of research and development that are
pertinent to both military and civil systems. This would include
appropriate areas of DOD-sponsored research and development,
the generic work conducted under NASA sponsorship, and that
which is privately funded. The FAA, which also contributes to
this technology through its support of aircraft safety, flight
operation, and related certification -research technology and
development, should be included in the coupling. This R&D Is the
foundation for the advanced U.S. position in power plants, con-
trols, aerodynamics, structures, and aircraft operations for both
military and commercial applications.
The panel recommends that the DOD. NASA. and the FAA
0
a
Timing of Procurement
Ensuring reasonably level support for the production base
i	 through timing of purchases would help both military and civil
activity. This help would be most meaningful in the areas of
regional transports, business aircraft, and rotorcraft. Procure-
ment of military aircraft is characterized by wild fluctuations,
and such variations play havoc with utilization of facilities and
retention of key human resources. For example, virtually no
military helicopters were purchased during the 1970s. Manufac-
ture of civilian helicopters preserved the industry. Recent{	 military orders are now capitalizing on the infrastructure so
preserved.
Large civil transports represent a special situation. DOD has
identified a strategic gap in the adequacy of reserve air transport
to meet emergencies. The civil transport fleet can provide some
support in a reserve role, but the fact that the aircraft were not
designed for that purpose limits their usefulness. One option is
for DOD to subsidize the extra expense that would be incurred in
developing a special fleet of civilian aircraft to serve explicitly as
a reserve. When budget priorities are being established, DOD has
not seen fit to allocate resources to such a task, and the panel is
not in a position to recommend changes in DOD priorities. With
regard to large civil transports, DOD has examined the issue of
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reserve transport needs and the role of the civil transport fleet.
These issues are not fully resolved. Obviously, the resolution of
the reserve fleet issue can affect large aircraft procurement
considerations and is of special Interest to the manufacturing and
air transportation industries.
The panel recognizes the difficulties of achieving more stable
procurement of military aircraft. Nevertheless, the production
base plays a vital role In surge capacity. Stability of operations
contributes to maintaining the readiness of that production base
and indirectly strengthening the competitive capability of civil
activity. Consequently, renewed efforts are needed to reduce the
wide swings In military procurement (in the absence of any emer-
gency) that affect the base so adversely.
The uanel recommends that DOD and industr y seek to
c
NOTES
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'
	Conference of t e Universities -National
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Economic Research, Columbia University Press, New York, 1970.
(b) U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. Militar y
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Aircraft Industry, A report by the Comptroller General tot the
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March 18, 1982.
(c) U.S. House of Representatives, Trade with Japan,
hearings before the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on
Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, 96th Congress,
Second Session, Washington, D.C., 1980.
(d) United States Trade Council, Japan's Aircraft
Industry, Washington, D.C., January , 11, 1980.
3. Great Britain secured a position on a U.S. fighter with the
Martin-Baker ejection seat in an open competition. Subsequently,
as a result of pressure from U.S. industry, Congress mandated use
of a U.S. product instead. The action caused great resentment in
Great Britain.
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Competitive Assessment of Technology
In reviewing the history of the United States in world com-
mercial aviation, it is obvious that the ability to translate high
technology into efficient products suited to the marketplace has
been a major factor in penetrating world markets successfully.
Of comparable importance, manufacturers and customer airlines
have been willing to incorporate even newer technologies as they
emerged, both for new aircraft anc for modification of existing
models to improve their performance. The U.S. response to the
need for quiet engines, reduction in fuel consumption, and the
incorporation of new materials is an example of its continuing
ability and readiness to utilize new technology. The airlines of
the United States, other national markets, and the certifying
agencies have fulfilled an essential role in supporting acceptance
of these technologies and in demonstrating them through safe and
cost-effective service. None of this would have been possible
without the active participation, encouragement, and support of
the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in achieving early
certification.
Technological leadership in the commercial aircraft field is
not of itself sufficient for success in the marketplace. The
products must fit the customer's needs and be available when the
customer wants them. When the United States dominated the
large transport and other aircraft markets, the time of introduc-
tion and the fit of the product to a specific customer's needs were
important but not as overriding as today. Two things have hap-
pened to suggest that the United States must accek rate its
application of technology: Effective foreign competition has
emerged with equivalent technology and a number of additional
countries such as Indonesia, Brazil, Spain, and Japan have
indicated their determination to enter some segments of the
market.
This chapter consists of two parts. The first addresses the
airframe and the fully assembled aircraft, th,% second examines
propulsion technology. In each the pane! assesses the present
state of technology, then considers capabilities for conducting
research and development and for manufacture.
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AIRFRAME AND FULLY ASSEMBLED AIRCRAFT
The following technologies associated with the airframe and
fully assembled aircraft have been Identified as fundamental to
the future competitive posture of U.S. civil aviation:
1. Design techniques
Advanced computational analysis
Design optimization and integration (computer-aidea
design/computer-aided manufacture--CAD/CAM)
2. Aerodynamics
Active boundary layer management (including laminar
flow control)
3. Flight control+;
Relaxed stability (reduced tall and wing size)
Active cantrols (wingload alleviation and flutter
suppression)
4. Advanced structures
Advanced metallic alloys (including superplastic forming)
Metal bonding techniques
Composite structures
5. Propulsion Integration
Integrated engine/nacelle/airframe
Advanced propellers and gearboxes
6. Avionics
Ultrareliable, lou l,t-tolerant systems
Advanced fligh r clicks ( 00all glass cockpit10)
Computer-integrated flight management
The combinavion of the key technologies listed above, when
fully integrated into an all-new aircraft design, could improve its
fuel efficiency by as much as 30 to 50 percent--and some industry
experts are even more optimistic. During the past 20 years, the
propulsion system provided the most significant gains. In the next
20 years, the propulsion systown will again provide improvements,
but they will be accompanied by improvemer.tt
 in aec odynaml
structures, avionics, controW, and systems. Figure 5-1, adapted
from a paper by NASA, Illustrates how these technology improve-
ments can be combined over the remainder of thAs century to
produce these large benefits. The propulsion system gain does not
include the effects of advanced turboprops or propfans, which
could provide an additional 20 percent Improvement. If the
recently conceived unducted fan concept is succest;ful propfans
would achieve Improvements in efficiency of 30 tc- 35 percent.
The viability of future new civil aircraft will depend on the ability
to develop and implement these technologies in i+ cost -effective
and timely manner.
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FIGURE 5-1 Benefits Possible From Technology Improvements
SOURCE: Derived from NASA Technology Program for Future
Civil Air Transports; H.T. Wright, Aerospace Industries
Association of America, International Air Transportations Conference, June 1983, Montreal, Canada.
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The capabilities of modern high-speed computers have made
pcssible the use of very sophisticated techniques for computa-tional analysis in both aerodynamics and structures. Recentadvances In computational aerodynamics have allowed transonicisdrag e ch
aracteristics to be determined with a high degree of
accuracy, thus allowing designers to develop airfoil shapes quickly
to meet a variety of requirements. Computati ,al aerodynamics
techniques are also being applied to nacelle cowl design, after-body design, and nacelle placement relative to the wing. The
effect of these techniques is to reduce dependence on empiricism
and experiment and to use fewer, but more 
representative windtunnel tests fl ir validation. The technology is also applicable todesign processes for rotorcraft and general aviation craft.
United States manufacturers are making extensive use of
these techniques in design studies of the next-generation 150-seat
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aircraft. Airbus Industrie is exploiting ongoing European research
r ; ograms in computer-aided airflow modeling of the A320 wing.
The goal is further reduction of drag while maximizing aero-
dynamic and structural efficiency.
In structural analysis, the United States retains a lead in the
ability to optimize designs through use of modern mathematical
r>>odels in conjunction with modern large-capacity computers. do
basic advanced wing design the status of the United States
appears to be comparable with others. However, in transonic
wing design, the United States is believed by the panel to have a
slight lead over Europe and probably a larger lead over Japan di
gto pioneering supercritical wing work by NASA, which has been
extended by U.S. airframe manufacturers and NASA.
C
omputer-aided design and computer-aided manufacturinK,
(CAD/CAM) are key new design techniques brought about by the
revolution in interactive software developed for modern high-
speed computers. CAD systems provide the capability for analyz-
Ing many different designs quickly and accurately. System
optimization of complex interactive elements can riow be easily
a
ccomplished, thus minimizing design lead time and cost. CAM
systems allow selected designs to flow directly to the manufac-
turing process by providing computer-developed instructions for
numerically controlled machines. About one-third of the Boeing
767 cork;p nnents were designed with the help of a computer, and
about 5 percent of the B-767 design went straight from computer-
aided design into numerically controlled machiniig. The resulting
reduction in drawing errors is a major benefit as work is released
onto the production line.
Pioneered in this country, CAD/CAM technology has been
quickly adopted abroad and is now standard practice at Airbus
Industrie and in Japan. With the 
Messerschmitt (MBB) computer-
aided design techniques, which are widely used for lofting and
autodrafting, peaks and troughs of new design tasks can be
handled without attendant manpower 
fluctuations. Ease of accessby foreigners to CAD/CAM hardware and software developed in
the United States assures that the European and Japanese aero-
space industries can stay competitive in this technology in thefuture.
The panel believes that not enough attention is being paid to
the application of those powerful CAD/CAM tools to smaller
aircraft. Thus, the U.S
.-manufactured aircraft for small feeder
lines and for limited markets, such as executive aircraft, may not
be realizing their full technological potential and obtaining as
strong a market position as possible.
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Aerodynamics
In addition to the advances in aerodynamic computational
procedures, significant potential exists for advances in aero-
dynamics in the areas of boundary layer management for cruise
conditions and lift enhancement for takeoff and landing. Figure
5-1 indicates the gains to be realized from the successful
attainment of laminar flow to reduce skin friction drag. In the
past three decades extensive analytical and experimental work
has been done in this country under NASA sponsorship to under-
stand the laminar- to turbulent-flow transition and to develop
methods for delaying this transition. Much more work needs to be
done to adapt these methods to a large commercial transport in a
practical, cost-effective manner. Current NASA plans call for
testing the most promising configurations in actual flight con-
ditions. Should these tests prove successful, adaptation of this
technology to a new production aircraft is not expected before
the mid- to late 1990s, 10 to 15 or more years from now.
The status of active boundary layer management programs In
Europe is unknown at this time, but the United States is thought
to be ahead, based on the extensive NASA work discussed above.
The Japanese are developing an experimental "Quiet STOL°°
research aircraft using the upper-surface blowing concept similar
to NASA's QSRA aircraft and Boeing's YC-14 STOL Transport
Demonstrator Aircraft for DOD.
In the low-speed, high-lift flight regime, current transports
incorporate a combination of leading edge devices and sophis-
ticated flaps to vary wing camber to increase lift at low speeds.
Significant advances in multielement airfoil analysis techniques
are providing considerable insight into the behavior of high-lift
systems and reducing the need for extensive experimental data.
The United States and Europe are thought to be generally
comparable in wing design, e.g., the Airbus A310 wing incorpor-
ates the latest in high-lift systems to provide excellent takeoff
and landing performance. Extensive double curvature in the lower
skin of the inner wing provides optimum lift characteristics.
Precise altitude control, combined with thrust control through
flight path computers, provides the capability for Category III
automatic landing in which conditions are virtually zero ceiling,
zero visibility.
Improvements in aerodynamics are not receiving particular
attention in aircraft for general aviation, but the strength of the
United States in this field could accrue to U.S. manufacturers if it
is applied. In rotorcraft, foreign capability is judged to be on a
par with the United States--though foreign manufacturers have
been able to supply advanced technologies more rapidly.
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aAdvanced Structures
Recently, new high strength
-to-weight aluminum-lithium
alloys have shown potential for additional significant weight
savings, but much work remains to be done in qualifying the
material and scaling up its production in sheet, plate, and
extruded forms before widespread application in aircraft manu-
facture can take place. Another emerging structural concept that
shows much promise is superplastically formed, diffusion
-bonded
metals (notably titanium but also possibly aluminum).
Improved aluminum alloys are now being incorporated by
Airbus in the A310. However, the "economic repair life" of the
A310 is estimated by Airbus to be 40,000 cycles compared to
Boeing 's
 estimated life of 60,000 cycles for the 767. Comparisons
of life, however, are dependent on the stress level chosen by the
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Flight Controls
Active control systems that could allow reduced static longi-
tudinal stability are conceptually possible for transport aircraft,
with resulting reductions in drag and weight due to reduced tail
and wing areas. However, further research and development
effort is required for large-scale applications. The next genera-
tion of 150-seat transports is expected to use augmented stability
systems to provide a tail designed to accommodate a center of
gravity located aft, thus minimizing trim drag. U.S. manufac-
turers and Airbus appear to be approximately equal in this tech-
nology. Full exploitation of this technology will require another
round of aircraft development.
The use of limited active controls for wind-gust and maneuver-
load alleviation has already been incorporated in the Lockheed
L-1011-500. This technology can allow reductions in wing struc-
tural weight or further increases in wing aspect ratio to imp rove
performance without weight increase. Flutter suppression modes
offer further improvements for more advanced aircraft. Applica-
tion of this technology is already being considered by Airbus for
stretched versions of the A300 as well as for later versions of the
A320, which is to have what is called a fly-by
-wire control sys-
tem. The Concorde was the first certificated commercial air-
craft to rely principally on a fly-by-wire control system. It also
contains a highly integrated stability augmentation control sys-
tem. In this area of technology, the United States and Europe can
be judged to be about equal in current capability.
General aviation airplanes tend to follow large aircraft in
adopting advanced flight controls. In rotorcraft, the United
States is thought to have the lead in flight control technology.
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designer for the structure in question. Newly developed
aluminum-zinc alloys with thermomechnical treatment for
increased compression strength and better fracture properties are
planned for the A320. More extensive use of titanium is also
planned for highly stressed parts. In these respects, Airbus
metallic structure technology is fully competitive with current
U.S. technology. Its research on advanced alloys of the
aluminum-lithium type and superplastic-formed, diffusion-bonded
titanium is approximately the same as in the United States.
To date, current and planned aircraft are minimizing use of
adhesive bonding due to poor early experience. Metal-to-metal
bonding technology applications in Europe are at least equivalent
to those in the U.S. where application to fuselage structure,
including compound-curved panels, is fully accepted, certified,
and demonstrated in extended operation of wide-bodied transports.
The largest single opportunity in airframe materials lies in
composite materials, including metal matrix composites. The
combination of thermoplastic or thermoset composites with the
attendant means of processing and fabricating technology is a
rapidly expanding field with very large potential payoff. Both
United States and European developers are active. European
research capabilities are almost equal to those in the U.S. During
the past few years, great strides have been made in the use of
advanced nonmetallic composite structural elements. These
composite structures have high stiffness and extremely light
weight when compared with conventional metal structures and
offer the promise of significant increases in performance, due to
the reduction in weight and the promise of extended life in overall
aircraft performance and efficiency.
The latest U.S. aircraft, such as the Boeing 767, incorporate
significant amounts of composites in secondary structures. More
advanced designs, such as the proposed McDonnell Douglas D-330
series, extend composites to more wing components, cabin floor
beams, the entire nacelle, and the tail cone (Figure 5-2).
European research and development efforts on composite
materials are extensive and continue to accelerate. Many Euro-
pean aerospace companies have been working with composite
materials for up to 15 years. These companies believe they have a
basic scientific understanding of the materials, which they are
now converting into practice. Airbus Industrie has a program for
the progressive introduction of composite components on the
A300 and the A310 (Figure 5-3). The A320 will add composite
elevators, fin and tail-plane trailing edges, floor panels, cowl
components, wing-to-body fairings, and carbon-composite wheel
brakes (Figure 5-4).
At present, relatively small elements such as rudders, ailerons,
and spoilers have been produced. In the long term, the full poten-
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FIGURE 5-2 McDonnell Douglas D-3300 Advanced MaterialApplications
SOURCE: McDonnell Douglas.
tial of composite materials will be realized with their incorpora-
tion into primary aircraft structures such as wings, stabilizers,
and fuselages. Benefits would potentially include a 15 to 25
percent reduction in structural weight, a 7 to 15 percent improve-
ment in fuel efficiency, and resulting 4 to 8 percent reductions in
direct operating cost. Projections of the latter are more uncer-
tain because the manufacturing costs for composites and future
costs for fuel are very uncertain.
In the United States a composite primary structure program
was initiated by NASA in 1976, with the objective of developing
the technology and confidence to ermitp	 commercial transport
manufacturers to use composites extensively in the primary
	
k
ij	 structure of production aircraft. The original plan to build and
flight test a full-scale wing was regarded as too expensive. The
	 :v
program has been scaled back to build and test key components.
Further specialized tests and the establishment of a resulting data
base are still necessary to develop confidence in the application3	 I	 of composites to primary structures. NASA plans still call for
fuselage design studies to begin this year, followed by a six-year
	
t^
fuselage test program. Similar plans, directed at demonstration
	 G
s	 of such structures for airline evaluation and assurance that
certification is valid, have consistently been terminated during,
;.	 budget negotiations with OMB.
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Airbus Industrie partners already have wide design /development/service experience
Including current service trials on P 00s in airline use.
Initial Applications
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"Reads across from current A300 experience.
IGURE 5-4 A320 Advanced Composite Materials
OURCE: Airbus Brochure.
t
U.,
F
S
Yid 71$
j / h{
f J
F
113
Fin Leading
Rudder and Trailing Edges
\	 Horizontal Tail Tip
i and Trailing Edge
Floor Beam
Struts
Flap Track
Fairing
Airbrakes
Spoiler
Main Lending Gear	 \
Leg Fairing
	
Pylon Fairings
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European industry use of primary composite structures has
begun in military applications. Composites are also used for the
pod for the Rolls Royce RB211 engine and for helicopter rotor
blades and rotor heads. Composite research and development in
Europe is now concentrated on ways to speed the production
process and reduce costs through automation and other methods,
as well as on postproduction testing and quality control. This
indicates that Airbus will continue to be very aggressive in the
application of composites to future aircraft, and given the moder-
ate pace of the current NASA program and the budget pressures it
is encountering, Airbus may take the lead in this very important
technology.
In application of advanced structures to general aviation and
regional aircraft, the United States is judged to have an advan-
tage; however, in rotorcraft our position is regarded as no more
than equal to that of foreign competitors--especially France.
Propulsion Integration
Propulsion integration of powerplant with wing or fuselage is a
relatively mature art for conventional turbofan-powered aircraft.
The United States and Europe are regarded as comparable. Ana -
lytical techniques are helping to rptimize the location of engine
nacelles relative to the wing for wing-mounted turbofan instal-
lations. Both U.S.- and British-designed nacelles have been
applied to U.S. aircraft. The British nacelles show a slight
advantage due primarily to shorter engine length. However,
competitive nacelle technology is judged about equal.
Integration of the propulsion system with the airframe be-
comes extremely important when high-speed turboprop power -
plants or propfans are used. This advanced technology is widely
regarded, both in the U.S. and elsewhere, as holding great promise
for improved fuel efficiency. It is especially applicable to general
aviation aircraft and regional aircraft. As advanced turboprops
exceed M = 0.70 (the region now being contemplated) interference
drag becomes exceedingly critical, as do inlet recovery, flow
4 distortion, and interference problems. Mathematical analyses of
these complex three-dimensional flow fields are under way, but
extensive wind tunnel and flight testing are required to verify and
calibrate these analytical models before design decisions can be
made.
Advanced turboprops also have to contend with high-decibel,
and poorly understood, acoustic problems. Analytical models of
propeller noise require full-scale flight test data for confirma-
tion. Once propeller acoustic characteristics are understood,
methods of minimizing noise and vibration in the passenger cabin
4
must be developed and substantiated.
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The development of advanced propellers and their gearboxes,
or systems that eliminate the need for gearboxes, Is central to
incorporation of propfans and advanced transports. Aerodynamic
performance of propfans has already been substantiated by tests.
Structural design of the thin, swept blades and contrarotating
configuration necessary for the higher Mach-number operation has
not yet been proven at full scale. Extensive research and
development work needs to be done on all aspects of advanced
propeller systems before design of advanced high-speed turboprop
transports can proceed confidently. Current U.S. propfan R&D is
largely limited to NASA-sponsored programs, which are not
scheduled to complete demonstration of systems integration in
aircraft flight tests until 1988, providing funds are allocated.
That schedule will not permit U.S. propfan development to start
until the early 1990s at best. The U.S. propfan program has
concentrated on very high speed props (M = 0.8), and in that speed
range the United States is probably ahead in technology. How-
ever, economic studies suggest this speed may be too high. At
slower speeds (M = 0.7), the cost per seat-mile is substantially
lower, and the Europeans may not be behind, having considerable
experience at M = 0.5.
The Airbus view of propfan technology would seem to indicate
that it is wrestling with the same problems, and Airbus does not
forecast an advanced propfan aircraft before the 1990s, if then.
The French government has been sponsoring research into prop-
fans for the last three years. How extensive this work is or what
results have been achieved to date is not yet known.
In rotorcraft the United States is regarded as an equal in
propulsion integration. The United States has a substantial tech-
nological lead in an advanced version of rotorcraft, the tilt rotor.
NASA and the Army have recently validated a new concept in
rotorcraft technology having potentially significant civil appli-
cations. The XV-15 tilt-rotor, proof-of-concept vehicle has
demonstrated that the characteristics and capabilities of turbo-
prop airplanes
 can be blended with those of helicopters in a single
aircraft. DOD has moved rapidly to capitalize on this configura
-
tion via the Joint Services Vertical Lift Aircraft Program (JVX),
now in preliminary design.
A civil derivative of the military JVX could yield a 30- to
40-passenger vertical-takeoff and -landing (VTOL) regional
transport rotorcraft in the 35,000- to 45,000-pound gross weight
class. The vehicle would be capable of cruising at speeds above
300 knots at altitudes of 25,000 to 30,000 feet over a range of 500
nautical miles. The aircraft would be a synthesis of advanced
e,	 rotorcraft technology and the other technologies that have been
t	 noted.
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Civil versions of the rotor could broaden the services provided
by small regional aircraft and helicopters and increase the
passenger capacity of limited airports.
Avionics
The application of digital electronics has already made major
improvements in avionics systems capability and reliability while
reducing weight, volume, and cost per unit of capability. The new
generation of B-757, B-767, 8737-300, MD-80, and A310 aircraft
all utilize digital flight control systems. Major increases in the
use of the latest developments in microcircuitry will permit the
attainment of ultrareliable, fault-tolerant systems architecture.
Such systems are vital to the implementation of active controlsand computer-integrated flight management systems.
The forward-facing crew cockpit (FFCC) on the A:310 is an
advanced design comparable with the latest U.S. planes. How-
ever, it should be noted that the color CRT hardware essential to
such systems was developed in Japan. Both Aerospatiale and
British Aerospace are conducting advanced flight deck programs
that have developed the use of multifunction CRT displays. Simi-
lar advanced crew stations are being developed by U.S. manufac-
	
iturers. Advanced avionics, in conjunction with active controls
and the incorporation of flight management systems, can poten-
tially produce fuel savings of up to 20 percent, weight reductions
aof as much as 10 percent, with attendant reductions in operating
	 !	 jcost of 5 to 10 percent.
The advances in avionics also have extensive room for a lica-
`	 tion to general aviation and regional aircraft, and U.S. strength
  in	 !	 ''
this area is applicable to these classes of aircraft. In rotorcraft
the U .S. is judged to have an advantage in both  flight management
	
y
and automated control.
	
g	 g
Much of the electronics/avionics capability in commercial
transports is the by
	 of technology developed for military
	 j	 ?
aircraft. This is as true for foreign countries as it is for the
United States. In military avionics, the United States still leads
the rest of the world; as long as the United States continues the
	
II
close synergy between civil and military avionics technology, it is
doubtful that any foreign country will soon surpass the UnitedStates in this technology.
However, as noted earlier, the Japanese did develop present
	
A
aircraft-quality color CRT hardware for the European and U.S.
aircraft industry. Japan does have the development capability
and potentially lower costs that would enable it to challenge the
U.S. leadership in aircraft avionics (digital computers), given the
opportunity. Presently, flight deck and flight controls technology
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account for over 12 percent of the total aircraft price. Thus, with
less expensive avionics in foreign aircraft, the U.S. competitiveposition could be jeopardized.
In summary, significant opportunities exist for further
advances in technology. These advances will have their impact
primarily in the production of aircraft that are lighter, more
efficient, quieter, and more economical to operate. Thus, while
they will lead to significant improvements in the economics of air
transport, they are unlikely to affect the amenities that are more
visible to the passenger--speed, comfort, and roominess.
The United States enjoys leadership or parity in all the impor-
tant technologies, but in all cases the lead Is small and our com-
petitors have the necessary skills and knowledge to achieve
leadership if our momentum falters. The area of greatest concern
within the industry is its potential inability to translate advances
in technology into new aircraft that incorporate the latest
,
 tech-
nology. The possibility of partnership between European and
Japanese companies would lead to truly formidable competition.
t,
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Status of Research, Development, and Production Capabilities
Research Capabilities
Technology development starts at the level of the research
laboratory. In the United States the prime aeronautical research
facilities are those of the National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration (NASA), the U.S. Military Services, and the major air-frame companies.
The capital investment in NASA test facilities and wind tun-
nels over the years has resulted in an extensive capability to
support the requirements of research, design, and total systems
tests for all aeronautical systems. The current replacement value
of these federal facilities is estimated at approximately 10 billion
dollars. Total NASA employment is currently 21,200 people, of
whom 3,740 specialize in aeronautics.
Information on European research and technology efforts
indicates strong concentration on many of the same concepts
being pursued in the United States. Western European countries
have some excellent aeronautical laboratory facilities and many
excellent technical universities.
The National Research Facilities (similar to NASA) which
support the major Airbus Industrie partner companies are:
Great Britain
Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE)
Eight wind tunnels--7,300 people (1980)
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Employment
In terms of major aerospace companies, the total employment
of Airbus partner companies is roughly equivalent to that of
Boeing and McDonnell Douglas combined (Figure 5-5). The United
States figure is conservative because the Boeing and McDonnell
Douglas numbers do not include the employees of the manufac-
turers of some major components built by others, whereas the
Airbus numbers do. These figures include civil, military, and
space-program personnel. Japan's big three companies--IHI,
Mitsubishi, and Kawasaki--have an aerospace population of about
14,000, or slightly above half the Japanese total aerospace
employment.
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France
National Office for Aerospace Research (O.N.E.R.A.)
Eight wind tunnels-- 1,900 people (1980)
German
German Gas Dynamics Institute
Seven wind tunnels--3,100 people (1980)
Total population of these three research facilities is 12,3,11.
which is over half that of NASA's total of 21,200. The number
individuals in equivalent aeronautics work compared with NASA's
3 0 240 Is not known, but is thought to be larger because of NASA's
heavy emphasis on space technology. The United States high-
speed tunnels are superior to those in Europe; however, low-speed
and transonic tunnels are judged to be about equal in capability.
All of these facilities should be on a par In 10 to 15 years.
The aeronautical technology In Japan lags far behind that of
the United States. Japan 's National Aerospace Laboratory (NAL)
supports national R&D, but it has few adequate facilities for aero-
nautical research. While Japan 's aircraft manufacturing industry
is also comparatively small by Western standards, national plans
call for expansion by redeployments from "maturing" industries,
such as consumer electronics, shipbuilding, and autos.
Japanese civil R&D is further viewed as handicapped because
there are no domestic commercial avionics outlets and little
military spinoff. However, national policies endorse direct gov-
ernment support for basic and high-risk experimental and generic
research. Aspects of Japanese research are of interest in a dual-
use sense, and the Japanese recently agreed to specific technol-
ogy exports of this nature that would benefit the military estab-
lishment in the United States. Japanese technical development
programs are coordinated by the Ministry of International 'tirade
and Industry (MITI).
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According to an Airbus Industrie plan published in 1980, the
number of Airbus partner company 
personnel engaged in thevarious Airbus programs is expected to grow to 40
9000 or 45,000by the mid-1980s (Figure 5-5). However, the worldwide 
recessionof the last few ye ., s, which severely curtailed aircraft orders, hasalready significantly slowed implementation of this plan.
t	 Facilities
A gross measure of the size of Airbus Industrie's facilities is5	
the combined factory floor area of all the 
participating partners
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of Airbus Industrie p
 which Is roughly comparable to that of Boeingand McDonnell Douglas combined. 
In both cases, these facilities
are used for civil, military, and space s ystems; however, in theU.S. case, 
major aircraft components are subcontracted to otherU.S. aerospace manufacturers, whereas the Airbus partnershipm
anufactures all major components internally. If the total floorspace of U.S. facilities devoted to the MLAufacture of Boeing andMcDonnell Douglas products were combined, it would far exceed
that of Airbus Industrie. As noted earlier, the production of theA320 
is specifically intended to further strengtnen Europeanmanufacturing capability.
A 
more meaningful comparison with Airbus Industrie lb pro-duction capacity can be obtained from Figure 5-6, which indicatesthe monthly production rate of A300 aircraft (on a comparablee
mpty-weight basis). The dashed line on Figure 5-6 shows theexpected A300/A310 production rate buildup from the original1980 plan. Delivery of the A320 is scheduled to commence in1988. 
The slope sinct, has changed, but the important point iz; that
Airbus is putting in Place facilities, tooling, and personnel capable
of achieving a potential 10 per month production rate by the latterpart of this decade.
British Aerospace (BAe) has tooled up to produce 98 A300/A310 wing sets per 
—year. Heretofore, British Aerospace was set
up for low-volume pr
oduction. It took a significant cultural
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change and major investment in nee + tools to reduce costs and
increase production runs so that BAe could participate in the
A300 program. BAe investment in new machining equipment and
tooling for the Airbus Industrie program will total over $150
million by 1984.
Messerschmltt-Boekow-Blohm (MBB) of West Germany opened
a new facility in 1979, which makes extensive use of numerically
controlled machining. As a result, MBB productivity on A300/
A310 parts has improved significantly. It appears to be on an 83
percent learning curve, which compares well with the best Ameri-
can practice. New investment in facilities and tooling is esti-,
mated by MBB to be $250 million (1979 dollars) with about a 30
'	 percent increase in factory floor space.
Aerospatiale, in addition to building the cockpit, forward fuse-
lage sections, and wing-carry -through structure of the A-300/
A-310, has the responsibility for final assembly. Aerospatiale has
recently invested some $200 million over a two-year period and
will continue to invest at this rate. To the existing large final
assembly plant at Toulouse is being added the equally large
assembly hall formerly occupied by Concorde. An additional hall
is also being built alongside, essentially tripling the existing A300
factory space. Aerospatiale has now moved to a two-shift opera-
tion, which required a significant change in the habits of the
French work force. Third -shift operations are not envisioned.
The Japanese should not be underestimated. Although they
luck the technology or capability to initiate a new large commer-
cial aircraft program on their own, they would be formidable
competitors as partners in an international joint venture. Major
involvement in programs such as the F-15 and Boeing 767 trans-
port is helping Japanese aeronautical production technology to
become more competitive with the United States.
a
The three free-world engine manufacturers currently produc-
ing large commercial transport turbofan engines are Pratt and
Whitney, General Electric, and Rolls Royce. In addition to the
three principal manufacturers, several European and Japanese
manufacturers participate in licensing, coproduction, and codevel-j opment through agreements with the three principals. These
participating companies are SNECMA (France), MTU (Germany),
Volvo Flygmotor (Sweden), FIAT Aviazione (Italy), and
Ishikawajima-Harima (IHI), Mitsubishi WHI), and Kawasaki WHO
in Japan.
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This section assesses the U.S. manufacturers of large com-
mercial transport engines compared with current and potential
future foreign competitors. Areas of comparison discussed are:
	 j
engine technologies and programs, development and production
capabilities, and international 'oint
	 t
Among the most important technologies for turbojet and
turbofan engines are the following: aerodynamics of rotating
machinery (fans, compressors, and turbines); combustion; light-
weight, high-strength and high-temperature materials; design and
configuration; and engine controls. An overview assessment of
U.S. and foreign technoloa^al strengths in these areas can beinferred by comparing the end results of the application of thesetechnologies to resultE
.7
 : commercial turbofan engines.
Figures 5-7 through 5-9 chronologically compare three
important overall parameters reflecting technology content in
engines.
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FIGURE 5-7 Commercial Transport Engines--Cruise Specific Fuel
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SOURCE: Pratt and Whitney, from data supplied by manufac-
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Decreasing Thrust Specific Fuel Consumption (TSFC) at Cruise
(Figure 5-7) A measure of fuel efficiency of the engine.
Advances in aerodynamics, high-temperature materials, and
combustion technologies are important contributors to this
parameter. Additionally, engine controls technology can con-
tribute to overall aircraft -mission fuel efficiency by helping to
minimize fuel consumption during taxiing, descent, and low-
altitude holding. For example, on a flight from Chicago to Miami
this noncruise fuel use can be as much as 11 percent of total trip
fuel.
Increasing Engine Thrust-to-Weight Ratios (Figure 5-8) Tech-
nologies contributing significancy tothas parameter are light-
weight, high-strength, and high-temperature materials, as well as
design and configuration.
Increasing Turbine Inlet Temperature (Figure 5-9). This param-
eter influences the fuel efficiency of the engine and is a con-
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FIGURE 5-9 Commercial Transport Engines--Turbine Inlet
Temperature (manufacturer 's quoted performance)
SOURCE: Pratt and Whitney, from data supplied by manufac-
turers.
tributor to lighter weight. Improvements in combustion and
hlgh-temperature materials, along with turbine blade cooling
	 ti^design, are major contributors to this technology. Projections
have been extended into the 1990s by including published engine
data for future designs from the respective engine manufacturers.
	 j
Figures 5-7 through 5-9 include SNECMA°s participation as a
50 percent codevelopment partner in the CFM56 and study engines
	
lsuch as the M56-2000, which it considered developing with 100
percent French financing and contracted technical assistance
from General Electric. Also shown in the figures is the FJR710,
an engine under development An
 Japan since 1971 and scheduled to
power a four-engined, short-takeoff and -landing demonstrator
,,.	 aircraft in May 1984. The aircraft is being developed in Japan by
the National Aerospace Laboratory. For the time period of itsA.	
potential commercial availability, the FJR710 is not considered
competitive in technology.
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Rolls Royce Engine Technologies and Programs
Since the beginning of the jet-powered commercial transport
era in the 1950s, Rolls Royce has been recognized by the U.S.
engine manufacturers as serious competition. Until the advent of
the wide-bodied commercial transports in the late 1960s, Rolls
Royce engines mainly powered European-built aircraft such as the
Comet, Caravelle, BAC411, and Trident. In 1968, Lockheed
selected the Rolls Royce RB211 engine to power its L-1011 Tristar
wide-bodied commercial transport. Until the termination of
L4011 production in 1983, Rolls Royce remained the exclusive
s«pplier of engines to the L-1011 program. Rolls Royce was
nationalized by the British government in 1971, following bank-
ruptcy resulting from expenses incurred in the development of the
RB211. In 1973, Rolls Royce achieved a position on the Boeing 747
with an uprated version of the RB211, and thus placed itself in
direct competition with Pratt and Whitney and General Electric.
Rolls Royce has been unsuccessful to date in achieving a position
on the Airbus Industrie°s A300 and A310 airplanes, while both U.S.
manufacturers supply engines for these aircraft.
Figure 5-7 indicates that the Rolls Royce RB211 engine family
has near parity in terms of thrust and specific fuel consumption
against the two U.S. manufacturers. However, as shown in Fig-
ures 5-7 and 5-8, Rolls Royce has lagged behind Pratt and Whitney
and General Electric in thrust-to-weight ratio and turbine tem-
perature.
Thrust growth within an engine family is usually achieved by
increasing turbine temperature, and the deficiencies of Rolls
Royce in high turbine temperature technology placed it at a
competitive disadvantage especially during the early 1970s.
Rolls Royce has acted to bring its turbine temperature tech-
nology up to the state of the art of the two U.S. engine manufac-
turers. In 1968 Rolls Royce established a High Temperature
Demonstrator Unit (HTDU) and an associated ongoing research
and development effort. Rolls Royce is seeking to extend its tech-
nology in the areas of turbine blade and nozzle guide vane cooling,
turbine aerodynamics, and application of advanced manufacturing
techniques and new materials to turbines. While Rolls Royce did
not keep pace with Pratt and Whitney and General Electric
through the 1970s, Figure 5-9 indicates that Rolls Royce will
achieve parity in turbine temperature technologies by the mid-
1980s. The length of time needed for Rolls Royce to catch up is
indicative of the long lead times required for research, develop-
ment, and the introduction to production of engine technological
advancements. Rolls Royce recovery efforts in this area demon-
strate its determination to remain a viable competitor with Pratt
and Whitney and General Electric.
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SNECMA Engine Technologies and Programs
SNECMA is the French manufacturer of large gas turbine air-
,raft engines and is 85 percent owned by the French government.
The company designed, developed, and currently produces the
NTAR and M53 engines powering the French Armed Forces' Mir-
kge and Super Etendard fighter bombers. Additionally, SNECMA
has a 50 percent codevelopment and production share of the
CFM56 commercial transport engine family and a 10 percent
codevelopment share of the CF6-80C. SNECMA°s execution of its
share of these programs, and earlier programs with Rolls Royce
on the Olympus engine, has been up to the state-of-the-art stan-
dards of U.S. manufacturers.
SNECMA does not have a complete technology base now,
Particularly in high-stage
-loading compressors, high-space-rate
combustors, and high-temperature turbines. SNECMA and French
government labs are developing such technology through R&D
work on eutectic allccv and structural composites.
In general, many of the technologies incorporated in com-
mercial transport engines are also applicable to military fighter
engines; typically, there is a high degree of synergistic technology
transfer between military and commercial engine designs. Thus,
examination of SNECMA°s fighter engine technology compared
with that of Pratt and Whitney and General Electric provides
some further assessment of SNECMA°s technological competitive-
ness. Figures 5-10 and 5-11 compare two significant measures of
overall technology level for fighter engines: thrust-to
-weight
ratio and turbine temperature. The data would indicate perfor-
mance levels for the M88 below those of the latest U.S. fighter
engines (F100, F404, and F110) and also lagging some 8 to 10years i;i
 development, if needed funds are found for the program.
It should be noted that the SNECMA development is proceeding
without a specific application objective to pace it.
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MTU Engine Technologies and Programs
l
The West German firm Motoren
-und-Turbinen-Union GmbH(MTU) also participates as a codevelopment and coproductionpartner in ,
--cveral large commercial transport and military engine
programs. Its technical execution of the engine modules, for
which it has had codevelopment responsibility, has been compar-
able to state-of-the-art standards of U.S. manufacturers.
	
dThe German government has concluded that the German
	 ^
market is not big enough to justify an independent capability in
large commercial transport engines. The government has con-
cluded that further investment for a small turboshaft develop-
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FIGURE 5-10 Military Engines--Thrust
-To-Weight Ratio (manu-facturer 's quoted performance)
I	 SOURCE: Pratt and Whitney, from data supplied by manufac-
turers.
ment might be low enough, and its marker large enough, to sup-
V
port an MTU independent venture or majority partnership. MTU,
along with Turbomeca, has been studying a join t
 venture engine in
the 1000-shp class, the MTM 385, to power a new European hell-
copter.
The government does not want to expand its engine industry to
handle peak loads, leaving idle capacity to be filled by make-
work. it will probably remain a high
-technology partner with the
three principal manufacturers and is likely to attempt to increase
its share of participation in future commercial programs.
Volvo Flygmotor Engine Technologies and Programs
In Sweden, Volvo Flygmotor engine activities are heavily
oriented toward military engines. The company has pursued a
long-range strategy of expanding its civil aeroengine and non-
aerospace business segments to achieve a balance in sales among
military engines, commercial engines, and nonaerospace products
	
`	 (such as hydraulic motors). Since 1972 f1
 it has increased its civil
engine share from 3 to 13 percent of sales and its nonaerospace
business from 7 to 31 percent. Military' engines are 56 percent of
total sales. Volvo Flygmotor does not have a complete technology
base, particularly for high-stage
-loading compressors and high-
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FIGURE 5-11 Military Engines--Maximum Turbine Inlet Temper-
ature (manufacturer 's quoted performance)	 j
SOURCE: Pratt and Whitney, from data supplied by manufac-
turers.	 i
temperature turbines, and it does not have good capability in fan,
combustion, and afterburner /thrust reverser technology.
Swedish national policy for the last 45 years has called for l
self-sufficiency in the manufacture and support of military
engines. This has been interpreted to include design and devel-
opment of derivative models adapted to unique Swedish operating
specifications. The Swedish government has funded such R&D.
Volvo Flygmotor has said that its industrial competence makes it
an attractive partner and that it intends to be a prime source, 	 ?	 a
worldwide, for a selected range of components.'
Japanese Engine Industry Technologies and Programs
	
Three Japanese companies, IIshikawajima -Harima heavy	 {'
Industries (IIHI), Mitsut6ishi Heavy Industries (MH1), and Kawasaki
Heavy industries, Wil), along with the government National
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Aerospace Laboratory (NP,L), are responsible for Japanese engine
research, development, and manufacturing efforts.
MHI has been involved In licensed production of 3T8D-M9
engines and also in commercial overhaul and repair of turbofan
engines since about 1972. IHI, the largest of the three, Is the
prime contractor for F-100 engines, produced under license and
used on the Japanese-built F-15 fighters.
In 1979 these three companies established a domestic consor-
tium, Japan Aero Engines Corporation (JAEC), which joined with
Rolls Royce to develop a new -tgine (the R3500) for the 150-
passenger airplane market. This development has evolved Into the
V2500 engine and been supplanted by an expanded multinational
consortium in which the Japanese companies (through 3AEC)
participate as a 23 percent risk-sharing partner. The others
include Pratt and Whitney along with Rolls Royce (each with 30
percent shares), and also MTU and Fiat (with 11 percent and 6
percent, respectively).
The most ambitious independent Japanese engine effort to
date has been the F3I2710. This engine, begun in 1971 under spon-
sorship of NAL and subcontracted to IHI, MHI, and KHII, is an
11,000-pound thrust, high bypass ratio turbofan engine. Figures
5-7 through 5-9 show that the F3R710 is not compatible with
today's commercial transport engines. Development of the engine
has proceeded slowly, suggesting a focus on development and
demonstration rather than a viable commercial engine.
The Japanese plan to invest $181.6 million through 1986 on the
V2500's development--essentially a doubling of the $93 million
that has thus far been allocated to the F3R710 program. While
Japan's participation in the V2500 program is that of a minority
partner, its longer-term objectives in the development of con-
tributing engine technologies--in high-temperature alloys,
coatings, and ceramics--should not be overlooked.
3	 Status of General Aviation, Regional, and Rotorcraft Propulsion
1
All three types of aircraft, of course, use smaller powerplants
and gearboxes to transfer power. Thus, the benefits of advances
in large engines do not accrue to these smaller versions. The
advances in high-temperature materials technology are appli-
cable, and the strength of the U.S. infrastructure in these mate-
rials is valuable. The U.S. is thought to be ahead in propulsion
technology for all of these aircraft. As noted earlier, the Can-
adian government has targeted engines of this size as an oppor-
tunity and is supporting development. In doing so, Canada is able
to capitalize on proximity to high-temperature materials capabil-
ity in the United States.
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There are currently 18 jet engine manufacturers in the free
world and a total of 26 companies participating as licencees, con-
sortia members, or joint venture partners. The three manufac-
turers of large engines and their associated companies account for
approximately 75 percent of the market. Their share of the mar-
ket for engines under 5,000 lbs. thrust, however, drops to under 45
percent. Four other U.S. companies--Garrett, Lycoming, Allison,
and Williams Research- -have more than 40 percent of the market.
The development cost of a new engine in this size range is
from $200 million to $1 billion, and these smaller engine manufac-
turers are marginal with respect to their ability to fund the devel-
opment of a new engine. They face a formidable task In compet-
ing with companies receiving government support. Just as in the
case of smaller aircraft, the technology and capital requirements
for these smaller engines are a more attainable target for smaller
countries. West Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, Japan, and
Israel all have active entrants in this field.
Engine Development and Production Capabilities
Commercial transport engine development and production
capabilities are strongly dependent on (1) the availability of
specialized test facilities such as altitude chambers and wind
tunnels, (2) the manpower available in the industry, and (3)
suitable production facilities.
Altitude Test Chambers and Wind Tunnels Figure 5-12 and Table
5-1 show the availability and capability of engine altitude test
chambers of sufficient size to test medium- and large-sized
commercial transport engines. Both the United States and the
United Kingdom have test facilities available. The only other
country currently possessing a suitable facility is France.
The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) report on
Aeronautical Research and Technology Polict indicates that 11...
wit minor exceptions, existing an panne .S .J major facilities
are adequate and will not require replacement in the near
future. 112 A 1981 study was conducted by NASA titled Survey of
Altitude Test Facilities and Wind Tunnels--U.S.A. an Foreign.
Information in this report, summarized in Figure 5-T2 an Ta 
5-1, which lists major United States and foreign altitude chambers
and wind tunnels, indicates that Europe, in general, has sufficient
modern test facilities to support independent development of
engines by European manufacturers.'
Japan lacks altitude test chambers and wind tunnels to support
research and development of engines. The recent altitude test of
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NASA, LEWIS RESEARCH CENTRE, CLEVELAND, USA.
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FIGURE 5-12 International Altitude Test Facilities Capability
SOURCE: Survey of Altitude Test Facilities and Wind Tunnels--U.S. and Foreign; NASA.
the FJR710 was accomplished in Great Britain's National Gas
Turbine Establishment. The report Aeronautical Research and
Technology 
P2!ISX states, "Japan lacksa focal point for aero-
nautics researc such as NASA, as well as important facilities
for aeronautical research, particularly in areas of propulsion."a
,} Manpower  Table 5-2 compares the manpower employed by the
companies building commercial transport engines or their major
components in 1979, which was a good employment year for the
industry. A comparison based on 1982-1983 employment would be
misleading due to the current distressed condition of the commer-
cial transport aircraft segment of the aerospace industry.
In the future, Japan can be expected to increase its staffing in
the aerospace industry. The white collar segment of Japan's
working population is heavily weighted toward engineers and
scientists compared with the U.S., and its educational system
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TABLE 5 . 1 Subsonic and Transonic Wind Tunnel Facilities
Dimensions Mach Number
Country Facility (in feet) Capability Remarks
France S2-MA 6.3 X 5.75 0.1
(C.E. Pr.)
F-1 14.8 X 11.5 0,0.0.36 High-lift devices
S1-MA 20.5 X 22 0.02.1.0 Aerodynamic and engine
England RAE SM 16 X 14 0.0.0.33 High-lift devices
RAE 8 x 8 0.1-0.85
RAE 24 Dia. 0.0-0. 15 Noise
ARA 9 X 8 0.3.1.4
Netherlands NLR 7 X 10 0.0-0.2
NLR 6.8 X 5.4 0.2-1.4
DNW 26.5 X 20 0.0-0.3 Aerodynamic and engine
31.0 X 31.0 0.0-0.18
20 x 20 0.0-0.43
Canada NAE LST 6 X 9 0.0-0.27
Switzerland EFW 23.1 Dia. 0.0-0.24
EFW 26.4 X 18.8 0.0-0.1.5
United States LERC 6 X 9 0.0-0 .4 Icing
9 X is 0.0-0.2 Noise
10 X 10 0.0.0,4 Propulsion
8 X 6 0.4.2.0 Propulsion
ARC 40 X 80 0.0-0.4 Propulsion
80 X 120 0.0.0.1 Propulsion
12 Dia. 0.0.0.1
14 Dia. 0.6-1.2
11 X 11 0.4-1.4
6 X 6 0.2-2.2
LRC 30 X 60 0.0-0.1 Propulsion
7 X 7 0.2-1.3
16 Dia. 0.2.1.3
16 X 16 0.0-1.2
SOURCE: Survey of Altitude Test Facilities and Wind Tunnels -U.S. and Foreign; NASA.
TABLE 5-2 1979 Engine Division Employment
Companies Employees
U.S.
Pratt and Whitney 43,800
General Electric 30;000
Foreign
Rolls Royce 52,200
SNECMA 18,400
MTU 6,000
FIAT Aviazione 2,700
Volvo F'lygmotor 3,000'"
IHI 4,000
Mitsubishi 500
Kawasaki 1,200
• 1978 data (1979 not available.
SOURCE: Pratt and Whitney, General Electric, Flight
International.
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supports this emphasis. As an example, out of every 10,000
citizens in the United States, 20 are lawyers, 40 are accountants,
and 70 are engineers and scientists. In Japan, there are 1 lawyer,
3 accountants, and 400 engineers and scientists per 10,000
population.
h
International Joint Ventures to
codevelopment agreement on the CFM56 was established in the
early 1970s. Since then, joint-venture partnerships between an
American engine manufacturer and European and Japanese
manufacturers have become an established approach for new
commercial transport engine programs. The following large
commercial transport engine codevelopment and coproduction
agreements are currently In place or are proposed:
1. General Electric/SNECMA
	 CFM56
2. GE/SNECMA/MTU	 CF6-50
3. GE/SNECMA/MTU/Volvo Flygmotor 	 CF6-80
4. Pratt & Whitney/MTU/Fiat 	 PW2037
5. Pratt & Whitney/MTU/Fiat/
Rolls Royce/IHI/MHI/KHI	 *V2500
*International Aero Engines, Inc.
Recently, Pratt & Whitney and General Electric have been
studying advanced turbofan engines with technology bgond that
of the NASA-sponsored Energy Efficient Engine (E) demon-
strators. These studies have identified further potential for
improving fuel consumption of about 12 percent, which could be
available after the year 2000. Additionally, the propfan concept,
mentioned earlier, utilizing a thin-bladed propeller of advanced
design to operate efficiently at flight speeds approaching those of
turbofan-powered airplanes, holds promise of reducing fuel con-
sumption by up to 30 to 35 percent compared with today 's turbo-
fans. The appreciable potential gains available from propulsion
systems make it reasonable to assume that new commercial
engine program opportunities will emerge.
With international joint ventures likely for future commercial
transport engine development programs, it is important that U.S.
engine manufacturers maintain their current technical leadership
and thus retain the lead role in future development programs.
The maintenance of technical leadership and the retention of
market shares large enough to support the production base of the
U.S. engine industry will be challenging in the face of develop-
ment and production subsidies extended by foreign governments to
their manufacturers.
^ e^ {f4 J^ add ^ry
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Within the powerplant segment of the aeronautics Industry,
the U.S. has gained competitive advantage not only from its
accumulated massive civil transport development and experience,
but from advances in system design and performance sponsored by
DOD. It would appear that powerplants could be built by the
mid-1990s with approximately 10 percent better thrust -to-weight
ratios and 15 to 20 percent lower specific fuel consumption than
the "energy efficient engine" technology that evolved from recent
NASA activity. The market push, because of dollar volume, is
stronger for large-aircraft powerplant development than for
small. Similar technology achievements are feasible and are
being pursued, but to a lesser degree for small powerplants.
Foreign competition is very active in the small engine area.
Inherent In the system synthesis for advanced aircraft designs
is industry 's ability to produce and apply complex avionics sys-
tems that can provide more effective operating functions at lower
power consumption and overall weights. Here, too, military devel-
opments help by stringent requirements for ultrareliable, fault-
tolerant system design and the support of a production base tluit
keeps costs lower.
MAINTAINING MOMENTUM
IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
A series of mutually reinforcing factors has enabled the
United States to maintain the degree of competitive and com-
mercial leadership in civil aircraft that it has at present. The
bedrock of that leadership is technology--its effective use
provides superior performance and economy at competitive
prices. Given the significant opportunities for further techno-
logical progress that have been identified, it is apparent that
maintaining momentum in R&D is critical for preserving tech-
nological leadership. Important technological advances are not
yet fully validated, and their embodiment in new aircraft, in many
cases, will not occur until the 1990s. This long delay between
technology development and its incorporation into new products
creates vulnerability, because loss of momentum in R&D would
not be apparent in the deterioration of competitive position in the
U.S.--probably until it was firmly entrenched.
The growing trend toward internationalization of aircraft
manufacture, with its inevitable sharing of technology with
foreign partners, lends even greater urgency to the need to insure
the vitality of our basic research and technology development
effort. Although some information is undoubtedly transferred in
international joint ventures for manufacture, the technical
knowledge underlying the embodiment need not be. The technical
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10
leadership of the United States as a development partner need not
be threatened provided that the United States maintains a vigor-
ous program of basic research and technology development.
Role of NASA
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is
the focal agency for government support of aeronautical tech-
nology. The act creating NASA charged it with "preserving the
role of the United States as a leader in aeronautical science and
technology.... 1b Its responsibilities covered both civil and military
applications. NASA replaced the National Advisory Committeefor Aeronautics (NACA), established in 1915 to "guide and
supervise the fledgling science of aeronautics in practical military
and civil applications. 16 NASA made significant diversions of
"aeronautical capabilities and managerial attention to space
activities,"' because it had been created to guide the U.S. space
program. Figure 5-13 shows the decline in manpower devoted to
aeronautical technology after the creation of NASA.
In view of the high cost of aeronautical R&D and the massive
facilities required to conduct experimental programs, no other
organization--and certainly no private enterprise--can perform
the central role in the development of new technology that NASA
carries out.
0
1920	 1930	 1940	 1950	 1960	 1970
	 1980
FISCAL YEAR
FIGURE 5-13 NACA /NASA Aeronautics Manpower History
SOURCE: NASA 's
 Role in Aeronautics: A Workshop, Volume I
Summary, p. 41, National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 1981.
i
J{ fSC
n Y ^+
t
i
;r
n
Y Y	 ^ d
,k
is
t ^	 i
r f	 !^y
3fi
t
tY
^
ys
r	 ;	 ^	 Y
A1
136
There is little doubt that budget priorities reflect perceived
political appeal and that space programs have been deemed to be
more important than aeronautics. However, It is important for
budget priorities also to reflect technological and economic oppor-
tunities and the altered competitive context that has been des-
cribed in this study. Thus, the status of the international com-
petition needs to be fully appreciated before making judgments on
priorities. Examination of European and Japanese investments ofpublic funds in R&D does not provide a clear picture of their
activity. Their accounting and public reporting practices do not
provide the Information needed to separate the R&D funds related
to generic work from funds allocated for the development and
production of aircraft and engines. Thus, it is difficult to com-
pare directly the funds of the United States devoted to R&D with
those of other nations. It Is likely, however, that expenditures by
others for generic R&D are, in the aggregate, approximately
equal to those in the United States. The technical accomplish-
ments of the Concorde supersonic transport, Airbus A300, A310,
RB-211 turbofan engine, RJ-500 turbofan engine, ATR 42 com-
muter transport, and helicopter, suggest a sound preceding
research and development program.
of the research and
..pva s..na rata o.VL1iW ill LIMP SLUU
As can be set. in Table 5-3, aeronautical RED represents
approximately 5 percent of total R&D. Considering the impor-
tance of civil aircraft manufacture to economic health, societal
good, and the balance of payments, there would seem to be reason
to reexamine priorities and levels of expenditures. The NRC
study, cited above, concluded that the problem did not result from
the dual responsibility of NASA for space and for aviation. As has
been noted, the need is to rethink the importance of advancing
aeronautical technology to the American public and to national
goals of economic strength and strategic security in the light of
the changed competitive environment.
Another development need also warrants attention. The
present institutional mechanisms for developing and applying new
technology do not address adequately the investment required for
validating new technological advances for certification and for
ublic ac t pt ep 
	 IInte. n the classical sequence of R&D new physical
	 t°principles, configurations, structures, etc. are conceived and
evaluated in the research and technology phase through analytical
modeling, simulation, and flight research techniques as appropri-
ate. For the technology to be ready for application its inherent
risk factors must be fully understood by working with systems
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TABLE 5 .3 NASA Budget Authority, 1968.1983
(millions of dollars)
Aeronautical
Year	 Total	 R&D	 R&T
1963 4,589 3,912 NA
1969 3,995 3,314 NA
1970 3,749 2,993 96
1971 3,312 2,556 102
1972 3,308 2,523 109
1973 3,408 2,599 157
1974 3,040 2,194 168
1975 3,231 2,323 167
1976 3,532 2,678 17S
1977 3,819 2,856 190
1978 4,064 3,012 228
1979 4,559 3,477 264
1980 5,243 4,088 308
1981 5,522 4,334 271
1982 6,020 4,772 265
1983 6,839 5,543 280
SOURCE: Aerospace Industries Association of America, Inc.
Aerospace Facts and Figures, 1983/1984, pp. 74 and 76.
that approximate full scale under representative flight or other
simulated op -rating conditions. In this process (called validation)
the component subsystem or system technology to be validated is
generic not specific to a design under development--not a proto-
type or actual product development. This validation stage pro-
vides the expanded knowledge necessary far enabling designers to
incorporate the new advance into a specific product with a high
degree of confidence in its performance and in the integrity and
certificability of the product.
There is no way that validation can be satisfactorily circum-
vented,, It is the longest and most expensive part in the chain of
advancing new technology. (1t has also at this point where the
momentum of the United States' R&D has become most vulner-
able.) Industrial firms lack the resources to undertake expensive,
long-term, and uncertain work of this nature; they have no public
franchise that would legitimize their undertaking it; and no stan-
dards have been established to satisfy public opinion in an area
where questions of safety are central. NASA has traditionally
carried out the early phases of basic and applied research, while
aircraft manufacturers have assumed responsibility for incor
-
porating new technology into designs and obtaining certification.
in the past the armed forces have played an important role in
some validation, e.g., turbine engines, sweptback wings, and
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ipersonic flight, but the generic technology supported by DOD
	 jas been significantly curtailed over the past 15 years.
The technology validation phase is within NASA's charter, but
are also, it has received limited funding and support. The panel
alieves that the national implications of this gap in technology
	 j
..avel
I_opment have not been fully understood.T
NASA's activities
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An additional area in which NASA is not now active involves
the flight, demonstration of long life, and basic process under-
standing of composites. Composites play a special role in future
performance gains for aircraft. in addition to reductions in manu-
facturing cost that must be achieved by individual producers,
their extended use will require significant advances in process
automation, in nondestructive testing and inspection, in devel-
oping standard strength-of-materials data for use by designers, in
evaluation of operational life and suitability, and in establishing
design criteria for crash-worthiness. If these new materials are
to be used in primary structures, it will be necessary to insure
their integrity not only at installation but also during use. This
means that progress in material processing and test techniques is
as important as progress on composites themselves. An endeavor
of this sort would clearly benefit from joint NASA-DOD-industryplanning and participation. Consequently, an expanded role for
NASA might also include accelerated service testing and work on
evaluation technologies as part of the validation of new materialsfor use in primary structures.
An expansion of NASA's activities into technology validation
and evaluation of composite materials should include mechanisms
to insure that areas selected for additional effort are relevant to
the needs of industry and that the results will be of such a nature
that they can be applied with confidence. One possible mech-
anism for ensuring relevance involves joint industry-government
program definition. Another mechanism could be through aug-
mentation of the present NASA aeronautics advisory committee
structure. Similar committees have been effective in the past.
The advisors included representatives from industry, universities,
'the airlines and from other involved government agencies, especi-
ally the DOD and FAA. The Aeronauti
	 dcs an Space EngineeringBoard of the National Research Council could make a contribu-
tion, as could the Aeronautics Committee of the NASA Advisory
Council. The newly established OSTP Aeronautical Policy Review
	 ¢Commmittee can play a special role in such process because it
reports to the PresHent through the science advisor.
The OSTP study of aeronautical R&D policy noted that both
the Soviet Union and our commercial competitors actively col-
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The FAA is responsible for flight safety, operational safety,
ind certification of new aircraft, equipment, and procedures.
through coordir.ation with NASA in formulating the rules for
:ertification, the FAA can help accelerate the development of
:he technology base, its application and certification, and its
acceptance by designers, developers, and buyers. Special atten-
ion should be devoted to the rapid advances in electronics and
heir use for flight control, for air traffic control, and for general
iperations. If this is done in concert with NASA's technology
levelopment, it will shorten the time for certification and for the
ntroduction of such advances in aircraft and operational systems
y manufacturers. The industrial members of the panel believe
hat more effective coupling between NASA and FAA as tech-
ology development proceeds would reduce uncertainty for
ircraft designers in obtaining certification of new aircraft.
The paned recommends that the FAA work closely with NASA
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lest, read, and evaluate published U.S. aeronautical technical
data, which are widely distributed. The panel recognizes the
value of trying to extract maximum domestic value from tech-
nical 'information generated by public funds. Attempts to impose
restrictions--however laudible their Intent--must be sensitive to a
long history of unfortunate consequences of similar past efforts.
Any new effort to reexamine this problem will need to recognize
the value of international technical cooperation and research
exchanges at the university level.
The growing technological strength of foreign competitors Is
creating a considerable amount of foreign-based aeronautical
R&D in the technical literature. NASA does not collect and
evaluate the best foreign R&D and distribute reviews or assess-
ments to the U.S. technical community. In general, U.S. industry
also has not been aggressive in monitoring and applying foreign
technical advances.
The panel concurs in the OSTP recommendation that NASA
aircraft manufacturers an irms
Role of FAA
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In considering the likely competitive future of U.S. civil air-
craft manufacture, one must examine separately the major ele-
ments of the industry: large transports, helicopters, and general
aviation--including commuters, executive aircraft, and light air-
craft. In large transports the U.S. position of dominance has been
shaken but remains strong. The future environment will be differ-
ent, however, and could be characterized as competitive inter-
national interdependence. Given the close tie between civil
aviation and national security, it is in the national security inter-
ests of the United States to have a viable civil aviation industry--
including both airlines and aircraft manufacture. If the United
States were to end up with only one large air transport manufac-
turer (a scenario that is not too improbable) our long commitment
to efficiency through competition would no doubt lead us to wish
an alternative supply from some source.
The challenge within the United States is to preserve the
strength and effectiveness of the large transport industry as it
accommodates to higher financial risks, increased competition,
the need to assureaccess to foreign markets, and increased
market uncertainty.
The environment for the other categories of aircraft is dif-
ferent in character and scale. The smaller size and lower capital
requirements to develop these aircraft and their powerplants
make them a more suitable vehicle for many nations to enter the
civil aircraft market. Since deregulation the U.S. market for
commuter aircraft has been perceived as being much larger than
in the past. U.S. manufacturers are now beginning to address
these opportunities, but they are tardy compared with many
foreign entries. Furthermore, they will find it necessary to pene-
trate world markets if they expect to achieve needed economies
of scale. U.S. manufacturers do not start from a position of
dominance in the market for smaller transport aircraft. However,
when considering policy alternatives and priorities one cannot
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invoke the argument for national security with the same force
that applies to large transports.
Helicopters represent a special area of technology. Their
importance to national security is clear. The growing success of
foreign competitors, which is based partly on U.S. technology, is
also clear. It would appear that foreign nations have been more
adroit at stabilizing military procurement and phasing it with
civilian sales. In the United States, military helicopter develop-
ment has diverged from dual-use concepts, and although the state
of the art has been maintained, the cost of commercial develop-
ment has increased. Attainment of dual-use capability warrants
reexamination for military helicopters that are designed for
transport use.
This study has identified six key policy issues to which atten-
tion should be given by government, industry, and organized labor.
i
;a
TRADE POLICY
International competition in aircraft production has crossed a
watershed; it has moved from being almost a contradiction in
terms to something of major concern. As this study has noted,
the U.S. aircraft industry is now often in virtual competition with
governments, not just with private commercial enterprises.
Foreign governments are deeply involved in the financing of
design, development, production, marketing, and sale of aircraft.
They assume some or all of the financial, technological, and
market risk associated with these endeavors. In parallel, they
exert political pressures during the purchase of aircraft by their
own and other airlines. Furthermore, they do not necessarilyjudge success or failure by the normal commercial standards of
market acceptance and return on investment that apply to the
U.S. private sector. Their criteria include national prestige,
creation of an indigenous technology and production base, pro-
vision of employment and training of the work force, substitution
for imports, evolution from a low-technology to a high-technology
economy, and preservation of foreign currency. These directed
efforts apply to commuter aircraft, helicopters, and business jets
as well as to large commercial transports and their engines and
components.
The increased competitive strength of foreign manufacturers
is appearing at a time of declining U.S. dominance and leadership
in world markets and is fostering disturbing U.S. pressures to
increase protectionism. In the coming decade 60 percent or more
of the world aircraft market for large civil transports will be
outside the United States. These export markets were previously
dominated by U.S. manufacturers. This fact alone supports the
1r,"
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conclusion that pursuinp an effective U.S. trade policy to permit
U.S. manufacturers to enter and compete on a fair basis is
essential.
Developing countries represent one of the major growth mar-
kets for aircraft. The general trend of increasing the barriers for
exports from developing countries to the United States and other
industrialized nations may result reciprocally in a severe impact
on U.S. aircraft exports to these markets. The ability of develop-
ing countries to import is critically dependent on their ability to
finance the purchases with exports. Otherwise they cannot gener-
ate the foreign currency to purchase aircraft and other goods and
services. This increases the importance of trade for the develop-
ing countries and demonstrates the significance of financing as a
competitive weapon. Thus, there is the need to increase the
priority for a well-articulated, comprehensive, timely foreign
trade policy toward developing as well as developed nations.
U.S. international trade policy in high-technology industries is
being forced to focus on a new set of issues. The central issues in
earlier multilateral iiegotiations in the postwar period, e.g.p the
Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds, were tariff reductions (however,
Tokyo did address nontariff issues as well). Tariffs are not now
the central trade Policy issues in aircraft and other high-
technology industries, Instead, nontariff barriers to market
access--such as goverfarientally directed procurement--or more
subtle forms of foreign government subsidy are the central
issues. This new form of international competition in high-
technology industries was the basis for the Agreement on Trade in
Civil Aircraft that was negotiated in parallel with the final set of
Tokyo Round talks. However, nontariff barriers and some forms
of subsidy are far less visible and much more difficult to monitor
than are tariffs, e.g., cross-trading, grants, deferred paybacks,
special grants and services with no costs or below-market costs,
and contingent sale of military aircraft.
The position of the United States on subsidizing higher-tech-
nology development provides competing nations with a basis for
justifying their forms of subsidy. The long, productive relation-
ship of NASA, its predecessor NACA, and the aircraft industry is
one example. Similarly, historical examples of spinoff to the
civilian sector from military development and Drocurement
provide further ammunition to other nations in the negotiation
	
_4
over trade.
U.S. trade policy for aircraft, and other industrial products as
well, has focused on defining the framework--the rules of
conduct--under which both industry and governments are expected
to operate. In that process, the U.S. government has had as its
primary objective insuring that U,-S. industry had the opportunity
to compete on fair terms in the international markets.
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variety of obsticles. Thusp continued focus of U.S. trade policy
on a careful specification of the 11rules of the game" is open todifficulties in today's operating environment. The high visibilityof tariffs In the past meant that enforcement of trade agreementswas a relatively simple undertaking. Faced with a broad and
constantly changing array of foreign nontariff barriers, U.S. trade
policy now must devote a much higher level of resources and
attention to the monitoring and enforcement of multilateral
agreements on the rules and actual practice of the game--arid
with a growing list of competitor nations.
The relative ease with which nontariff barriers may be altered
and manipulated means that U.S. trade negotiators, and the
agencies that support them, need the resourc.i.
,, to delineate
acceptable and unacceptable practices in an arena where inter-
national competitors are continually seeking ways of avoiding the
restrictions of multilateral agreements in order to gain commer-
cial advantage. This administrative support structure must alsohave the resources to marshal evidence regarding practices being
followed. Recent steps to strengthen the resources for monitor-
ing compliance and for discussing problems with trading partners
are a hopeful signal of increased priority on trade issues. In order
to insure stability and consistency it is important for the value of
the work to be so broadly accepted that it will not be undone by a
subsequent administration. The present staff is to be commendedfor its competence and commitment, but it faces a monumental
task in monitoring, data gathering, and analysis. An effectivetrade policy must include institutional arrangements to insure
that balance is achieved among differing and conflicting policy
objectives, and that mechanisms exist for rationalizing and
coordinating the Policy balancing process.
Consideration should also be given to the development of a
broader arsenal of response mechanisms, such as temporary tax,
financial support, or import limitations, that would permit more
carefully targeted responses. The development of greater flexi-
bility in timeliness of responses also warrants study. This step
requires greater foresight by the private sector and continuing
effective relationships between the trade admiWstration and the
private sector. The rapid pace of commercial transactions can
easily render an eventual response useless unless administrative
action matches the pace of commerce.
The situation with respect to Eximbank policies and proce-
dures reflects the greater ambivalence and lower priority asso-
ciated with international trade in the United States. The commit-
ments of the bank represent a Potential drain on the U.S. Treasury,
and in a time of huge deficits all such potentials warrant careful
scrutiny. Nevertheless, competition over the terms of financing
u^
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often central in international sales of aircraft. The present
Ingenuity being demonstrated by both financial Institutions and
aircraft 
manufacturers in devising new financial instruments, new
leasing conditions, creative use of Insurance, Increased use of4.
	
	
international sources of capital, and conversion into currencies
that aid repayment is to be commended and should be continued.
However, the importance of Eximbank as a lender and guarantor4
requirest hat it have both the lending conditions in terms of pay-
back period, Interest charged, percent of assets covered, front-
end money, etc., and the 
administrative practices, especially with
respect to support of smaller transactions, that can match com-
petition. In order to be effective, Eximbank needs to have avail-
able mechanisms and administrative 
practices that provide a
credible force for achieving the basic U.S. position, which is to
insure that international market rate and market terms apply
equitably to all transactions. The more evident and credible the
arsenal of responses available, the more likely that the market
will discipline Itself.
One especially troublesome aspect of financing involves com-
petition with international suppliers for domestic sales. If thei	
mechanisms permit it, domestic airlines will seek to stimulate
below-market financing from foreign vendors to force better{
	
	 terms from domestic suppliers. Mechanisms and policies must bedeveloped to uncover and counter such practices.
The development and 
administration of an effective trade
Policy requires that all involved interests be balanced to resolveP lic
 issues facing our 
government. The panel supports the
recent consensus expressed by the National Research Council
Panel on Advanced Technology Competition and the Industrialized
Allies that recommended in part that 
11the federal government
shou!v initiate a biennial, cabinet-level review to assess U.S.trade 
competitiveness ... 0o and that this review "...should be
supported by a continuing mechanism that would draw on
+i.	
expertise both from within the government and from outside.
Beyond the restructuring of the policy process, however, the
panel supports the scrutiny and political debate now beginning on
the entire subject of trade policy. A more strategic approach
may well be necessary for the United States to achieve both bet-
ter focus and better differentiation among industrial sectors
regarding their importance to international trade and the differ-
ences in competitive environment within which they operate.
In so doing, it is important to include in the deliberations an
informed awareness of the balances achieved by our international
commercial competitors. It is apparent that the governments of
the countries in which they operate have attached greater weight
to trade success than has the United States.
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The subject is complex. The data concerning the effectiveness
	 ?of explicit Industrial policies implemented in other countries are
incomplete, giving rise to varying interpretations. An
changes in U.S. policy must recognize our own traditions, 
values,and institutions. Nevertheless, the future prospects of civil air-
	 icraft development and manufacturing for the U.S. industry lend
urgency to the assessment.
I
nternational trade is important to the U.S. economy. It faces
increasinglyg y powerful international competition, and the entireapparatus of government-
-not just trade policy--tends to reflectthe priorities and perceptions of an earlier time when our totalinternational trade was much less significant. 
Furthermore, for aperiod after World War 11 the United States enjoyed an unsustain-
able economic and technological dominance that lulled us into afalse sense of competitive su periority. What is needed perhaps
more than anything else, is a change in tone and attitude, the
creation of a changed national consensus that gives the needed
greater weight to international trade and strengthening of theU-S. competitive position.
B ALANCING ECONOMIC AND SECURITY INTERESTSIN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
As this report has noted, international technology transfer has
an impact on both the perception and the reality of U.S. national
security. With the increasing importance accorded to technology,
it offers potential leverage in diplomacy. The conventional view
is that formulation of policy In this area requires balancing na-
tional security or foreign policy objectives against those of
	 rstrengthening the economy and preserving the U-S- position in
advanced technology. This study has emphasized that a broader
view of national security should include economic strength and
	 jtechnological leadership.
It is important to recognize the changing p
osition of the U.S.visA-vis that of international competito ad 	 world markets. Intechnological competition, the United States appears still to have
a lead in most of the technologies associated with aircraft design
and manufacture; however, the lead is small, the rate of technilcal
diffusion has increased, and both our European and Japanese com-
p
etitors possess the necessary skills and capabilities to compete
effectively with or without further technology transfer from theUnited States.
The international competitive equation has also changed due
to factors other than technology. International markets areprojected to grow more rapidly than U.S. domestic markets and
thus become increasingly important. In addition, after many
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years of effort, serious international competition is now emerging
in large transports and has become a major marke. factor for
commuters, helicopters, and executive aircraft.
In this changed environment, an overt policy to restrain tech-
nology transfer provides little leverage and may serve to freeze
U.S. companies out of markets and to stimulate the development
of even more powerful technological competitors. Even with
respect to national -security, technology has value only in a
limited time frame.
Cooperative programs between the United States and its allies
for licensing and coproduction of aircraft are also an Important
factor in technology transfer. This subject also is complex. It is
in the national security interest of the United States for its allies
to have an indigenous aircraft industry, which inevitably repre-
sents a potential threat in civil markets. Memoranda of Under-
standing ( MOU) have represented the le6al vehicle for large-scale
transfer of technology for military aircraft. Industrial represen-
tatives believe these MOUs should be written with more consider-
ation of the international competitive impact they may have on
domestic manufacturers of civil aircraft.
The key to effective policy formulation in this area is to insure
that all parties with an important interest in the outcome have
the opportunity for inputs. The mechanisms for marshaling the
argument for national security and diplomacy are all within the
government. The relevant inputs from the private sector are both
more diffuse and more diverse, and the institutional arrangements
for assembling and assessing these inputs are not now well
articulated.
MAINTAINING MOMENTUM IN R&D
Although technological leadership is not of itself sufficient for
success in the marketplace, the emergence of effective inter-
national competition increases its importance. The competitive
assessment of the current promise of new technology in this study
concluded that there were indeed important, attractive opportuni-
ties for further advances in aerodynamic design, controls, struc-
	
ture, and propulsion that would lead to greater fuel efficiency, 	 a
lower noise, greater utility, and lower operating costs. In most of
these technologies the United States still enjoys a lead. However,
that lead is shrinking and competitors possess the skills and com-
mitment to challenge its leadership in virtually every field. The
likely increase, noted in this report, of cooperative international
arrangements for the design and production of aircraft in order to
spread risks, gain market access, and obtain capital will expand
the potential for more rapid diffusion of technology. This ap-
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proach appears to be advantageous far the United States, If It
continues to support research consistently at an adequate level.
The development of new aeronautical technology Involves long
lead times, large expenditures, and massive facilities. Thus, the
actions and decisions that could lead to a deterioration in the U.S.
position might well be taken many years before their conse-
quences become visible. Maintaining momentum In the effective
aeronautical R&D complex that Includes NASA, DOD, private
industry, and to some extent, the FAA, Is crucial to continued
U.S. technological leadership. NASA is the linchpin in that
complex. No other organization possesses the charter, public
acceptance, resources, or capabilities to support such long-term,
high-risk, expensive R&D.
The relative priority assigned to NASA aeronautics versus
space technology is of particular concern. Aeronautical R&D has
diminished since the start of the space program. This study ques-
tions whether present priorities reflect appropriately the relative
strategic, economic, and social importance of aviation compared
with that of space.
A second concern addresses the question of a gap in the flow
from basic research to product development. NASA conducts
basic and applied research and technology development in key
areas of science and engineering. Private companies incorporate
properly validated new technology Into new aircraft. The crucial
step of technology validation, including exposure of risk under
flight or simulated flight conditions, represents at present a
weakness in the sequence. The work is long-term, expensive,
risky, and generic in character. NASA's charter recognizes its
role in this phase, but it is not now being pursued in a manner to
sustain national competitive advantage. The panel recommends
that the entire validation process be reexamined.
ACHIEVING SYNERGY BETWEEN
NATIONAL. SECURITY AND CIVIL AVIATION
This study has called attention repeatedly to the close linkage
between national security and civil aviation. The skills and capa-
bilitles required for production of civil and military aircraft are,
to a large extent, common. This applies not only to the more
obvious assembly of completed aircraft, but more particularly to
the massive infrastructure of thousands of firms that supply
materials, components, parts, etc. The design and manufacture of
civil aircraft challenges the assemblage of technical skills of
design and production teams, and manufacture of civil aircraft
helps keep such teams in a high state of readiness and shares
payment of their overhead with military programs.
mY'
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Conversely, of curse, advances in military technology have
often found use in civil aircraft. For many years the interests of
military and civil )t' , icurement tended to move in parallel, and
little thought or e^lort was required to insure continued synergy.
The situation is changing. DOD is sponsoring the launching of
fewer new aircraft, and its interests in pushing the state of tech-
R	 nology have focused on high-speed combat aircraft. For Its needs
in support aircraft, it is continuing Its practice of buying
off-the-shelf technology.
Reinstituting careful consideration of dual-use requirements
between military and civil applications, especially in support air-
craft, could have helpful leverage for all classes of aircraft
included In this study. Timing the procurement of military air-
craft so as not to exacerbate the large swings in production that
characterize the industry could also be helpful, but the panel
recognizes the practical barriers to this goal.
MANAGING IN THE NEW ENVIRONMENT
The changes occurring in both the domestic and international
environments pose some severe challenges for the management of
civil aircraft development and manufacturing. As noted, histori-
cally the large air transport manufacturers have excelled at pro-
ducing technically proficient aircraft that were well matched to
market needs. Although it sold and serviced airplanes worldwide,
the industry operated from an exceedingly powerful domestic base
and faced little foreign competition in any markets. It dealt with
a short list of customers whose characteristics were well known
and who handled the financing of their own purchases.
In the environment that is emerging, the domestic manufac-
turers face potentially powerful competition, increasingly impor-
tant international markets, and both domestic and foreign cus-
tomers with uncertain futures and shaky financial resources.
As this study has indicated, additional technical opportunities
are still present for important advances in technology. These
technical advances will provide significant improvements in the
eco;tomdc performance of air transports. They will, however,
require very large investments to bring the technology to the
state of readiness necessary for incorporating It into new products.
The major consequences of these emerging trends are that the
manufacturers are having to move from a position of strongly
autonomous operation to one of complex interdependence.
The panel perceives four important challenges for man-
agement:
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1. Developing an approach to managing the introduction of
new technology that will spread the high cost and risk among
par t'^ ,r3 to an extent that goes beyond the traditional contractor-
subcontractor relationship.
2. Becoming participants in complex arrangements with
customers, banks, other financial institutions, and insurers to
develop new financial instruments and arrangements that will
spread risk adequately to permit purchase of needed new aic craft.
3. Moving from a position of global preeminence to one of
senior partnership with international partners--a change that will
require sensitivity to new cultural and national nuances.
4. Achieving the necessary selectivity to maintain domi-
nance in strategic technologies in a world where total dominance
across the board is no longer possible--or even desirable, i.e.,
retaining the overall U.S. lead in a situation of complex part-
nership with foreign firms.
In all of these areas, U.S. manufacturers are demonstrating
irnpre:., sive flexibility and drive, but the necessary responses have
just begun. Furthermore, the needed changes will be controver-
sial because they will raise questions in the eyes of the public
regarding loss of technology and displacement of American
workers that cannot be answered definitively in advance.
The challenge for the manufacturers of the other classes of
aircraft is more direct. They face the more immediate threat of
international competition in both domestic and international
markets, and thry do not occupy the position of global dominance
enjoyed by manu4acturers of large transports. Furthermore, until
recently they faced little in the way of competition. Conse-
quently, they have had little exposure to the exigencies created
by facing new, well-designed products in their markets.
The managements of these companies seem destined to feel
severe pressure for many years. They have the advantage and
challenge of retaining a domestic market that will continue to
dominate in scale the world's markets. Historically, the relation-
ship between these companies and the government has been
remote--the companies saw little need to seek government help
and the government was not set up to serve them anyway. That
situation is changing. The government is now positioned to pro-
vide assistance on trade--on terms of sale of exports, restraints
on imports by other countries, or unfair trade practices by inter- 	 R
national competitors. Less positive are the unintended or under-
weighted effects of government policies that tend to inhibit
exports. It is important for both industry and government V^
develop even closer and more effective interactions on these
problems.
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MANAGING HUMAN RESOURCES
The lL: ge swings in employment in this industry are cause for
concern. In addition to the human cost associated with such cycli-
cal employment, the Instability threatens the long
-term capability
of the skilled technical and production teams that have been
assembled.
It is apparent that our International competitors, most of
whom receive substantial government support, place a higher
	 jpriority on providb
-ig stable employment than it is possible for
individual U.S. aircraft manufacturers to provide.
Three problems need urgent attention:
s
• Retirement security-
-accruing pension benefits that are not
tied solely to the fortunes of individual companies.
• Unemployment--seeking to ameliorate the severe periodicjob loss.
• Training--allowing workers to develop new skills required by
advancement in technology and to share equitably in the fruits of
technology.
NOTE
1. International Competition in Advanced 7
Decisions for America, Panel on Advanced '
i^ompetition an the Industrialized Allies, National
Council, National Academy Press, 1983, pp. 5-6.
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This report on the civil aviation manufacturing industry is one of seven
Industry-specific studies (listed below) that were conducted by the Committee on
Technology and International Economic and Trade Issues. "...[T]hese reports
constitute a praiseworthy though controversial undertaking by the National
Academy of Engineering, for they go far beyond strict issues of engineering.
Instead ... they offer detailed assessments of competitive standing and, more to
the point, of the extent to which that standing depends on technological mastery
of one sort or another." Alan M. Kantro :v, Harvard Business Review.
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International Com etition in Advanced Technolo 	 Decisions for
merica ". . should help mob:llze Government support for the
nation ls slipping technological and international trade position...."
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